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This thesis examines Bernard Stiegler’s revivification of the technologies of 
the self as an alternative to technologies of psychopower. It discusses the relevance of 
care as the exercise of freedom in the age of new media, which is seemingly reinforcing 
structures of control and surveillance. 
 
The task of this thesis is twofold. It first offers a critical engagement with 
Stiegler’s argument for the necessity of developing an aesthetics of the self, which I 
propose to do through a discussion of Jean-Paul Sartre and Michel Foucault. Second, 
the thesis aims to show the limits of Stiegler’s technologization of the socio-cultural 
malaise we are confronted with. This will be principally done with the works of Sherry 
Turkle, Alexander Galloway and Wendy Hui Kyong Chun.  
 
Stiegler proposes to reinstall practices of care at the core of human existence 
in order to minimise or escape the effects of psychopower. By psychopower, Stiegler 
understands the massive exploitation of consciousnesses currently facilitated by new 
media. I show that a reading of Sartre is necessary to understand the political resonance 
of this stance insofar as they both locate the possibility of freedom within the structures 
of consciousness. I then contrast Stiegler’s reading of care with Foucault’s to stress 
that the existential crisis diagnosed by Stiegler is a technological problem which has 
an aesthetic effect and deserves political attention.  
 
I argue, however, that Stiegler’s emphasis on the disastrous reality of 
psychopower, influenced by his reading of Foucault, leads him to overestimate the 
actual power of structures of control.  
 
Through a comparison of his work with Turkle’s, I show that they both portray, 
in their own way, technologies as the mirror of the human and thus assume an effective 
correspondence between technologies and the human. I then contend, by means of 
Galloway’s work, that Stiegler’s reduction of technology to its capacity to produce, 
diffuse and order meaning does not allow technology to be anything else than a 
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message. Finally, I stress with the work of Chun that this conflation of the message 
with the medium, already criticized by Galloway, has led, among other things, to the 
conflation of freedom with its technological application and may contribute to 
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INTRODUCTION 
 





Towards a Politics of (Self)-Consciousness: 
 
 
In What Makes Life Worth Living and in Taking Care of Youth and the 
Generations, Bernard Stiegler argues for the revivification of care as a means to fight 
against, or escape, the current strategies of power embodied in mass media 
technologies and the marketing industries. This thesis intends to reunite the works of 
Jean-Paul Sartre and Michel Foucault in order to examine the political relevance of the 
development of an aesthetics of the self in the age of new media, as proposed by 
Stiegler. Though Sartre, Foucault and Stiegler are coming from different philosophical 
backgrounds, I argue overall that their views complete one another. All three have, in 
their own way, acknowledged the importance of cultivating a relationship with oneself 
in order to preserve and consolidate a form of meaningful existence. We owe to 
Stiegler the emphasis on technics, to Foucault the focus on power relations, and to 
Sartre, his conception of the aesthetics of the self as the exercise of freedom. I intend 
to show that a reading of Stiegler’s work in conjunction with Foucault’s and Sartre’s 
is crucial to fully understand the necessity to develop what Stiegler calls a politics of 
consciousness1.  
 
Stiegler argues that we are going through a generational malaise which is 
characterized by “the loss of the feeling of existing”2 — an expression Stiegler borrows 
from the infamous case of Richard Durn3.This claim caught my attention and therefore 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Bernard Stiegler, Philosophising by Accident: Interviews with Élie During, ed. and trans. Benoît Dillet 
(Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2017) p.78 
2 see the introduction of Bernard Stiegler, What Makes Life Worth Living: on pharmacology, trans. 
Daniel Ross (Cambridge: Polity Press 2013) 
3 Richard Durn opened fire in 2002 at the end of a council meeting in Nanterre before committing 
suicide while being interrogated by the police. In a letter, Durn confesses having “lost the feeling of 
existing”. The example of Richard Durn is symptomatic of the period of disenchantment and (self)-
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constitutes the departure point of my thesis. Though short and simple in appearance, 
Stiegler’s affirmation needs to be further unpacked in the order to understand the 
direction of his project. This will therefore be the object of this introduction. In the 
face of Stiegler’s claim, two questions may legitimately arise: what is existence and 
what is this feeling that Stiegler talks about?  
 
For convenience, let us assume that we are speaking of human existence and 
restrict our understanding to the human without discarding the possibility that other 
entities may or do ek-sist. Briefly put, to exist is to be endowed with transcendence. A 
thinker like Sartre insists that human beings are always in the making for they have no 
preceding essence, no fixed substance or given properties. He thus makes the 
distinction between the in-itself (en-soi) and the for-itself (pour-soi), the former 
designating a mode of being which is full and self-identical, whereas the latter 
corresponds to a mode of existence that is necessarily engaged in the world for the 
very reason that it is incomplete and open-ended. Hence, Sartre argues that while other 
entities live in the realm of immanence (the in-itself) insofar as they simply are what 
they are, human beings also exist for-themselves. Indeed, the human’s lack of essence 
condemns her to find alternatives and means of compensation. Said otherwise, this 
ontological deficiency forces her to engage in strategies of diversion or sublimation to 
forget, fulfil or simply cope with that fundamental absence. Hence, to exist is to be 
caught in a quest for self-coincidence. In this respect, Sartre writes that what is 
characteristic of the human is that it is what it is not and is not what it is4. Behind this 
obscure claim lies the broader idea that to exist is to be condemned to have no other 
essence that the one we construct for ourselves which is always outside of ourselves.  
 
For his part, Stiegler affirms in the first volume of Technics and Time that the 
human’s lack of essence constitutes in fact its prosthetic character. To be more precise, 
Stiegler claims that humans have no origin, that is, no natural essence. Hence, humans 
do not and cannot find being inside themselves but outside themselves. This leads 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
disgust contemporary societies are going through: it the distressing feeling that life is not worth living, 
and it is precisely what Stiegler wishes to combat in reintroducing care. 
4 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans. Hazel 
Barnes (New York, London, Toronto, Sidney, Tokyo, Singapor: Washington Square Press, 1956) p.112 
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Stiegler to affirm that we are what we become5, insofar as human beings must 
compensate for their lack of essential qualities in interiorizing the skills and attributes 
they lack. In this respect, humans are nothing less than the internalization of external 
elements, so that what grounds the transcendence of existence is the accumulation of 
acquired experiences. This empirical exteriority, which Stiegler calls ‘technics’, is 
constitutive of the human, who, by definition, is a technical being. To put it more 
succinctly; we exist in and through technics6 and our existence is made possible by 
technics. Conversely, we cannot not be technical. While it is not the intention of this 
thesis to claim that Stiegler is Sartrean, two things must be taken in consideration at 
this stage. Firstly, Stiegler comes close to Sartre in claiming that humans do not 
possess a fixed essence, and secondly, Stiegler adopts the same move as his 
predecessor in suggesting that this absence of nature is constitutive of freedom, for it 
allows and condemns humans to act out in the world7.  
 
But what have we learnt so far in relation to the so-called loss of the feeling of 
existing? We have learnt that the human’s default8 of being is a fact and that this 
ontological default (or originary lack) generates existence. As such, it is important to 
stress that Stiegler’s claim could not possibly be about the collapse of existence, for 
he argues that we never cease to exist.  
 
If we go back to our reading of What Makes Life Worth Living, Stiegler writes 
further down in the text that the loss of the feeling of existing shall in fact be 
understood as the loss of the feeling that “life is worth living9”. Read from this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Bernard Stiegler, Philosophising by Accident: Interviews with Élie During, ed. and trans. by Benoît 
Dillet (Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2017) p.48 
6 see the introduction of Stiegler and Technics, eds. Gerald Moore and Christina Howells (Edinburgh; 
Edinburgh University Press, 2013) 
7 Christina Howells, ‘‘Le défaut d’origine: The Prosthetic Constitution of Love and Desire’, in Stiegler 
and Technics, eds. Christina Howells and Gerald Moore (Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press,2013) 
p.139 
8 Stiegler uses the term “default” to refer to the human’s lack of origin. Default/défaut (which appears 
sometimes as de-fault in the English translation) also means “failure”, “mistake”, “deficiency” or 
“defect”. Richard Beardsworth and George Collins write in a footnote to the first volume of Technics 
and Time: “The concept défaut in fact marks a strategy in Stiegler's work which addresses, through the 
concomitant reflection on the originary relation between the technical and the human, the question of 
finitude within and across diverse fields of human thought and practice”.  See footnote, Bernard Stiegler, 
Technics and Time: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. Richard Beardsworth and George Collins (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press 1998) p.280 
9 Bernard Stiegler, What Makes Life Worth Living: on pharmacology, trans. Daniel Ross (Cambridge: 
Polity Press 2013) p.4 
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perspective, one could answer that if the generational malaise pointed out by Stiegler 
does not concern the collapse of existence, it may well concern that of values, as the 
presence of the word “worth” suggests. One would have every reason to believe so; 
Stiegler has on many occasions built his argument around the worldwide adoption of 
American values, spread by, according to him, the compelling aura of Hollywood, to 
point at the uniformization and the subsequent impoverishment of culture. The 
Americanization of the world, says Stiegler, has led to the synchronization (or 
uniformization) of thought and therefore to its decline, insofar as thought can only be 
renewed, stimulated and displaced through a diachronic exchange, that is, through 
alterity. As such, the effects of globalization are disastrous because alterity is 
progressively effaced and diversity eliminated10. What is at stake with globalization is 
the fact that the United States stands out in the political game as “the lone global 
superpower11” which seems to have no serious opponents. This last point may be 
debatable12, but Stiegler argues overall that the political agenda of the United States of 
America is to ideologically and psychologically dominate Europe and other parts of 




During the 1930s and 1940s America used cinema, as it continues to do today, as an instrument 
of psychological, ideological, and commercial warfare. In this war of images, in the course of 
which America was also struggling against German Nazism and then Soviet communism, its 
goal was to ensure that the entire world would adopt the American Way of Life. Adopting this 
lifestyle meant behavior modification and revised representations, consumption habits, and 
relational models, making the entire world “vibrate” in expectation of a carefully structured 
story (in numerous installments), from Gone with the Wind to Apollo IJ by way of Chaplin's 
Little Tramp, the Western, Ronald Reagan, and Dances with Wolves: the adventures of 
American cinema. Beginning with Hollywood images, then with multi-episode television 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise, trans. by Stephen 
Barker (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011) p.116 
11 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise, trans. by Stephen 
Barker (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011) p.116 
12 Nowadays, the United States may find in China a serious rival, for example. But in Stiegler’s defence, 
I am here referring to the claims he made in the third volume of Technics and Time, originally published 
in 2001. 
13 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise, trans. Stephen 
Barker (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011) p.116 
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In this respect, cinema plays a crucial role as an apology of consumerism and 
more largely of democratic liberalism. With the rise of the cinematic age (which 
includes cinema and more largely new media technologies), capitalism seems to have 
left the domain of finance to regulate not simply the market, but various aspects of 
culture. In other words, it has become a lifestyle and, more problematically, a system 
of thought. It has penetrated the libidinal, argues Stiegler, to channel and manipulate 
desires. For Stiegler, such cultural capitalism is dangerous for it reduces symbols to 
effects and turns brands into new symbols. By symbols, Stiegler means objects, icons 
and other kind of supports that sediment and contribute to the diffusion of social and 
cultural memory14 15.This phenomenon is characteristic of what he calls symbolic 
misery. Such regressive aesthetics, Stiegler says, constitute a major cultural crisis 
insofar as individuals, and more specifically children who are more vulnerable to the 
effects of images, are encouraged to identify themselves “not with parents, nation or 
any idealized object but with merchandise and brand names16”. Consumerist values 
vampirise individuals and contribute to the loss of individuation, insofar as brands and 
merchandises are not capable of transmitting meaningful symbols 17. The individual is 
reduced to its function of consumer, accumulating objects which in turn only intensify 
his or her sensation of emptiness. The reason for this is that these objects are not 
designed to resonate with the wants of ontological singularity but satisfy the demands 
of particularity; as such they do not target persons but profiles. In this situation of 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Bernard Stiegler, Taking Care of Youth and the Generations, trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2010) p.6 
15 In a more specific way, Stiegler defines the symbol as the “secondary and tertiary retentions of the 
‘We’”. Secondary retentions refer to the individual’s memory, that is, the recollection of past 
experiences, whereas tertiary retentions such as the alphabet, the book or a gramophone are the 
externalization of memory in traces and objects. Tertiary retentions enable the transmission of symbols 
for example. As such, Stiegler consider them to be symbolic media.  
Bernard Stiegler, Philosophising by Accident: Interviews with Élie During, ed. and trans. Benoît Dillet 
(Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2017) p.87-88. 
16 Bernard Stiegler, Taking Care of Youth and the Generations, trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2010) p.62 
17 To better understand the correlation between symbols, ideals objects and the formation of the 
individual, one will need to dig further to Stiegler’s account of psychoanalysis, which I will cover more 
specifically in the chapter dedicated on Turkle. 
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Having said all this, Stiegler’s argument does not simply revolve around the 
collapse of meaningful values, but unpacks the consequences of this shift for the 
formation of the self. Indeed, what seems to worry Stiegler is the impossibility for us 
to appropriate our identity insofar as it has become the object of commercial targeting. 
The standardization of values and habits, he argues, leads to a standardization of modes 
of individuation. On a larger scale, it appears that what Stiegler deplores is the lethal 
homogenization of subjectivity. Yet the loss of the feeling of existing is a claim about 
existence, not about the subject or subjectivity; existence does not simply equate to 
subjecthood. Stiegler is not trying to revivify the classical notion of the subject as an 
abstract philosophical category, for example. His interest lies elsewhere. To better 
understand his contribution, let me go back to the problem of Americanization. 
Stiegler claims that American-led globalization homogenizes modes of identity 
formation and produces a false sense of cohesion through the glorification of 
merchandise. Yet, one could reply that such stance is not particularly new or original, 
and may even well appear as a bit of a cliché. In fact, Stiegler’s account of the 
industrialization/marketization of culture finds a strong resonance with what the 
Frankfurt School has denounced as the culture industry. Adorno explains for example 
that mass culture is supported by industries of entertainment which aim to amuse their 
audiences. As such, mass culture, far from being benign, has toxic effects on 
individuals because it encourages social regression through the excessive consumption 
of goods that are designed to respond to consumer needs. For Adorno, the fetishization 
of the object leads to the to the dissolution of the subject. In this respect, entertainment 
is a hollow ideology that feeds on despair18.  
 
  
At this stage, one may be puzzled about the necessity to bring the contributions of the 
Frankfurt School into the discussion, insofar as this thesis concerns Sartre, Foucault 
and Stiegler and that I haven’t yet justified the relevance of their presence. I am doing 
it because Stiegler is confronted with the same criticism I have just pinpointed, namely, 
that his view does not seem to differ from what has already been formulated by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, 
trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford California; Stanford University Press, 2002) p.123 
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Horkheimer and Adorno.  In a series of interviews with Élie During, Stiegler defends 
his position as follows: 
What limits Horkheimer and Adorno’s analysis is that in denouncing the process of the 
technical exteriorisation of the imagination, they fail to explain why consciousness can be so 
highly penetrated and controlled by the unfolding of a movie or a temporal object in general19. 
In order to better express the significance of the “temporal object20” on the 
psychological formation of the individual, Stiegler finds it crucial to go back to 
Husserl. The latter has demonstrated that a temporal object is “one whose flow 
coincides with the flux of consciousness” and that “only exists with the passage of 
time21”. A melody is a temporal object for example and is “woven of retentions and 
protentions22”. Consciousness functions through a dual retentional and protentional 
dynamic. The retentional process consists in conserving elements (notes or images for 
example) in the now of consciousness, whereas protentions are “the anticipation of the 
unity of conditions of the flux still to come23”.  To put it more simply, retentions form 
a ‘just past’ that grounds the possibility of a future24. As such, retentions and 
protentions are essential in the fabricating of the present. The main problem, argues 
Stiegler, is that “today, the flux of consciousness of which we are constituted 
increasingly follows the rhythms and warp of mass-produced temporal objects25”.  
 
Hence, the loss of the feeling of existing is not just symptomatic of the 
dissolution of subjectivity, but of something more profound which is that of the 
generalized synchronization of the temporal flow of consciousnesses26.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Bernard Stiegler, Philosophising by Accident: Interviews with Élie During, ed. and trans. Benoît Dillet 
(Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2017) p.96 
20 Bernard Stiegler, Philosophising by Accident: Interviews with Élie During, ed. and trans. Benoît Dillet 
(Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2017) p.96 
21 Bernard Stiegler, Philosophising by Accident: Interviews with Élie During, ed. and trans. Benoît Dillet 
(Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2017) p.96 
22 Bernard Stiegler, Philosophising by Accident: Interviews with Élie During, ed. and trans. Benoît Dillet 
(Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2017) p.96 
23 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise, trans. Stephen 
Barker (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011) p.59 
24 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise, trans. Stephen 
Barker (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011) p.44 
25 Bernard Stiegler, Philosophising by Accident: Interviews with Élie During, ed. and trans. Benoît Dillet 
(Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2017) p.97 
26 Bernard Stiegler, Philosophising by Accident: Interviews with Élie During, ed. and trans. Benoît Dillet 
(Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2017) p.97 
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However, Stiegler has not yet explained why the synchronization of 
consciousnesses is problematic. Having mentionned Husserl and the key role of 
consciousness in the formation of the individual, one may have a clearer idea of how 
I intend to insert Sartre in the map. Stiegler explains that in order to fight the 
standardization of the retentional and protentional processes of consciousness, which 
concerns more largely the uniformization of imagination and memory, we need to 
develop a politics of consciousness. In other words, we need to find the tool to 
reappropriate the conditions of our psychological formation. Here lies indeed the 
whole perversity of what Stiegler calls psychopower; mass media are not simply 
influencing the desires, tastes and dreams of the already-formed individual, they are 
conditioning the very structures of psychic life that enables the formation of identity.  
Hence, Stiegler argues that technologies of psychopower, in targeting consciousness, 
are dislodging the very possibility of human freedom27. As he argues: “freedom is the 
act of consciousness par excellence28”.  In this respect, Stiegler does sound very 
Sartrean. Like Sartre, Stiegler also suggests that it is because freedom is always 
threatened and yet irreducible to the human, that one must cultivate a relationship with 
oneself. However, Stiegler does not mention Sartre and though he seems to present 
freedom as both an ontological necessity and a duty to achieve, he does not explicitly 
and fully elaborate on that. The theme of freedom is present in his work as its subtext 
or discussed hastily for the demands of an interview, but is not tackled at length by 
Stiegler. One of the possible reasons for that may be Stiegler’s reluctance to put back 
a self-determining consciousness at the center of his work. For Stiegler, the formation 
of consciousness is enabled and depends on technics. To privilege the role of 
consciousness in the transcendent formation of the individual would be taking the risk 
to return to a humanistic vision of the subject as the measure of all things. Yet, Stiegler 
is clear. We are not the masters of our own consciousness, which is the very reason 
why we must take care of that consciousness. The importance of care will be developed 
later in this thesis. At this stage, suffice to say that Stiegler does acknowledge the 
fundamental role of consciousness in the exercise of human freedom, even though the 
transcendantality of consciousness relies on a prior empirical base which is that of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Bernard Stiegler, Philosophising by Accident: Interviews with Élie During, ed. and trans. Benoît Dillet 
(Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2017) p.77 
28 Bernard Stiegler, Philosophising by Accident: Interviews with Élie During, ed. and trans. Benoît Dillet 
(Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2017) p.77 
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technics29. The purpose of the chapter on Sartre, which will initiate my inquiry, is to 
develop what Stiegler’s work has not developed so far: the necessity of freedom as a 
fact to be recognized and a goal to be pursued. My intention is not to point out one of 
Sartre’s possible successes to better emphasizes one of Stiegler’s failures. Instead, I 
am implying that a Sartrean legacy is already in effect in Stiegler’s work. In other 
words, I suggest that it is worth shedding light upon this legacy as it would enable 
Stiegler to make a stronger connection between human freedom and the political urge 
of reinvesting our identity.  
 
Stiegler and Foucault: An Archaeology of Reflexivity 
 
With the inclusion of Husserl and Sartre, it seems so far that I am going down 
a phenomenological route, which may be enriching on some level but seems 
completely at odds with Foucault’s project. This difficulty is what I would like to 
address now. I will also momentarily leave aside ontological considerations on 
existence, as I believe that this has been sufficiently elucidated so far, to turn to the 
question of feeling.  
Foucault’s work is said to have gone through three significant periods. The 
archaeological period starts from 1963 to 1969 and notably includes The Archeology 
of Knowledge, The Birth of the Clinic and The Order of Things. The genealogical 
period encompasses the body of work produced between 1970 and 1976 such as The 
Order of Discourse, Discipline and Punish and the first volume of The History of 
Sexuality. The last period which starts from 1984 and is much more controversial, 
focuses on the history of subjectivity and includes the two following volumes of The 
History of Sexuality. For personal convenience, I am not going to mention the fourth 
volume (Les aveux de la chair) that has just been published in February 2018 by 
Gallimard. Considering that Foucault was against posthumous publication30, it is 
unclear to me how and to what extent this work should fit in his overall project and if 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Stephen Barker, ‘Techno-pharmaco-genealogy’, in Stiegler and Technics, eds. Christina Howells and 
Gerald Moore (Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press,2013) p.268 
30 Stuart Elden, ‘Review: Michel Foucault, Histoire de La Sexualité 4: Les Aveux de La Chair’, Theory, 
Culture & Society, 35 (2018) 293–311 
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it can be considered as a canon. To go back to my chronological account of Foucault, 
I would add that while the archaeological and genealogical inquiries implied the 
examination of specific periods of History such as the Middle Ages and the 19th 
century, Foucault’s later interest for the subject brought him back to the Greco-Roman 
Antiquity. This shift has puzzled many scholars and seems to stand in contradiction 
with the critical project that Foucault has developed so far. Let me explain this point 
further. 
 In his archaeological period, Foucault intended to question the conditions of 
possibility of knowledge, hence renewing the Kantian question, while at the same time, 
taking his distance from Kant. The question of the conditions of the possibility of 
knowledge, argues Foucault, cannot be answered with Kantian terms insofar as Kant 
starts from the perspective of human faculties, that is, the schematism31, and therefore 
cannot escape the anthropological account of knowledge. Foucault attempts to correct 
Kant’s mistake by putting the stress on the historical a priori as the new definer of the 
conditions of possibility for knowledge to form itself according to an epoch. Hence, 
Foucault adopts an anti-humanistic discourse insofar as he rejects the subject (whether 
empirical or transcendental) as the key founder of experience32. Archeology comes 
close to phenomenology insofar as the latter challenges Kantian idealism which 
grounds the possibility of experience in the pre-existence of pure categories. The 
phenomenological method achieves this through its conception of the intentionality of 
consciousness which states that consciousness is always the consciousness of 
something. This means that consciousness is necessarily transcendent and tied with 
the exteriority of the object. Foucault’s archaeology takes issue with phenomenology, 
especially that of Husserl, for it still takes the I of consciousness as its main departure 
point. But not every phenomenologist assumes the existence of a transcendental ego 
in the manner of the late Husserl. In fact, Sartre will be critical of Husserl for this 
precise reason. Yet, Foucault believes that phenomenology cannot completely break 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 The schema is the unification of understanding and intuition, which is achieved independently from 
experience. For Kant, mathematics and geometry provides a convincing model for schematism as the 
possibility to formulate synthetic a priori judgments, that is, ideal forms of reasoning. It is to assume 
innate rational/cognitive faculties to the human. Stiegler tackles the issue by showing, for example, that 
mental calculation is originally possible by counting on one’s fingers, the same way the slave in Plato’s 
Meno first makes sense of a geometrical form by tracing a figure in the sand. Hence, even our innermost 
rational faculties (such as the intuition of time and space) depend on technics.  
32 see Beatrice Han, Foucault’s Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the Historical, trans. 
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away from the transcendental subject. Hence, the archeological method intends to 
historicize as much as possible this transcendental residue.  
The genealogical inquiry intends for its part to continue the critical question of 
Kant in examining the production of regimes of truths and the effects of power in the 
constitution of knowledge. Once again, the subject remains subordinated to the 
discursive. For example, Beatrice Han summarizes Foucault’s journey as the “passage 
from an archaeological interrogation of the conditions under which a subject can speak 
the truth, to the genealogical claim that truth is per se the major condition of possibility 
for the construction of the self as subject33”. In this respect, the object of Foucault’s 
genealogical inquiry seems now to be double for it both analyzes the conditions of 
possibility for truth to be produced and the effects of these games of truth. But 
Foucault’s work takes a new turn when he decides to explore the ethics of 
subjectivation. This sudden interest goes against the archaeo-genealogical approach of 
his earlier investigations34.  Indeed, subjectivation (in contrast with the disciplinary 
mode of subjection) refers to the reflective elaboration of the self in which the subject 
is understood as spontaneously free and self-constitutive. It did not take long for 
Foucault scholars to sense a major difficulty, which is the following: to present the 
subject as self-constitutive is to assume the existence of an originary selfhood. Put 
otherwise, it is to make the subject the agent of her own creation. As such, this position 
reactivates the conceptual viability of transcendental subjectivity that one has already 
encountered in Kant’s subject of apperception or in Husserl’s transcendental ego of 
consciousness. Yet, as has been mentioned, Foucault’s archaeo-genealogy has put a 
lot of efforts into coming to terms with transcendental subjectivity.  
 
This paradox of the process of self-constitution by the self is largely known 
and has been notably tackled by Deleuze35. What I would like to suggest for my part 
is that Foucault’s insistence on the relation to oneself can elucidate the notion of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Beatrice Han, Foucault’s Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the Historical, trans. 
Edward Pile (Stanford, California; Stanford University Press, 2002) p.10 
34  Peter dews, ‘The return of the subject in late Foucault’, Radical Philosophy (spring 1989), pp. 37- 
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35 Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, trans. Sean Hand, Minneapolis (London: University of Minnesota Press, 
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feeling that Stiegler is talking about. Indeed, Foucault’s examination of the Greco-
Roman practices of subjectivation “reveals the structure of the relationship of 
recognition36” as the key element to the process of identification. As such self-
constitution does not start with a prior self, but more specifically, with a reflexive 
relation, essential to the process of subjectivation. Hence, the cultivation of this 
reflexive relation is at the center of the ethics of care. The fact that Stiegler refers to 
the late Foucault, that is, the Foucault who has put the relation to oneself at the center 
of his research, is not innocent or accidental. It proves that what Stiegler understands 
as the loss of the feeling of existing is the loss of the self-reflexive relation to oneself 
which is essential to the practice of care, that is, the process of individuation. Though 
Stiegler uses the word feeling, he is not talking about an emotion or a sentiment. He is 
hinting at our very capacity to connect with ourselves, to be capable of self-awareness. 
 
 
Stiegler’s philosophy of technics borrows a lot from the phenomenological 
method, but also flirts with anthropology and sociology. The aim, as Stiegler puts it, 
is to develop and archaeology of reflexivity37. Like Foucault, Stiegler finds himself 
confronted with the transcendental perspective, which he intends to surpass, not just 
in historicizing, but also in technicizing the process of subjectivation. Hence, if Stiegler 
puts a certain emphasis on consciousness, the individual and the necessity of freedom, 
he also bypasses the problem of pure transcendentalism in transposing the 
transcendental onto the empirical basis of technics38. To be more precise, Stiegler’s 
key contribution in relation to Sartre and Foucault is to claim that consciousness itself 
is always already technical. As such, the history of subjectivity always implies at its 
very core the history of technics39 insofar as the two are concomitant.  However, it is 
technics that allows the emergence of the conscious human, not the reverse.  
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 In this thesis, Foucault appears as an intermediary who enables me to draw 
connections between Sartre and Stiegler from the angle of the aesthetics of self-
constitution. If Sartre put the stress on freedom as the necessary departure point of the 
project of existence, Foucault displaces the issue in turning the aesthetics of existence 
into a practice of power in which freedom appears as its normative derivative.  
 
I will show in the first chapter that Sartre’s reading of self-therapeutics, though 
enlightening on many aspects, fails to fully detach itself from an egological enterprise 
in which the other is a threat to one’s spiritual conversion. In the second chapter, I will 
point out that Foucault’s positive acknowledgement of the co-expansion of the 
individual and her social environment throws the aesthetics of existence into the 
political domain and locates the possibility of self-formation not in the subject herself 
but in the surrounding network of the individual in which the latter is complicit. The 
third chapter will be dedicated to Stiegler’s philosophy of technics and will offer a 
particular focus on his reappropriation of Foucault’s work. Stiegler presents the 
disciplinary power of old institutions as a viable system of care insofar as the 
institutional model (such as the school) enables the intergenerational transmission of 
knowledge and consolidates a sentiment of community, essential to the process of 
individuation. In this respect, Stiegler’s account of care differs from Foucault’s insofar 
as he explicitly turns the ethos of self-formation into an educative measure dependant 
on the institutional model of the school and in which the adults assume the 
responsibility to take care of the younger generation. Overall, Stiegler suggests that 
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A Paranoid Model of Psychopower?  
 
Here are the key points to remember; for Stiegler it is not so much that we do 
not exist, that we cease to exist or that we are not capable of producing new forms of 
existence, insofar as it is not existence itself that is lost but its feeling. Hence, the loss 
of the feeling of existing is not symptomatic of a collapse of existence, nor is it collapse 
of selfhood or subjectivity, but a collapse of self-awareness. As such, the challenge is 
to restore a self-reflexive relation with oneself and to fight against the destructive side 
of technologies that have plunged individuals into a critical state of disaffection. 
Stiegler thus proposes to reactivate care as a technique of the self and as a new 
disciplinary norm.  
 
While the first part of this thesis will show sympathy to Stiegler’s ethico-
political appropriation of care as a meaningful technique of existence, it will be the 
aim of the second part to point out the limits of such argument, which offers an unfair 
account of new media technologies. Hence, after having explained in what the loss of 
the feeling of existing consists for Stiegler, I would like to focus on its cause, namely, 
psychopower.  Stiegler writes: 
The future of the planet must be thought from the question of psychopower characteristic of 
control societies, the effects of which have become massive and destructive. Globalized 
psychopower is the systematic organization of the capture of attention made possible by the 
psychotechnologies that have developed with radio (1920), television (1950) and digital 
technologies (1990). It has spread across the surface of the planet via several forms of 
networks, producing a constant industrial channeling of attention, and resulting in a new 
phenomenon: a massive destruction of attention, referred to by nosologists in the United States 
as 'attention deficit disorder'. This destruction of attention is a particular, and particularly 
severe, case of the destruction of libidinal energy through which the capitalist libidinal 
economy is destroying itself41.  
 
As one may already suspect, Stiegler’s model of psychopower echoes directly 
to Foucault’s conception of biopower. While biopower designates the institutional 
apparatuses aiming at the government of bodies, psychopower refers to a set of mass 
media and marketing strategies which intend to penetrate the structures of psychic life. 
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Under the grip of psychopower, individuals are constituted as consumers42 and are not 
capable to appropriate their own freedom in the sense that freedom is before all a 
freedom to think43. Behind the worldwide adoption of consumerist values and the 
identification to commodities, Stiegler hints at a general attitude of irresponsibility and 
immaturity. To his mind, this mental state of disaffection is not simply encouraged but 
provoked by new technologies which are in turn subordinated by the exigencies of 
economic powers, that is, of capitalism as a whole. However, it is unclear if these 
economic powers act as a transversal or a supra-archaic force; if it is the source of 
psychopower or its effect.  
 
Though it seems from this angle that, for Stiegler, power originates already in 
power, and hence his philosophy appears to give rise despite itself to a metaphysics of 
power. I will explain later that it is this overestimation of the power of power that is 
precisely problematic and that needs to be deconstructed.  For the moment, I believe 
that it is important to note once again that for Stiegler, we are not simply confronted 
with cultural industries that are influencing, altering and modifying the individuation 
process; we are confronted with programming industries that are conditioning, 
configuring and manipulating the process of the inscription of subjectivity. Though 
we cannot escape this technical conditioning in virtue of our lack of essence, we must 
develop alternatives techniques of individuation in order not to be reduced to a 
consumer, a profile or a collection of data. This urge to find “new weapons44” is a 
direct reference to Deleuze’s ‘Postscript on Control Societies’ of which Stiegler’s two 
volumes of Symbolic Misery intend to be a form of continuation. I won’t have the 
opportunity to dig in further details Deleuze’s influence on Stiegler thought. Instead, 
I will trace back Stiegler’s account of control to Foucault’s understanding of panoptic 
power and show how the Foucauldian legacy has been received in the field of new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Sophie Fuggle, ‘Stiegler and Foucault: The politics of Care and Self-writing’, in Stiegler and 
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media, especially in the works of the three theorists I chose to examine, namely, Sherry 
Turkle, Alexander Galloway and Wendy Hui Kyong Chun.  
 
What differentiates Stiegler’s model of psychopower from Foucault’s 
biopower is the following: biopower intends to control the population as a “producing 
machine” while psychopower aims to control that population as a “consuming 
machine”45. In addition, strategies of biopower intend to model one’s behavior, 
whereas strategies of psychopower aim to create (or program) one’s motivations46. In 
both cases, we are dealing with an apparatus of control, which is invisible, sprawling 
and menacing. Yet, Stiegler’s portrayal of psychopower appears to me problematic for 
it is essentially conceived through the scope of control and (to a lesser extent) of 
surveillance. Such emphasis denotes not simply a Foucauldian influence, but a 
panoptical understanding of systems of control which is anachronistic and inaccurate. 
This point will be further elaborated at the beginning of the second half of the thesis.  
 
Though Stiegler suggests that Foucault’s model of biopower is insufficient to 
describe adequately the governance of the temporal flow of consciousness at play with 
the emergence of programming industries, he does not call into question his input on 
control and surveillance, as if the coupling of control and surveillance is condemned 
to remain an invariable principle in the paradigm of power. To be fair, Stiegler has 
expressed some doubts about the effectivity of control and has nuanced its magnitude; 
the synchronization of consciousnesses which leads to the standardization and 
regression of the collective psychic life, does not impact people in the same way or in 
the same degree. In other words, Stiegler suggests that the individual’s vulnerability 
to psychopower depends largely on her social background. Indeed, the world has 
become increasingly polarized between those who have access to culture and those 
who do not47. This point constitutes already in itself a major political problem. For the 
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purpose of this work I won’t dig further into this issue as this does not constitute the 
focal point of my argument. Yet, I would like to stress that, for Stiegler, a culture of 
singularities is still possible and in effect. Besides, Stiegler does not spontaneously use 
the term “surveillance” unless he is discussing Foucault’s conception of biopower and 
rather prefers the Deleuzian term of vigilance48. However, that does not make him less 
pessimistic in his account of psychopower, which he believes, will always have the 
final say in the battle for intelligence49. As such, psychopower remains a threat which 
is more or less efficient depending on the techniques of attention the individual has 
been exposed to so far, and control is still a fact to be dealt with.  
 
Though my thesis does not intend to minimize the political reality of 
psychopower, I am less assertive than Stiegler about the effectivity of the structures of 
control. Hence, I argue in the second part of the thesis that the Foucauldian-Deleuzian 
paradigm of power and control does not adequately describe the protocological system 
we are embedded in. Less than a cross-over with the field of new media, the second 
half of this thesis proposes to confront Stiegler’s philosophy of technology with more 
concrete examples, whether these examples include the companionship of robots as 
developed by Turkle, the effect of the network in the case of Galloway or the actuality 
of systems of control as discussed in the last chapter with the work of Chun.  
 
Chapter 4 explores Turkle’s concern about the impact of technology on the 
psychological development of the human. She demonstrates at length that we nurture 
an affective and mimetic relationship with machines. Both Stiegler and Turkle tackle 
the issue of narcissism and show that our relationship with machines fully participates 
in the formation of identity because it fixates a sense of self in relation to the alterity 
of the machine/computer/tool. Individuation is therefore always techno-psychological. 
Both Turkle and Stiegler suggest that our dependence on technologies liquidates this 
primary narcissism, essential to the formation of the individual. By narcissism, Stiegler 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 see Bernard Stiegler, Automatic Society: The Future of Work, trans. Daniel Ross (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2016) 
49 The battle for intelligence refers to the techniques deployed for the capture and the formation of 
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Cf: Bernard Stiegler, Taking Care of Youth and the Generations, trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford: 
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does not simply mean self-love as it is the case with Turkle, but “auto-affection” and 
more largely “self-consciousness”50. Hence, when Stiegler claims that we are 
losing/have lost the feeling of existing, he is not, strictly speaking, putting the blame 
on new technologies but on our current aesthetic experience of technology. What we 
have a lost, in other words, is a certain attitude towards technology; this attitude is that 
of the artisan-amateur. The amateur, unlike the consumer, is able to relate positively 
with the object: “He is one who loves an object and sublimates and thus believes in 
that object51”.  The amateur, Stiegler says, is capable of care; she is capable to fully 
invest the object and establish a symbolic relation. To explicitate the importance of 
care in the narcissistic evolution of the individual, Stiegler draws on Winnicott and his 
insight on maternal care as the first pharmakon, that is, the first possession or 
supplement that instils the feeling that life is worth living and that is embodied in an 
object such as a “teddy bear” or a favorite blanket52”. The amateur, like the child, will 
place his faith or love in prostheses. This is the act of sublimation. Having stressed the 
necessary connection between the capacity to develop a symbolic relationship with the 
object and the state of auto-affection, Stiegler affirms that our addiction to brands and 
merchandise engenders a negative form of sublimation, which is that of carelessness 
and disgust. As a result, the individual “sinks into anaesthesia, indifference, and 
apathy53” for the standardized consumption of identical objects does not allow the 
development of a singular sensibility.  One is therefore drawn into a pathological state 
of disaffection. Turkle shows in contrast that our dependence upon technologies 
impoverishes significantly the quality and the authenticity of social relations, so that 
we are expecting more from computers and less from each other54. However, she 
believes that the malaise we are going through is not due to a loss of narcissism but an 
excess of it.  She argues as a result that it is necessary to reconsider the place of 
technologies, the same way we need to ultimately reconsider our place as human 
beings. Despite a few divergences on the psychoanalytical account of technology, it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Bernard Stiegler, Philosophising by Accident: Interviews with Élie During, ed. and trans. Benoît Dillet 
(Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2017) p.113 
51 As quoted by Oliver Davis, ‘Desublimation for Education in Democracy’, in Stiegler and Technics, 
eds. Christina Howells and Gerald Moore (Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2013) p.169 
52 Tania Espinoza, ‘The Technical Object of Psychoanalysis’, in Stiegler and Technics, eds. Christina 
Howells and Gerald Moore (Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2013) p.155 
53 Bernard Stiegler, Symbolic Misery; The Katastrophè of the Sensible, trans. Barnaby Norman 
(Cambridge; Polity Press, 2015) p.23 
54 See Sherry Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect More From Technology And Less From Each 
Other, (New York; Basic Books, 2011) 
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will be stressed that Turkle, like Stiegler, calls for a politicization of the question of 
the relationship between new media and the mental activity of the human55.   
 
Though Turkle’s and Stiegler’s anxiety regarding the future of the human is 
justifiable, the section on Galloway intends to challenge their conception of 
technology, which I believe overemphasizes technology as meaning-producing. For 
Stiegler, indeed, the question of technics is closely related with that of meaning insofar 
as technics either constitutes, retains or transmit memory. The tool sediments meaning 
through the accumulation of past experiences and allows further inscriptive processes: 
 
A sharpened flint is a form in an inorganic matter that is nevertheless organised by sharpening 
it: the technical gesture ‘engrams’ an organization that transmits via the inorganic, opening for 
the first time in the history of life the possibility to transmits knowledges that were individually 
acquired but by a way that is not biological56.  
 
As such, technics is what makes culture possible. Hence, Stiegler articulates a 
programmatology in which technics is the arche-writing that allows the emergence of 
a human world57. The fact that he puts the emphasis on the transmissive function of 
the tool gives rise to two major issues: firstly, it makes of technics a communicative 
instrument, secondly, it implies a logocentric account of technics, which is therefore 
always techno-logical. Galloway explains on this issue that the conception of new 
media as communicative tool, though in some sense accurate, is insufficient to fully 
apprehend their complexity. Media technologies also flirt with the non-discursive and 
the extra-discursive which Galloway coins as excommunication58.  
Galloway’s point is not to discard technology as meaning-bearer but to show 
that new technologies are more than mere meaning-determining apparatus capable of 
producing or destroying, curing or poisoning the socio-political state of affairs.  The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Stiegler and Technics, eds. Gerald Moore and Christina Howells (Edinburgh; Edinburgh University 
Press, 2013) p.2 
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(Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2017) p.51 
57 Bernard Stiegler, Philosophising by Accident: Interviews with Élie During, ed. and trans. Benoît Dillet 
(Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2017) p.51 
58 Eugene Thacker, Alexander R. Galloway and McKenzie Wark, Excommunication: Three Inquiries 
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ambiguous figure of Hermes, the god-messenger that gave its name to hermeneutics, 
illustrates perfectly the duality of media, for Galloway. Though conducive of meaning, 
the Greek deity is also known in mythology for being deceptive: Hermes cheats our 
expectations, lies on multiple occasions, and distorts the content of the message. This 
leads Galloway to analyze two models of networks which, according to him, have been 
in play since the Antiquity; the chain of triumph and the web of ruin. In this respect, 
the process of mediation can be structurally ordered as much as it can be an enactment 
of a certain chaos, which is characteristic of “furious media59”. Overall, Galloway 
suggests contra Stiegler that technology as a network, possess entropic tendencies that 
are aesthetically as valuable as their negentropic counterparts. To put it briefly, entropy 
refers to the “breakdown of order” while negative entropy or negentropy is “the 
resistance to collapse60”. As a reader of Simondon, Stiegler does acknowledge that 
technology is traversed by entropy and negentropy, but he argues that technological 
evolution, and the organization of life in general, must feed on negative entropy in 
order to compensate with the loss of energy and/or natural decay. Hence, technological 
evolution is mostly conceived by Stiegler as a transmissible and cumulative process 
which is that of the epiphylogenesis. Regarding our current aesthetic relationship with 
technology, if we have any, Stiegler suggests that it has become increasingly entropic 
due to our consumerist habits that are encouraging an economy of waste, rather than 
of creativity. Though Galloway does not directly address the issue pointed out by 
Stiegler, his work allows us to apprehend in more positive terms the aesthetic values 
of ruin and destruction, an idea which I intend to reinforce with the work of Walter 
Benjamin on cinema.  I will then move on Galloway’s understanding of protocol. 
Protocol, as he puts it, is a set of rules and instructions that grounds the internet61. Put 
more broadly, the protocol refers to a decentralized and invisible system of 
management; its main function is to command. As such, the protocol articulates a 
network in which there is no will, only a number of operations; a quanta of power, as 
Galloway says62. However, this abstraction of power as mere effect of protocol is only 
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one side of the story. I will thus conclude this chapter in pointing out that due to his 
reading of Foucault, Galloway still assumes the effectivity of control and surveillance 
at the heart of the programming activity.  
 
Galloway’s intervention regarding the protocologization of social/cyber spaces 
seems to give credit to Stiegler’s theory of psychopower.  Indeed, Galloway’s analogy 
of the highway in which it is suggested overall that freedom is the product of a 
protocological system that formalizes the conditions of its aesthetic experience, gives 
us a lot to think about. He thus writes: 
 
 
Freedom of expression is no longer relevant; freedom of use has taken its place. Consider two 
categories: the computer user and the computer programmer. One designates the mass of 
computer society, the other a clan of technical specialists. Or not? The user and the programmer 
are also two rubrics for understanding one’s relationship to art. (“There are two musics,” wrote 
Roland Barthes, “the music one listens to, [and] the music one plays.”) “User” is a modern 
synonym for “consumer.” It designates all those who participate in the algorithmic unfoldings 
of code. On the other hand, “programmer” is a modern synonym for “producer.” It designates 
all those who participate both in the authoring of code and in its process of unfolding. Users 
are executed. But programmers execute themselves. Thus “user” is a term for any passive or 
“directed” experience with technology, while “programmer” means any active or “undirected” 
experience with technology. Taken in this sense, anyone can be a programmer if he or she so 
chooses. If a person installs a game console modchip, he is programming his console. If she 
grows her own food, she is programming her biological intake63.  
 
 
Can we experience freedom other than as an effect of programming industries? 
More broadly, is freedom condemned to the object of strategic relations? The fact that 
Galloway refers at length to Foucault’s body of work leads him to identify a necessary 
concomitance between power-relations and the practices of freedom in which freedom 
can only be exercised within a frame of procedures and conventions, that is, through 
mechanisms of control. Yet, I will argue in the final chapter that it is not that simple. 
First of all, the presence of mechanisms of control does not imply de facto their 
effectivity or their efficiency. Wendy Hui Kyong Chun notes for her part that the 
reception of the works of mid-‘60s intellectual figures such as Foucault and Deleuze 
gave rise to a paranoia of control among scholars. She argues that the latter have turned 
freedom into an object of power, leading to the presumption that one is never free but 
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always caught in a network. She thus suggests that the mystification of new 
technologies as apparatuses of control stems from the power of our own belief in the 
powerfulness of control: “paranoia does not respond to an overwhelming, all-seeing 
power but rather to a power found to be lacking64”. The fact that internet had largely 
contributed to the emergence of visual culture perpetuates this impression of being 
seen, but computers do not see; they make the invisible visible in translating and 
generating codes and texts65. However, this does not mean that Chun refutes the 
political reality of the twinning of control and freedom in the current programming 
structures. She rather suggests that it is not an inevitability. The intrusiveness of 
internet coupled with the uncertainty of being seen, has certainly raised anxiety among 
consumers. Yet, it is this uncertainty that constitutes the real power of the digital age, 
not actual control. As such, Chun argues that control is not a fact, but a possibility. 
One needs in this respect to reconsider one’s relationship with technologies, and more 
largely with one’s conception of power. While Galloway argues that enjoyment is the 
alibi of control, Chun seems to suggest that control is the alibi of our own resistance 
to freedom, which we struggle to fully seize.  
 
 
In my mind, Stiegler’s recent work on automaticity exemplifies well the 
concerns of Chun regarding our paranoid response to power. Throughout the 
Automatic Society: The Future of Work, Stiegler affirms, for example, that the 
algorithmatization of existence has led to a society of hyper-control, which is 
comparable to an electronic Leviathan66. Though it is unclear if Stiegler is referring to 
the Biblical monster or Hobbes’ famous text (though it is probably both), such an 
analogy remains very significant regarding his own conception of control, which is 
centralized, sprawling and totalizing. As a result, Stiegler’s tone grows more and more 
alarmist as he worries about the instalment of systems of trackability on electronic 
devices. In his defence, Stiegler is not the only one to give a terrifying portrait of our 
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contemporary techno-culture and would probably find a powerful ally in the person of 
Yuval Noah Harari. 
 
In this respect, I find myself on the side of Chun when she argues that despite 
its tracking ability, internet is rarely actively and effectively surveilling us. Chun 
refuses to posit the individual as a powerless agent entrapped in a system of control, 
but she does not wish either to present internet as the space of infinite freedom. 
However, she believes that the bridging of control and freedom, that is, the belief that 
freedom is the product of control, has led to a pessimistic and paranoiac account of the 
digital era.  As such, Chun argues that it is freedom that needs to be treated as a fact 
and control as a possibility, not the reverse. On a broader level, I suggest by the means 
of her work that a certain distance should be taken from the Foucauldian account of 
power-control in which the internet remains too often reduced to a panoptic tool.  
 
 
In conclusion, while this thesis argues for the necessity to deploy techniques of 
care in order to cultivate the feeling of existing, the paranoid mind-set that leads 
thinkers like Stiegler to assume the political reality of unfreedom runs the risk of 
turning care into a disciplinary measure, hence being equally existentially harmful for 
the human.  
 
 
Taking Care of Youth and The Generations: French Philosophy and New Media 
 
This work should be read as a contribution to Stiegler’s scholarship and to 
French Philosophy in general, more than an attempt to significantly nurture, or expand, 
the field of new media theory. The thesis  departs from the series of conclusions drawn 
by Stiegler in Taking Care of Youth and the Generations, often considered as 
controversial among its readers67. The reason for this discomfort lies in Stiegler’s 
nostalgic defence of traditions, that is, the defence of the family unit, the values of 
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work and that of an old-fashioned patriotism.  However, this nostalgic defence does 
not constitute my concern here. 
 
Stiegler’s politics of care is the true object of my inquiry. With this in mind, I 
intend to investigate the whys and wherefores of his position. While my reading offers 
a particular focus on Taking Care of Youth and the Generations, it nonetheless aims 
to cover Stiegler’s work as a whole from Technics and Time to The Automatic Society. 
I have chosen to focus on Taking Care because I consider that this text marks a shift 
in Stiegler’s philosophical journey and that it deserves closer attention. Stiegler 
already expressed some reservations about our current technological environment in 
the third volume of Technics and Time, Acting out, or in the two tomes of The Symbolic 
Misery68, but it is in Taking of Youth and The Generations, in my point of view, that 
the positivity of his discourse becomes openly tainted with suspicion, pessimism, and 
paranoia. But how does this paranoia articulate itself and is it justified?   
 
To me, the answer shall be found in Stiegler’s concept of psychopower, which, 
as I have said in the sections above, describes the massive exploitation of 
consciousnesses by cultural industries and motivates Stiegler to reactivate practices of 
care in the context of new media.   
 
Chapter 1 begins with Sartre and explores his philosophy of freedom. Though 
it would be tempting to rely on the works of Heidegger on this issue, I show that 
Stiegler’s discourse bears strong similarities with Sartre and that such a connection 
helps us to decipher the phenomenological and existentialist undertone of his 
approach.  I do not intend to modernize Sartre’s philosophy through Stiegler. My 
reading of Sartre remains in fact quite traditional. But it is Sartre, I argue, that holds 
the key to Stiegler’s half-phenomenological, half-existentialist, insights on freedom 
and psychopower.  
 
 Chapter 2 focuses on Foucault. While it is customary to oppose Sartre and 
Foucault, I intend to do something different.  This section wishes to offer points of 
contrast between Sartre and Foucault, but does so only to maintain a continuity which 
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is crystallized around the thematic of the cultivation of self. Throughout the chapter, I 
investigate Foucault’s model of power which I believe to be essential if one wants to 
fully grasp the political resonance of Stiegler’s concept of psychopower.  
 
Chapter 3 discusses Stiegler’s philosophy of technics and its importance for 
the biological, historical, psychological, and cultural development of the human. The 
chapter examines the reality of psychopower as described by Stiegler and the political 
necessity of care. After this, I then suggest, by the means of a short introduction to the 
part dedicated on new media, that it is Stiegler’s Foucauldian reading of power-
relations that plants the seeds of his paranoid model of psychopower. 
 
It becomes clear in this respect that my aim is to challenge Stiegler’s narrative 
on psychopower, that is, its reality and its efficacy. I propose to do so by opening a 
conversation with thinkers whose research explicitly targets the cultural impact of new 
media whether it is on our notion of intimacy (Turkle), our experience of freedom 
(Galloway), or own relation with power (Chun). The key aim in invoking these three 
thinkers in particular is to identify potential weaknesses in Stiegler’s discourse which 
I believe to be the implicit result of a certain French Tradition, namely the Sartrean 
and Foucauldian one69. It is to shed light on this particular legacy, which I argue is in 
effect in Stiegler’s thought, that I am turning to Turkle, Galloway and Chun. Their 
works, as we shall see, express an evident interest in French Philosophy. My 
discussion with these thinkers will be voluntarily selective in this respect, and might 
even be viewed as somewhat instrumental. It will leave aside key figures such as 
Huhtamo, Flusser, Kittler, Vissman, Manovich or Parikka. This is because it is not the 
purpose of this thesis to give a summary of the field of new media, and nor is it my 
ambition to reflect on media (and technics in general) as an empirical object, given 
Stiegler’s own approach of the theme70. Using the works of Turkle, Galloway and 
Chun, I identify three points of contention in Stiegler’s argument: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 My thesis does not put the blame on Sartre and Foucault. Instead, it wishes to uncover the internal 
dynamic of Stiegler’s argument on psychopower; it hints at the said and the unsaid of his philosophical 
position regarding the culture of new media. 
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1)   He assumes a direct correlation between the technical field and the 
psychological development of the human. 
2)   He makes of technics a rational process. 
3)   He tends to take the efficacy of systems of psychopower for granted. 
 
 
In chapter 4, I explore the correlation between the technical field and the 
psychological development of the human at play in Stiegler’s argument. Such an 
equivalence, I claim, runs the risk of reducing technics to a mere reflective tool. 
Drawing on the phenomenological tradition, Stiegler gives too much importance to the 
first-person point of view and often does so at the expense of the mode of existence of 
the technical object itself71.  His argument, I contend, resonates with Turkle’s account 
of media and enables me to link Stiegler’s theoretical approach with more concrete 
examples. I compare the two with the key aim of uncovering in Stiegler’s philosophy 
a propensity to see in technics the mirror of the human and to show the limits of this 
approach.  
 
Chapter 5 offers a discussion of Galloway. For Stiegler, technics enables 
humans to achieve consciousness, build memories and transmit past knowledge to 
future generations. In short, technics articulates meaning and constitutes the 
architecture of human history. But to argue this, I claim, is to endow technics with 
effective rationality and to present its historical development as teleological. This is 
on this point that Galloway’s work comes as particularly useful. If both express 
concerns regarding the culture industries — which they respectively name ludic 
capitalism and psychopower— Galloway’s insight on media diverges, insofar as he 
chooses to apprehend them on the basis of their opacity and their unworkability. In 
other words, technics (media for Galloway) is not tributary to the light of reason. It is 
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mentions Michael Lewis, Stiegler aims to show by the means of the latter that technics “has a dynamics 
of its own which can be ascertained only empirically” and that the very autonomy of the external 
memory support defines man.  I am not refuting this argument, but it is nonetheless technics-as-process 
(or dynamics if we follow Lewis), rather than technics-as-object, that mostly interests Stiegler.  
See Michael Lewis, ‘Of a Mythical Philosophical Anthropology: The Transcendental and the Empirical 
in Technics and Time’, in Stiegler and Technics, eds. Christina Howells and Gerald Moore (Edinburgh; 
Edinburgh University Press, 2013) p.61  
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this posture that is precisely missing in Stiegler’s account and which, I claim, deserves 
more attention if one is to elaborate a politics of care in the digital age.  
 
  Chapter 6 tackles the paranoia of control throughout Chun’s contributions. If 
the two points raised above largely contribute to accentuate the climate of suspicion 
regarding the future technics is possibly designing for us, it is the faith in the actuality 
of control that seals Stiegler’s argument. It occurs to me that, due to his reading of 
Foucault, Stiegler tends to treat the possibility of psychopower as a fact while hardly 
questioning its fallibility or its limits. It is on this precise issue that Chun’s 
contributions appear useful to me. Not only is she spelling out my concerns about the 
climate of suspicion surrounding new media, she also invites us to reflect on the 
Foucauldian legacy, which, as I intend to demonstrate in chapter 3, nurtures Stiegler’s 
argument on care in the face of psychopower.  
 
Overall, I hope to give by the means of this thesis a thorough account of 
Stiegler’s politics of care while, at the same time, expressing my clear reserves about 
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It may look a bit hackneyed to go back to Sartre, especially when the second 
part of the thesis is addressing the digital. However, Sartre’s work shares several points 
in common with Stiegler’s. This will be rendered more evident through Foucault, 
which will enable me to bridge them together through the key theme of the aesthetics 
of existence.  Yet, few things can already be said about Stiegler’s and Sartre’s 
philosophical compatibilities. First of all, the two have been influenced by the 
phenomenology of Husserl. As a result, they both make the intentionality of 
consciousness the core feature of the process of individuation. On the precise issue of 
individuation, it must be brought to attention that Stiegler’s work puts the stress on the 
lack of essence as ontologically constitutive. This argument finds a clear resonance 
with Sartre’s philosophy, which can indeed be described as a non-self philosophy, and 
does address the theme of psycho-social individuation72 through the process of 
exteriorization. In addition, they both situate freedom within consciousness. For 
Sartre, this form of freedom is inalienable and absolute, for Stiegler, it isn’t, insofar as 
consciousness remains vulnerable to strategies of power. They also share a same 
interest for psychoanalysis. Indeed, they both engage with Freud and Lacan73. This 
psychoanalytic background will allow both of them to turn to self-therapeutics. For 
Sartre, this is an existential issue, for Stiegler, a political necessity. Moreover, Sartre’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 It may be odd to bring “selfhood” and “individuation” together. If it is odd, it is because it conveys 
opposed ideas about the individual. Indeed, it is tempting to put selfhood on the side of substantialism 
(the pre-existing cogito of Descartes for example). On the contrary, individuation rather suggests 
hylomorphism (produced and processed through form and matter). Selfhood suggest unity, stability and 
un-changeability; individuation hints at the reverse. Sartre’s philosophy goes through this odd 
combination and proposes a conception of selfhood based on individuation; it asserts self as 
individuation.  
73 And as we will see in chapter 4, Stiegler also draws on Winnicott when developing on the 
psychological value of the transitional object.  
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work on the theme of self-cultivation bears something crucial: the notion of 
responsibility, which is the very condition of possibility for the individual to grasp the 
meaningfulness of her own existence and to achieve freedom. It is on this point that 
the two figures meet again, as Stiegler argues for his part, that responsibility has been 
destroyed in the last decades due to “the addictive and cynical triviality”74 of our 
cultural environment. For Stiegler, reconstructing selfhood entails the reconstructing 
of responsibility, which is in turn constitutive of a free and meaningful existence.    
 
For all these reasons, I believe that operating a return to Sartre75 is useful to 
better apprehend Stiegler’s diagnosis about the loss of the feeling of existing, before 
focusing on the modalities of its cure with the help of Foucault.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74Christina Howells, ‘‘Le défaut d’origine: The Prosthetic Constitution of Love and Desire’, in Stiegler 
and Technics, eds. Christina Howells and Gerald Moore (Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press,2013) 
p.147 
75 There is nothing particularly new regarding this approach as one can attest to in the work of Žižek, 
something evident in The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology. But the opposition 
between consciousness and social history is often taken for granted. In the Negative Dialectics, Adorno 
already raises this issue: “The antinomy between the determination of the individual and the social 
responsibility that contradicts this determination is not due to a misuse of concepts. It is a reality, the 
moral indication that the universal and particular are unreconciled” (p.264-265) While Adorno wishes 
to reassert the free subject as he believes that the “use the strength of the subject” (p. xx) will enable us 
“to break through the fallacy of constitutive subjectivity”, he argues that this does not have to be done 
at the cost of socio-historical considerations. Indeed, the responsibility of the subject stems from and 
depends from the possibilities offered by the historical context. In other words, the subject and the social 
form and deform each other, while the issue of responsibility, instead of strictly depending on one or 
another, circulate between these two poles; as such, responsibility is at the same time an individual and 
a collective matter, conditioned and rendered possible by both. Adorno’s essay on Commitment, which 
proposes a focus on Sartre’s What Is Literature?  argues that these themes are already present in his 
philosophy of situational freedom, though partly underestimated by Sartre himself: “For Sartre, its task 
is to awaken the free choice of the agent, that makes authentic existence possible at all, as opposed to 
the neutrality of the spectator. But what gives commitment its esthetic advantage over tendentiousness 
also renders the content to which the artist commits himself inherently ambiguous. In Sartre, the notion 
of choice—originally a Kierkegaardian category—is heir to the Christian doctrine ‘He who is not with 
me is against me’, but now voided of any concrete theological content. What remains is merely the 
abstract authority of a choice enjoined, with no regard for the fact that the very possibility of choosing 
depends on what can be chosen. The archetypal situation always cited by Sartre to demonstrate the 
irreducibility of freedom merely underlines this. Within a predetermined reality, freedom becomes a 
vacant claim: Herbert Marcuse has exposed the absurdity of the philosophical theorem that it is always 
possible inwardly either to accept or to reject martyrdom. Yet this is precisely what Sartre’s dramatic 
situations are designed to demonstrate. But his plays are nevertheless bad models of his own 
existentialism, because they display in their respect for truth the whole administered universe which his 
philosophy ignores; the lesson we learn from them is one of unfreedom”.   
See: Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Continuum, 1992) and  
‘Commitment’, in The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, eds. Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt (New 
York: Continuum, 1993)  
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However, Sartre’s philosophy of self is rich. This is why I propose for this first 
chapter to reformulate his main ideas in order to stress the necessity of self-cultivation 
as the exercise of freedom. In that sense, this section is intentionally exegetic.  
Here is what the chapter aims to cover: 
 
I will depart from the Transcendance of the Ego, in which Sartre problematizes 
the issue of individuation and claims self as the transcendent object of consciousness. 
Criticized for the solipsistic nature of his early philosophy, Sartre intends to refine his 
model of selfhood in his major piece of work Being and Nothingness, where he claims 
“I exist my body”76. By the means of this statement, Sartre aims to reinforce self as 
being-in-the-world, insofar as consciousness is necessarily embodied and situated. 
Yet, Sartre is not able to fully account for the existence of the other and struggles to 
develop a convincing ethics. In Existentialism is a Humanism, Sartre focuses on the 
notion of engagement, hereby implying that it is because I am condemned to be free, 
that I am responsible for myself and the way others treat me. If I need the other to 
maximize my freedom, the overall concept of freedom is understood by Sartre as the 
possibility to engage in a fundamental project of existence77, which itself aims at the 
reunification of the being-for-itself and the being-in-itself. However, Sartre suggests 
that such fundamental project must be revealed through the undertaking of a therapy. 
Borrowing both from Freud and Lacan, Sartre thus elaborates an existential 









	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans. Hazel 
Barnes (New York, London, Toronto, Sidney, Tokyo, Singapor: Washington Square Press, 1956) p.351 
77Paul Crittenden, ‘The Fundamental Project’, in Jean-Paul Sartre: Key concepts, eds. Stephen 
Churchill and Jack Reynolds (Durham: Acumen 2013) pp. 152-162 
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1.1 CONSCIOUSNESS, SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE ‘I’ IN SARTRE’S 
TRANSCENDENCE OF THE EGO 
 
 
Philosophy has long been attached to the idea of an inner self, whether captured 
under the notion of a soul or a transcendental subjectivity. Among these theories, one 
could mention the sophistic paradox of inquiry that led Plato to ground the possibility 
of knowledge in the process of the soul’s recollection (anamnesis). In this respect, the 
soul was believed to be a cognitive entity that originally belonged to a pure reality (the 
world of Forms); it stood as an inner truth that transcends the body and knows already. 
Later, rationalist philosophers such as Kant agreed to some extent on the preeminence 
of pure ideas and a priori judgments as the main architectures of knowledge. 
Descartes, for his part, grounds the possibility of knowledge (through the methodical 
doubt) in a pre-conditional interiority. Hence, the Cartesian theory advocates for a 
model of selfhood constituted inwardly; a model of self that calls for introspection. 
Finally, Freud’s work on the unconscious contributed to the prosperity of an individual 
interior influencing our actions and doings.78 In this respect, Sartre’s 
phenomenological investigations attempt to move away from these presumptions to 
observe instead a self as a psycho-social construct.  
 
 
 ‘Self’ is not a typical Sartrean term. In the early stage of his career, Sartre 
prefers the term of “ego” to elaborate on his model of selfhood. In The Transcendence 
of the Ego, Sartre adopts an Husserlian approach in agreeing with the main principle 
of phenomenology which asserts that consciousness is consciousness of something79. 





Sartre’s relation to Husserl may seem curious, if not downright paradoxical. An outspoken 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Kenneth J Gergen, ‘Technology and the self: From the Essential to the Sublime’, in Constructing the 
Self in a mediated Age (London: Sage, 1996) pp. 127-140. 
79 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans. Hazel 
Barnes (New York, London, Toronto, Sidney, Tokyo, Singapor: Washington Square Press, 1956) 
Introduction: Section V, p. lx.  
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enthusiast of phenomenology, which would liberate philosophy of its idealist heritage and 
bring it back into the world, Sartre simultaneously, and just as passionately, an 
uncompromising critic of the methodological and categorical apparatus the Husserl of Ideen I 
(…) put into the service of mapping out transcendental consciousness. One could dissolve this 
paradox by deeming Sartre faithful to the perceived spirit of Husserl’s phenomenology, but not 
to its word. Yet such a settlement glosses over the fact that this paradox is not simply a result 
of a scholarly disagreement. Sartre holds philosophy accountable in the face of the world where 
suffering, hunger and the war are both a possibility and a daily reality — the philosophical task 
cannot therefore ever be confined to a narrowly epistemological problem, but must also be 
existential, ethical and political80.  
 
As an existential phenomenologist, Sartre rejects the Husserlian idea of a 
transcendental ego, the same way he rejects the Kantian subject of apperception, that 
is, the transcendental I as synthesizer of experience. Opposed to Husserl’s subjective 
idealism, Sartre refutes the idea of a quasi-substantial I that would be the necessary 
condition through which the world emerges: “It is, on the contrary, consciousness that 
renders the unity and personality of my I possible”. In this respect, “the transcendental 
I thus has no raison d’être.81 ” In more simple terms, this means that the ego does not 
inhabit consciousness, nor does it precede it. Instead, Sartre posits the ego as the 
product of consciousness. This means that the ego is not the synthesizer of experience, 
but an object synthetized like any other object of experience. As Hazel E. Barnes 
mentions, consciousness “is not a being” for Sartre, but an “activity82”.   
Sartre then argues in the Transcendance of the Ego that the first mode of 
consciousness is a pre-reflective non-positional consciousness. It is consciousness as 
the implicit consciousness of its conscious state.  Leo Fretz indicates that (non)-
positional pre-personal consciousness is reflexive for it is able to “curve back83” on 
itself. But it is not yet reflective, precisely because it cannot bracket itself as an object, 
nor can it synthetize itself under an I. Personal consciousness comes therefore as a 
second mode of consciousness which acts as the redoubling of the first mode of 
consciousness. It is through reflective consciousness that I can posit myself as subject. 
Sartre’s model of consciousness is very Husserlian in the fact that it is directed towards 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Beta Stawarska, ‘Sartre and Husserl’s Ideen: Phenomenology and Imagination”’, in Jean-Paul Sartre: 
Key concepts, eds. Stephen Churchill and Jack Reynolds (Durham: Acumen 2013) p.12 
81 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendance of the Ego: A Sketch for Phenomenological Description, trans. 
Andrew Brown (London, New York: Routledge, 2004) p. 4 
82 Hazel E. Barnes, ‘Sartre’s Ontology: The Revealing and Making of Being’, in The Cambridge 
Companion to Sartre, ed. Christina Howells (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) p.37 
83 Leo Fretz, ‘Individuality in Sartre’s Philosophy’, in The Cambridge Companion to Sartre, ed. 
Christina Howells (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) p.74 
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objects and only exists in its positional (or intentional) capacity. It is through the 
capacity of consciousness to seize itself as object, that the I emerges, and that 
individuation occurs. The key point to remember at this stage is that individuation is 
understood by Sartre as a singular synthetization of experience. However, 
individuation is not triggered by the intentionality of consciousness alone, even less 
by the ego, but conditioned by the necessity of transcendence, that is, the object. As 
such, individuation is a process of interiorization of the exterior insofar as 
consciousness can only constitutes itself through the object. The ego, which derives 
from the activity of consciousness, consolidates such experience through 
synthetization.  
As the result of the synthetizing activity of consciousness, the ego must be 
thought as an ideal fusion of my psychic states. This means that it is not a real existent, 
as Sartre will confirm later in his major work Being and Nothingness; it is a 
perspective, an observation, a narrative. Because it is a narrative, the ego has no 
essence, nor does it possess an inner truth that awaits to be disclosed. I cannot know 
myself in the same way I develop a knowledge on real objects, for there is no such 
thing as an objective or fixed self. On that matter, Sartre declares: “the intuition of the 
ego is a perpetually deceptive mirage, since, at one and the same time, it yields 
everything and it yields nothing”84.  On the other hand, Sartre acknowledges that we 
tend to feel self as a profoundly innate, for we like to portray ourselves as unchangeable 
characters. It is thus comforting to think there must lie within oneself a plateau that 
stand as the foundation of one’s character, personality traits, actions and emotions. 
Yet, the I remains an imaginary object. This lack of identity shall not be considered as 
a flaw. Instead, it is for Sartre what enables the individual to exert her freedom and to 
act out in the world insofar as the individual can change and reinvent herself.   
This does not mean either that the I is empty or futile. In fact, Sartre’s model 
of the cogito is both reflective and reflected. Indeed, I can reflect on objects of 
experience as well as I can reflect on the I who is reflecting on objects. This is why, 
Sartre tells us, I can remember a certain landscape I saw few days ago, as well as I can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendance of the Ego: A Sketch for Phenomenological Description, trans. 
Andrew Brown (London, New York: Routledge, 2004) p.22 
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remember me seeing that landscape85. In other words, the I enables me to grasp 
consciousness as mine and think of myself as me, that is, as subject. Hence, 
consciousness of self occurs in a process of objectification and is essential to grasp 
one’s own individuality, for to grasp oneself as an individual one must feel inhabited.  
Now, it is undeniable that the Cogito is personal. In the ‘I think’, there is an I which thinks. 
We here reach the I in its purity and it is indeed from the Cogito that an ‘Egology’ must begin. 
And so, the fact that can be taken as the starting point is this: each time that we grasp our 
thought, either by an immediate intuition, or by an intuition based on memory, we grasp an I 
which is the I of the thought that is being grasped and which, furthermore, gives itself as 
transcending this thought and all other possible thoughts86.  
 
Here lies the whole ambiguity of selfhood: though experienced as immanent, it is in 
fact transcendent, and though thought as stable, it is elusive. For these reasons, Sartre 
describes the ego as a ‘deceptive mirage87’. However, this deceptive mirage is crucial 
for the constitution of the individual, because it is in the endless quest for self-
coincidence that one can once again cultivate her freedom. This point will be 
developed further down.  
Overall, while the ego is transcendent, consciousness is certainly for Sartre 
transcendental. And it is in the transcendentality of consciousness, or its impersonal 
spontaneity88, that freedom shall be primarily found insofar as it constitutes human 
consciousness’ fundamental property. Hence, when Sartre claims that freedom is 
absolute at the beginning of his career, he refers to the spontaneity of consciousness 
that enables us to choose, but also to imagine and project meaning onto the world. He 
is not suggesting that one has unlimited powers over a situation or that one is capable 
to fully detach herself from social constraints. The claim is simply psychological at 
this stage, insofar as Sartre locates freedom within the structures of consciousness. 
Consciousness is free because it is “uncaused, neither acting on phenomena, nor yet 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendance of the Ego: A Sketch for Phenomenological Description, trans. 
Andrew Brown (London, New York: Routledge, 2004) p.6 
86 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendance of the Ego: A Sketch for Phenomenological Description, trans. 
Andrew Brown (London, New York: Routledge, 2004) p.6 
87 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendance of the Ego: A Sketch for Phenomenological Description, trans. 
Andrew Brown (London, New York: Routledge, 2004) p.22 
88 The term of spontaneity will be preferred from now on when referring to the transcendentality of 
consciousness, insofar as Sartre will progressively cease to use the term ‘transcendental’ in his writings. 
Christina Howells suggests that this may be due to “its Kantian overtones”. 
Christina Howells, Sartre: The Necessity of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 
p.2 
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acted on by phenomena”89. This does not mean either that consciousness is isolated 
from the world or separated from reality. Instead, Sartre phenomenological approach 
conceives consciousness as always being “in and of the world”90. In sum, individuation 
takes place primarily within the unifying activity of consciousness. And it is by the 
means of individuation that one can experience freedom as the spontaneous and 
irreducible element of human existence.   
 
 
1.2 BEING AND NOTHINGNESS: “I EXIST MY BODY” 
 
 
Sartre writes in the Transcendence of the Ego that “the body thus acts as a 
visible and tangible symbol for the I”91. Yet, he does not develop much on that issue, 
for his main concern is to assert the ego as “an ideal unity of all states and actions92”. 
However, the Sartrean model of consciousness sketched throughout the 
Transcendance of the Ego takes a new turn in Being and Nothingness. First, Sartre is 
determined to move off from the egological experience he adopted in The 
Transcendence of the Ego, to assert instead the decisive role of the other in the 
individual’s apprehension of self. But he also argues that consciousness is embodied; 
a stance that may remind us that of Merleau-Ponty93.  While Sartre tends to overlook 
the role of the body at the beginning of his career, he corrects this mistake in his later 
texts. However, he nourishes some anger and bitterness towards it, for he makes the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Christina Howells, Sartre: The Necessity of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 
p.14 
90 Christina Howells, Sartre: The Necessity of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 
p.15 
91 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendance of the Ego: A Sketch for Phenomenological Description, trans. 
Andrew Brown (London, New York: Routledge, 2004) p.23 
92 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendance of the Ego: A Sketch for Phenomenological Description, trans. 
Andrew Brown (London, New York: Routledge, 2004) p.22 
93 Merleau-Ponty writes: “The ‘here’ of my body does not refer to a determinate position in relation to 
other positions or to external coordinates, but the laying down of the first coordinates, the anchoring of 
the active body in an object, the situation of the body in the face of its tasks”, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
The Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1962) p.100 
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body — and selfhood in general — subjected to the gaze of the other. In Being and 
Nothingness, Sartre states that consciousness incarnates itself within a body; flesh is 
the necessary envelop of consciousness. However, it must be outlined that 
consciousness is not a body per se. Sartre’s assertion “I exist my body”94 must be 
clarified: 
It is not true that the body is the product of an arbitrary decision on the part of a demiurge nor 
that the union of soul and body is the contingent bringing together of two substances radically 
distinct. On the contrary, the very nature of the for-itself demands that it be body; that is, that 
its nihilating escape from being should be made in the form of an engagement in the world. 
Yet in another sense the body manifests my contingency; we can even say that it is only this 
contingency. The Cartesian rationalists were right in being struck with this characteristic; in 
fact it represents the individualization of my engagement in the world. And Plato was not 
wrong either in taking the body as that which individualizes the soul. Yet it would be in vain 
to suppose that the soul is the body inasmuch as the for-itself is its own individualization95.  
 
Consciousness always stands as someone’s consciousness. This means that I 
experience myself as flesh and not just as a non-substantial thinking entity. And though 
my identity cannot be reduced to my body, it cannot be thought without. Indeed, if the 
I is characterized as the synthesis of one’s conscious relations, those conscious 
relations must at some point be filtered by the body. It is for all these reasons, Sartre 
says, that I must understand myself as existing my body. 
 
Despite his acknowledgement of the body, Sartre mostly thinks corporeality as 
repressive insofar as it forces the individual to be situated. Sartre distinguishes for 
example the body as for-itself and the body for-others. The body for-itself 
characterizes the body as lived from the first-person perspective, while the body for-
others characterizes the body as object of observance. Overall, Sartre rejects the idea 
of the objective body, for one’s body cannot be known; it is experienced. And this 
experience is always biased, for I do not constitute myself according to how people 
objectively look at me, but rather according to how I think people look at me. In this 
respect, one never ceases to be a psychic projection, born from the way one positions 
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oneself among others and within the world. As states Hazel E. Barnes, “the body is a 
point of view on the world, but a point of view on which I cannot take a point of 
view96”. There is between my body and I, an irreconcilable distance. Sartre thus writes 
in Being and Nothingness: 
I see my hand touching objects, but do not know it in its act of touching them. This is the 
fundamental reason why that famous “sensation of efforts” of Maine de Biran does not really 
exist. For my hand reveals to me the resistance of objects, their hardness or softness, but not 
itself. Thus, I see this hand only in the way that I see this inkwell. I unfold a distance between 
it and me, and this distance comes to integrate itself in the distances which I establish among 
all the objects of the world97.  
 
In Sartre’s philosophy, the individual is condemned to solitude. This comes evident in 
his conception of the experience of touch, for example: 
Of course when I touch my leg with my finger, I realize that my leg is touched. But this 
phenomenon of double sensation is not essential:  cold, a shot of morphine, can make it 
disappear. This shows that we are dealing with two essentially different orders or reality. To 
touch and to be touched, to feel that one is touching and to feel that one is touched — these are 
two species of phenomena which it is useless to try to reunite by the term “double sensation”. 
In fact they are radically distinct, and they exist on two incommunicable levels98. 
Here Sartre rejects Merleau-Ponty’s views on ‘double sensation’ as evidence of the 
continuous link that connects me with the other. Whereas Merleau-Ponty believes in 
the reciprocal and unifying experience of touch, for touching means being touched; 
Sartre asserts that the two cannot be ontologically brought together, for they constitute 
in fact separate phenomena. Sartre does not completely ignore the reversibility of 
flesh, but such reversibility is not simultaneous. While I can feel I am touching 
someone or something, I only realize afterwards that I am being touched.  In this 
respect, being touched is less a sensation than a realization; an experience that comes 
with reflection. It means also that there are no such things as objective revelation on 
embodiment, objects, or sensation99. Overall, Sartre’s conception of selfhood remains 
stuck in the trap of ipseity. Leo Fretz thus explains that Sartre fails to render 
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ontologically evident the presence of the Other 100. Indeed, the gaze and the experience 
of shame are not enough to prove the existence of the Other. In fact, the experience of 
shame might also be the product of my own paranoia, as Fretz indicates. This 
reconciliation with the other is what Sartre’s philosophy struggles to overcome for the 
other is rather seen as an enemy than an ally. 
On one hand, Sartre argues that I only exist in a situation. But on the other 
hand, the relationship I may have towards myself, others, and the world in general, is 
univocal. While Sartre’s conception of psychic individuation through the experience 
of the body allows him to think in depth the theme of individuality, it struggles to 
admit the positivity of transindividuality101. For Sartre, there is no reciprocal collective 
bond; no solidarity. The only way for one to relate to the other would be in taking 
recourse to the Kantian model of reasoning by asking oneself if one’s actions can be 
sustainable as a universal principle. However, the other always appears as the limit to 
one’s own freedom, the same way one stands as the obstacle to the other’s freedom. 
This lack of reciprocity in Sartre’s philosophy102 renders it hard to think the possibility 
of an ethics. In fact, his approach almost sounds as a validation for selfishness insofar 
as no one seems to owe anything to the other.  Sartre’s ethics focuses indeed on the 
individual choice, as we shall see in the next paragraphs.  
 
1.3 CHOICE IN EXISTENTIALISM IS A HUMANISM 
 
 
In Existentialism is a Humanism, freedom emerges as the explicit pivot of 
Sartre’s model of selfhood; it is both a necessity and a horizon to achieve. This means 
that Sartre is not only describing freedom as key fundament of his ontology, he is also 
prescribing it.  
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Sartre claims during the lecture he originally gave in Paris at the Club 
Maintenant103 that the individual is condemned to be free. I am condemned to be free 
in the sense that human consciousness never ceases to choose. To be forced to be free 
may sounds antinomic, but it is nonetheless how Sartre conceives freedom, that is, as 
a situation that leaves us no choice than that of ineluctably choosing. Yet, we are 
confronted with an endless succession of paradoxes in which freedom is coercive, 
consciousness both spontaneous and automatic, and choice involuntary. How do we 
resolve these paradoxes? For Sartre, this difficulty does not need to be faced, for it 
justifies responsibility. When he claims that “existence precedes essence104”, he thus 
means:  
 
There is no human nature since there is no God to conceive it. Man is not only that which he 
conceives himself to be, but that which he wills himself to be, and since he conceives of himself 
only after he exists, just as he wills himself to be after being thrown into existence, man is 
nothing other than what he makes of himself105.  
 
It is not that I am able to change my manner of being (Sartre does not merely mean 
here that I can decide on my personality traits for example), but rather, that I am 
profoundly engaged in my existence, responsible for who I am and what I am doing. 
In this sense, we have to take for a fact that, for Sartre, that “man is, before all else, 
something that projects itself into a future, and is conscious of doing so”.106.  
 
 
In this respect, my behavior sheds light on my project, indicates Sartre, just as 
my project is revealed, or articulated, throughout my actions. This is why human 
beings are nothing but what they do and are accountable for each of their enterprises. 
In that sense, it is right to call existentialism a morality of action and commitment, for 
my decisions espouse my project, and espouse a certain ethics. While I never cease to 
choose, and never cease to commit myself despite myself, I am still responsible for 
what I chose. Whatever path I decide to pursue reinforces the project I (knowingly or 
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unknowingly) assigned to myself. In that sense, denying the project or refusing to 
choose, remain forms of engagement. More broadly, Sartre makes of the radical choice 
the generator of moral principles. Because I am free and have no other possibility than 
being free, I am always choosing and expressing a commitment through my actions. 
The freedom of choice is the condition of meaning for Sartre, but also for ethics. 
Indeed, in choosing for him or herself, the individual chooses for all human beings107 
108 .  
 
However, if it is impossible not to choose, can we still speak of choice? Isn’t 
the impossibility of that situation negating the very nature of a choice as meaningful 
action? Besides, as Charles Taylor points out, if my choices represent the person I am 
— and vice versa — then who is the agent doing the choosing? In denying a form of 
a pre-agency that would be capable of evaluating the dilemma the individual is faced 
with, Sartre reduces the choice to a void and contingent expression. And if it is 
meaningless, we cannot talk about a choice at all. Taylor explains indeed that “in order 
for us to speak of choice, we cannot just find ourselves in one of the alternatives. We 
have in some sense to experience the pull of each and give our assent to one”.109 
 
 
Taylor believes that this form of engagement is incoherent, for in order to be 
faced with a dilemma, the individual must interpret the situation as such. If not, the 
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When we say that man chooses himself, not only do we mean that each of us must choose 
himself, but also that in choosing for himself, he is choosing for all men. In fact, in creating 
the man each of us wills ourselves to be, there is not a single one of our actions that does not 
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evil. We always choose the good, and nothing can be good for any of us unless it is good for 
all. 
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p.31 
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individual could easily dismiss one of the alternatives and, therefore, not have to 
choose. What Sartre forgot to take into account, according to Taylor, is that a choice 
is made with regard to something. In other words, we are choosing when we have no 
other choice. Decisions alone do not create or determine values. Rather, it is because 
the individual is confronted with two (or more) serious moral claims which he 
acknowledges as such, that he must choose. Taylor reminds us that for Sartre there is 
no moral source or universal law the individual can rely on, so that the individual must 
evaluate and weigh the situation before choosing A or B. Hence, in order to speak of 
a choice, such choice must presuppose an introspective exercise that inevitably brings 
us back to the model of identity, or agency as the source of the choosing. In short, the 
source of morality does not lie in my actions or decisions, but on the way I apprehend 
them. This leads also Taylor to affirm that it is not enough to think of self as born ex 
nihilo, precisely because identity is not made up through choices, but through series 
of evaluations, second-order desires, or preferences that make these choices possible.  
 
This is what is impossible in the theory of radical choice. The agent of radical choice would at 
the moment of choice have ex hypothesis no horizon of evaluation. He would be utterly without 
identity. He would be a kind of extensionless point, a pure leap into the void. But such a thing 
is an impossibility, or rather could only be the description of the most terrible mental alienation. 
The subject of radical choice is another avatar of that recurrent figure which our civilization 
aspires to realize, the disembodied ego, the subject who can objectify all being, including his 
own, and choose in radical freedom. But this promised total self-possession would in fact be 
the most total self-loss110.  
 
In this respect, it is not choice alone that defines myself, but the evaluation I ascribe 
to it. As such, Taylor reasserts the individual as self-interpretative subject. But 
Taylor’s criticisms are mostly valid only for Existentialism is a Humanism. Sensing 
the limits of his own argument, Sartre will indeed progressively leave aside his 
philosophy of action, for a philosophy of reflection in which the ‘project’ of existence, 
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1.4 THE HUMAN AS USELESS PASSION 
 
 
For Sartre, the fundamental project of existence could be described as the 
attempt to reconcile the human’s being-in-itself and being-for-itself, that is, her 
transcendence and facticity. In this respect, the fundamental project of existence is 
above all a project of unification111.  
 
Sartre argues that if the notion of inner self sounds so familiar and reassuring 
to us, it is because it corresponds to our profound desire to be totalized as in-itself and 
for-itself. However, that does not mean that facticity (in-itself) and transcendence (for-
itself) are two separated realities of existence. Instead, they compose human existence. 
Thomas W. Busch explains then that it is “the lack of identity which provokes a desire 
for self-identity112”. He is right. Sartre writes on this issue:  
 
Exiled from the identity of being, dispersed temporally and self-divided, being for-itself seeks 
to catch up with itself, to recover its dispersion and split identity in order to give itself meaning 
in the form of self-identity. Being factical, the for-itself is not its own foundation; it has no 
fundamental justification, no intrinsic meaningfulness. In its self-making, the for-itself creates 
and sustains a meaningful life, but cannot actually be that mode of life in self-identity, the 
mode of being in-itself. If being-for-itself could actually be, it would no longer exist as a for-
itself, a self-maker. It would itself as a self because a self is a “break” in the identity of being113. 
 
The for-itself is a non-self and as such, is condemned to self-deceit. We ex-ist, 
which means that we live outside of our self. It is a privilege and a curse at the same 
time. It is a privilege because, unlike objects, we are endowed with the capacity to 
create ourselves. We are fundamentally free to choose who we are, to sculpt the person 
we aim to be. In that sense, to be human is a poietic experience, for we, individuals, 
never cease to create, to appropriate and sublimate ourselves.  But it is also a curse 
because such poietic existence feeds on anguish, which is, for Sartre as well as it was 
for Heidegger, an inherent component of what it means to be human. Anguish is the 
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fuel of human’s existence. Anguish starts when self-identification fails. It is the 
revelation that I do not coincide with myself.  The experience of such an existential 
void, that is, of no-thing-ness, forces me to pull myself together, to act out in the world 
and decide (to some extent) who I want to be. In other words, the project I assigned to 
myself compensates for the lack of essence and the lack of sense. The experience of 
the lack is what characterizes, transcends, the human condition. It can neither be 
ignored nor fulfilled. As such, human existence is always in the process of making; it 
is a continuous struggle, an ever-renewed deception.114 
 
Hence, selfhood stands as the reconstitution of the essence we never had.  For 
Sartre, the presumed self we are striving to recover, and/or the ideal self we are trying 
to reach through the project, is motivated by our trying to be God, that is, our trying to 
be self-contained and self-fulfilled. This synthesis of in-itself-for-itself is impossible 
to achieve and to believe otherwise would be an act of bad faith. Yet, it remains the 
ultimate object of desire.  
 
The desire to know or (re)constitute oneself derives from one’s natural desire 
to unify what is non-unifiable; the transcendent and the immanent. Pursuing such 
project equals for Sartre to the existential pursuit of authenticity. Though Sartre posits 
the fundamental project of existence as motivated by the desire to coincide with 
oneself, Sartre does not defend the perspective of being nothing other than oneself. As 
Jonathan Webber explains, if authenticity was to be explained as the coinciding with 
oneself, it could then justify the worst evils. According to him, “Sartre’s attempt to 
cast authenticity as the supreme value need not face this problem115”, for we shall not 
understand authenticity as the pretext for self-indulgence, but as a commitment to the 
person I ought to be. To pursue authenticity is not only to accept but to try to own 
freedom through the existential project: it only consists in having a true and lucid 
consciousness of the situation” 116.  Brought up as the new goal of existence, 
authenticity is this horizon one should strive to attain, for in reaching authenticity, 
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one’s life would no longer be “frustrated in attempts to achieve the unachievable”. 
Instead, “one would accept one’s very break in being as the worthy life of freedom 
itself”117.  
 
To summarize, the human is a useless passion, because it is torn apart between 
its being-for-itself and its being-in-itself. Such ontological break constitutes the nature 
of existence. Despite her desire to be totalized, the individual is condemned to self-
deceit, for such enterprise is unachievable. Bad faith, in this sense, also acts as a motor 
in the process of conversion towards authenticity. The next object of my concern is the 
following: why undertake a project of existence, which seems to only confronts us 





1.5 THE PROJECT OF EXISTENCE 
 
 
For Sartre, the project of existence shall not be viewed as the promotion of 
futile narcissism, for even if it is motivated by the very capricious desire to be reunited 
with oneself, it is above all turned towards the acceptance of one’s existential condition 
and the full embracement of radical freedom. In this respect, the fundamental project 
is a free commitment to oneself as free being. The project of existence, which however 
values personal development, entails an ethical/moral dimension. As Phyllis Sutton 
Morris puts it in Sartre’s Concept of a Person: 
 
Sartre thinks we are free to choose ourselves in the sense of choosing the self we want to be. 
But in other senses we are not in the least free to choose what we are. One must distinguish 
between those senses. In fairness to Sartre's critics, it should be added that he does not always 
make these distinctions explicit and that he sometimes misleadingly speaks as if freedom were 
‘total’.118 
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Sartre is aware that freedom is not absolute, insofar as we are always the product of a 
situation. The question that interests me is therefore: to what extent one is free to 
choose herself?  
 
Sartre explains that the nature of the project is of one’s own choosing. This 
means that I am fundamentally free to be who I want to be, for I am the architect of 
my existence. However, this form of freedom is not a synonym of infinite license. As 
Christina Howells indicates, it is on the contrary always seen “as a response to concrete 
and constraining circumstances”119. Freedom should therefore be thought as 
resistance; it is the resistance to a situation, the resistance to facticity. On could say 
also that freedom is both absolute and limited. For Sartre, the choosing is absolute 
because spontaneous, that is, not “relative to circumstance time and place120”. But the 
chosen is limited.  
 
Hence, I cannot be whatever or whoever I want, just because I want it. What I 
am influences who I am, which means, in other words, that the (socio-cultural) 
situation that precedes me defines me to a certain extent, and that I am then left with 
the choice to accept, refuse or surpass my condition. I do not choose my body, my 
name, my nationality, or my birthplace, for example, but these details contribute to the 
constitution of myself as individual. These details form what I am, but do not 
determine me, for I can choose to go beyond my situation and transform — or 
sublimate— myself through the construction of a project, that is, of an ideal self. 
Whatever I do in relation to this situation will inevitably be my choice, and therefore, 
my ultimate responsibility. Hence, Sartre still defends freedom as the truth of human 
existence. Such defense of freedom shall not be viewed as simple naivety121, but as the 
illustration of his concern to “refute determinism122”. 
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As mentionned before, the realization of this ideal self is impossible. Hence, 
Sartre argues in Being and Nothingness that self is not a ‘consistent articulation123’, 
for the totalization of self can only occur in death. This means that while I am free to 
choose the direction of my existence, it is only when I die that I attain a form of 
essence124. When Sartre undertakes the writing of Jean Genet’s and Gustave Flaubert’s 
biographies, it is not to throw a new perspective about the life of these authors. The 
exercise rather stands as a recollection, an investigation procedure, which has for 
purpose the crystallization of Genet and Flaubert as finalized projects. If the fixation 
of self can only take place in death, it must be noted that this long desired self-
coincidence also constitutes, quite cruelly, my “final alienation to others who are the 
only witness of it125”.  Until then, I am forced to exist as continuous deferral. Indeed, 
Sartre writes: “The self (…) represents an ideal distance within the immanence of the 
subject in relation to himself, a way of not being his own coincidence, of escaping 
identity while positing it as unity”.126 
 
Yet, this does not mean that the project I assigned to myself shall be viewed in 
terms of a programmed failure or as an absurdity. As Phyllis Sutton-Morris notes, 
Sartre’s conception of the project is less concerned about its completion than its 
elaboration. In fact, it must be thought as the key to make sense of the world. It is a 
mean of orientation:  
 
This ideal self is the ultimate end or fundamental point of all our actions, unless we choose 
another project; it is the relation of co-personality that unites our actions and our experiences 
into coherent patterns. The fundamental project is the ultimate end in terms of which we give 
reasons and make decisions; it is, in other words, the key to whatever rationality we exhibit. 
The choice of ideal self is also a "discovery of the world" in the sense that it serves as the point 
of our classification of things in the world as instruments, and the point of our classification of 
past events as meaningful127.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans. Hazel 
Barnes (New York, London, Toronto, Sidney, Tokyo, Singapor: Washington Square Press, 1956) p.123 
124 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans. Hazel 
Barnes (New York, London, Toronto, Sidney, Tokyo, Singapor: Washington Square Press, 1956) 
pp. xxx–xxxi 
125  Christina Howells, Sartre: The Necessity of Freedom (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 
1988) p.24 
126 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans. Hazel 
Barnes (New York, London, Toronto, Sidney, Tokyo, Singapor: Washington Square Press, 1956) p.123 
127 Phyllis Sutton Morris, Sartre’s concept of a Person: An Analytic Approach (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts, 1976) p.111-112 
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The fundamental project of existence is the expression of a desire to be. Though 
deceptive, this desire must be cultivated and pursued because it enables the individual 
to develop a meaningful existence. Hence, one should view the project as a means of 
“deliverance and salvation128”. But to pursue this conversion to authentic life, one must 
undertake what Sartre calls an existential psychoanalysis.   
 
 
I will thus show in the next section that Sartre’s concern for the self leads him 





1.6 EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOANALYSIS 
 
 
Sartre’s incursion to the field of psychoanalysis brings a lot of difficulties. For 
instance: why would Sartre adopt a discourse that, for most parts, claims that 
consciousness has hidden motives which are lying in the deeper structures of the 
psyche/unconscious, when, as an existential phenomenologist, he argues that “there is 
no ego, no superego and id”, but only a “bodily lived consciousness grasping the world 
in this way or that129”? Such interest for psychoanalysis may be puzzling and untenable 
with Sartre’s earlier philosophy. Yet, behind these contradictions lies the attempt to 
refine his model of individuation.  
 
As suggested above, Sartre’s thoughts on consciousness are incompatible with 
the psychoanalytic discourse, for he argued in the past that consciousness is transparent 
to itself.  He thus rejected the Freudian account of the unconscious, for this was for 
him just an illustration of bad faith, an excuse for the individual to flee away from her 
responsibilities as a radically free person. There is nothing hidden concerning 
selfhood, argues Sartre. But in 1971, Sartre does not consider himself as a philosopher 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans. Hazel 
Barnes (New York, London, Toronto, Sidney, Tokyo, Singapor: Washington Square Press, 1956) p.412 
(footnote) 
129 Betty Cannon, ‘Psychoanalysis and Existential Psychoanalysis’, in Jean-Paul Sartre: Key Concepts, 
eds. Steven Churchill and Jack Reynolds, (Durham; Acumen, 2013) p.81 
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of absolute freedom and acknowledges the power of circumstances130. Thus, his 
thoughts came to be more nuanced towards psychoanalysis131. During his interview 
with Michel Contat for Le Monde, Sartre declares that one may not be predetermined, 
but predestined to accomplish certain types of action according to the situation one 
was born into. As such, one is not completely free, insofar as choices are in fact 
conditioned options132. In this respect, Sartre asserts the self as being the product of 
social forces, and moves away from his conception of self as a mere collection of 
decisions. Without discarding his early work, Sartre wants to put the stress on external 
constraints and dig further on the limits imposed by facticity.  His work thus 
acknowledges that individuals are entangled in situations, embedded in a specific 
culture or period of time, which conditions them and restrict their liberties.  In this 
respect, we do not always have choices, but we still have options. If Sartre is more 
nuanced it is due to his growing interest in Marxism133. In fact, the Sartre of 
Existentialism is a Humanism and of Being and Nothingness was, as he acknowledges 
himself, the prisoner of a certain ideal of freedom, conditioned by the social malaise 
of the Second World War and the issue of Resistance 134.  
 
 
Sartre sketches in The Critique of Dialectical Reason a vision of the individual 
more permeable to its social environment. But it would be wrong to accuse the 
philosopher of dissolving the subject into the determinations of the material framework 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Thomas W. Busch, ‘Self-making and alienation: from bad faith to revolution’, in Jean-Paul Sartre: 
Key concepts, eds. Stephen Churchill and Jack Reynolds (Durham: Acumen 2013) p.164 
131 Sartre’s interest for psychoanalysis is not brand new. We already find in Being and Nothingness a 
slight psychoanalytical tone when Sartre is speaking the possibility of “radical conversion”, which I 
will mention again in the next couple of pages.  
132 Orignal quote : D’une certaine façon nous naissons tous prédestinés. Nous sommes voués à un certain 
type d’action dès l’origine par la situation où se trouvent la famille et la société à un moment donné 
(…) La prédestination, c’est ce qui remplace chez moi le déterminisme : je considère que nous ne 
sommes pas libres — tout au moins provisoirement, aujourd’hui— puisque nous sommes aliénés. On 
se perd toujours dans l’enfance : les méthodes d’éducation, le rapport parents-enfant, l’enseignement, 
etc., tout cela donne un moi, mais un moi perdu (…) Cela ne veut pas dire que cette prédestination ne 
comporte aucun choix, mais on sait qu’en choisissant on ne réalisera pas ce qu’on a choisi : c’est ce que 
j’appelle la nécessité de la liberté. Par exemple, Flaubert n’était pas tout à fait conditionné à choisir 
l’écriture. C’est venu petit à petit à partir du moment où il a appris à lire (…) Tout est joué d’avance : 
il reste à Gustave des options, mais des options conditionnées.  
Sartre, Situations X, Entretiens sur moi-même, Sartre (Paris : Gallimard, 1976) p.99 
133 See Nik Farrell Fox, The New Sartre (New York, London; Continuum, 2003) 
 
134 Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘Itinerary of a Thought’, Conversations with Jean-Paul Sartre; Perry Anderson, 
Ronald Fraser, Quintin Hoare and Simone De Beauvoir (London, New York, Calcutta: Seagull Books, 
2006) p.5 
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(practico-inert). The themes of individuality, autonomy and responsibility remain 
essential to his work, though they are reinterpreted through the socio-material prism 
of Marxism135.  
 
After the war came the true experience, that of society. But I think it was necessary for me to 
pass via the myth of heroism first. That is to say, the pre-war personage who was more or less 
Stendhal's egotistical individualist had to be plunged into circumstances against his will, yet 
where he still had the power to say yes or no, in order to encounter inextricable entanglements 
of the post-war years as a man totally conditioned by his social existence and yet sufficiently 
capable of decision to reassume all this conditioning and to become responsible for it. For the 
idea which I have never ceased to develop is that in the end one is always responsible for what 
is made of one. Even if one can do nothing else besides assume this responsibility. For I 
believe that a man can always make something out of what is made of him136.  
 
The fact that I am not purely free, but conditioned by a web of situations that pre-exist 
and influence the person I am, as well as the way, I interiorize social rituals, relations 
of production, historical past and contemporary institutions137, does not invalidate the 
figure of the individual as responsible agent. But insofar as freedom is coextensive 
with responsibility, the latter shall itself be understood as limited by structural 
causations and factical conditions. While Sartre used to reject the finalism deployed 
through the Freudian discourse of the unconscious, he comes to acknowledge, for 
example, that one can live in disguise138. One can be misled, confused, and become 
the prisoner of his or her actions. After all, actions are the exteriorization of the 
individual’s interiorization of the practico-inert. To transcend the practico-inert and 
not be glued in determinism, the individual should develop weapons. This weapon is 
self-knowledge, that is, the elaboration of a personal project through which I can 
transcend, without negating my material configuration.  
In Being and Nothingness Sartre claims that one must go through a “radical 
conversion139,” if one wants to live out her freedom. The later Sartre rather suggests is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 See Nik Farrell Fox, The New Sartre, (New York, London: Continuum, 2003) 
136 Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘Itinerary of a Thought’, Conversations with Jean-Paul Sartre; Perry Anderson, 
Ronald Fraser, Quintin Hoare and Simone De Beauvoir (London, New York, Calcutta: Seagull Books, 
2006) p.6-7 
137 Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘Itinerary of a Thought’, Conversations with Jean-Paul Sartre; Perry Anderson, 
Ronald Fraser, Quintin Hoare and Simone De Beauvoir (London, New York, Calcutta: Seagull Books, 
2006) p.8 
138 Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘Itinerary of a Thought’, Conversations with Jean-Paul Sartre; Perry Anderson, 
Ronald Fraser, Quintin Hoare and Simone De Beauvoir (London, New York, Calcutta: Seagull Books, 
2006) p.12 
139 In a footnote, Sartre writes: “These considerations do not exclude the possibility of an ethics of 
deliverance and salvation. But this can be achieved only after a radical conversion which we can not 
discuss here.”  See: Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, 
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that it is only in undertaking an investigation upon myself, that I can tend to a form of 
freedom. This means that if the late Sartre is more pessimistic regarding the actual 
achievement of freedom, he seems to have faith in the practice of introspection as the 
realization of autonomy. The self is therefore not reducible to the sphere of visible 
actions as it was the case in Existentialism is a Humanism, but to the profundity of the 
‘fundamental project’ which must be ‘revealed’ to me. Towards the end of his life, 
Sartre will embrace this process of self-explicitation more explicitly. 140 However, this 
discourse of revelation may sound odd on many levels because of its spiritual 
character. It also exemplifies well my earlier concerns when I said that Sartre’s interest 
for psychoanalysis is entangled in lots of contradictions regarding his philosophy of 
self, supposedly transparent. But the difficulty can be avoided if one takes in 
consideration, as Christina Howells does, the difference between consciousness and 
awareness141. Here, revelation should be understood as the development of awareness, 
which therapeutics is concerned about.  
 
As Howells indicates, the separation in Sartre between consciousness and 
knowledge/awareness (savoir) forces him to progressively admit a form of ‘inhabited’ 
consciousness142. Moreover, it leads Sartre to reckon the existence of a hidden stream 
of consciousness. It is true that Sartre attacks the Freudian dichotomy between the 
conscious (what is known to me) and the unconscious (as mere repression of the 
known) which he sees it as a form of bad faith, that is, an excuse from the individual 
to escape his condition of free subject. But he will later become more sympathetic with 
the work of Lacan. While Freud makes of the unconscious a real consistent, located at 
the back of the individual’s memories, a set of obscures symbols and desires which 
have lust for finality, Lacan thinks the unconscious primarily in terms of 
transindividual discourse. And it seems that Sartre agrees on the importance of the 
relation between the subject and language as a revealing tool: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
trans. Hazel Barnes (New York, London, Toronto, Sidney, Tokyo, Singapor: Washington Square Press, 
1956) p.412 
140 Sartre: “I'm talking about things I know. There is always a kind of little fringe that is not said, and 
who does not want to be told, but who wants to be known by me”.  
Original quote :  “Je parle de choses que je sais. Il y a toujours une espèce de petite frange qui n’est pas 
dite, et qui ne veut pas être dite, mais qui veut être sue, sur par moi”, Sartre, Situations X, Entretiens 
sur moi-même, (Paris : Gallimard, 1976) p.143-144  
141 Christina Howells, Sartre: The Necessity of Freedom, (Cambridge, New York, New Rochelle, 
Melbourne, Sidney; Cambridge University Press, 1988) p.147 
142 Christina Howells, Sartre: The Necessity of Freedom, (Cambridge, New York, New Rochelle, 
Melbourne, Sidney; Cambridge University Press, 1988) p.152  
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As far as I am concerned, Lacan has clarified the unconscious as a discourse which separates 
through language, or, if you prefer, as a counter finality of speech: verbal structures are 
organized as a structure of the practico-inert through the act of speaking. These structures 
express or constitute intentions which determine me without being mine143. 
 
Sartre then makes a contrast between the conscious and the lived (le vécu)144. The lived 
designates: 
 
…neither the refuges of the preconscious nor the unconscious, nor the conscious, but the area 
in which the individual is constantly swamped by himself, by his own riches, and where 
consciousness is shrewd enough to determine itself by forgetting (…) What I call the vécu is 
precisely the whole of the dialectical process of psychic life, a process which remains 
necessarily opaque to itself for it is a constant totalization, and a totalization which cannot be 
conscious of what it is. One may be conscious, in fact, of an external totalization, but not of a 
totalization which also totalizes consciousness. In this sense, the vécu is always susceptible of 
understanding, never of knowledge145.  
 
 
As such, what separates the lived and the conscious is what separates understanding 
from knowledge. It is evident in this respect that Sartre appeals for the cultivating of 
the self, insofar as his model of existential psychoanalysis aims at the developing of 
the conscious relation with oneself. It is by the means of this conscious relation that 
the individual can develop a certain knowledge of herself. This knowledge is never 
objective or complete. For Sartre, one will always have an oblique account of herself, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 As quoted and translated by Christina Howells in Sartre: The Necessity of Freedom (Cambridge, 
New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne, Sidney; Cambridge University Press, 1988) p.259 
Original quote : “Pour moi, Lacan a clarifié l’inconscient en tant que discours qui sépare à travers le 
langage ou, si l’on préfère, en tant que contre-finalité de la parole ; des ensembles verbaux se structurent 
comme ensemble pratico-inerte à travers l’acte de parler. Ces ensembles expriment ou constituent des 
intentions qui me déterminent sans être miennes. ” 
Sartre, Situations IX, (Paris : Gallimard, 1972) p.97 
144 The lived will constitutes the crux of his biography on Flaubert. He declares in his interview with 
Michel Contat:  
“Pour moi cela représente, si vous voulez, l’équivalent de conscient-inconscient, c’est-à-dire que je ne 
crois toujours pas à l’inconscient sous certaines formes, bien que la conception chez Lacan soit plus 
intéressante…J’ai voulu donner l’idée d’un ensemble dont la surface est tout à fait consciente et dont le 
reste est opaque à cette consciente et, sans être de l’inconscient, vous est caché. Quand je montre 
comment Flaubert ne se connaît pas lui-même et comment en même temps il se comprend 
admirablement, j’indique ce que j’appelle le vécu, c’est-à-dire la vie en compréhension avec soi-même, 
sans que ce soit indiquée une connaissance, une conscience thétique. Cette notion de vécu est un outil 
dont je me sers mais que je n’ai pas encore théorisé. Je le ferais bientôt. Si vous voulez, chez Flaubert, 
le vécu c’est quand il parle des illuminations qu’il a et qui le laissent ensuite dans l’ombre sans qu’il 
puisse retrouver les chemins. D’une part, il est dans l’ombre avant et dans l’ombre après, mais, d’autre 
part, il y a le moment où il a vu ou compris quelque chose sur lui-même. ” 
Sartre, Situations X, Entretiens sur moi-même, (Paris : Gallimard, 1976) p.110-111  
145 As quoted and translated by Christina Howells, Sartre: The Necessity of Freedom, (Cambridge, New 
York, New Rochelle, Melbourne, Sidney: Cambridge University Press, 1988) p.258 
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but existential psychoanalysis enables the individual to be as conscious as possible of 
one’s choices. 
 
At this stage, another distinction must be made. It is indeed not enough to 
define existential psychoanalysis as the conscious relation of self by the self, for 
example. To be more precise, Sartre argues that while I am in a certain sense always 
conscious of my project, I am not necessarily aware of it. Yet, this shall not be 
interpreted as a return to the theory of the unconscious. Sartre is not a Freudian; he 
does not believe in the unconscious (which he reads as non-conscious). It is on the 
contrary the fundamental property of consciousness to be conscious. As such, the un-
conscious —for the phenomenologist he is— is an absurdity. On the other hand, 
consciousness does not equate knowledge. This means that despite the fact that I 
ineluctably live my freedom on a pre-reflective level, there is no guarantee of me 
possessing any reflective awareness of it: “Thus, the first effect of existentialism is to 
make every man conscious of what he is, and to make him solely responsible for his 
own existence”146. Such awareness does not make me more free, insofar as it cannot 
suddenly liberate me from social constraints, but it gives me the possibility to 
rediscover the freedom I already have. As such, it makes me more authentic.  
 
In short, Sartre argues that the individual is not originally aware of her 
fundamental project. But the observance of one’s past actions may help one to unravel 
it. The project one has assigned to oneself already exudes from one’s doings. In this 
respect, existential psychoanalysis is the attempt to grasp one’s fundamental project, 
understood that this project has its origins in “the background-depth of all my thoughts 
and feelings147”. Finally, if Sartre defends existential therapeutics, it is because the 
individual has, by the means of psychoanalysis, the opportunity to embrace her past as 
a series of choices. To be able to do so would, according to Sartre, free the individual 
from the belief that she is the mere product of social/ psychological/ familial 
conditioning148. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, trans. Philippe Mairet (London; Methuen&co, 
1948) p.23 
147  Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans. Hazel 
Barnes (New York, London, Toronto, Sidney, Tokyo, Singapor: Washington Square Press, 1956) p.141 
148 Betty Cannon, ‘Psychoanalysis and Existential Psychoanalysis’, in Jean-Paul Sartre: Key Concepts, 
eds. Steven Churchill and Jack Reynolds, (Durham; Acumen, 2013) p.82-83 




1.7 KEY POINTS 
 
The aim of the section was to show how Sartre approaches the theme of 
individuation. As I have highlighted throughout the chapter, he rejects the notion of a 
substansive self. In this respect, selfhood is not innate to the individual’s essence, nor 
is it set as its transcendental feature. Instead, the self is produced through the unifying 
activity of consciousness. The other key point to remember is the following; since our 
radical freedom (which lies in the spontaneity of consciousness) leaves us with no 
choice other than being responsible, Sartre’s conception of selfhood is less concerned 
by who we are, but by who we ought to be. Sartre then develops an existential 
psychoanalysis. For Sartre, such existential therapy does not involve the revelation of 
the repressed. It is instead understood as the clarification of the hidden, through which 
one learns to make of herself an object of knowledge and/or language. The next chapter 
proposes to investigate further the theme of the aesthetics of self-constitution in 





	   64	  







The purpose of this section will be to develop the issue of subjectivation in 
Sartre’s work while undertaking a comparison with the work of the late Foucault on 
the same issue. As such, my reading will be largely inspired by the contributions of 
Nick Farrell Fox on The New Sartre. Though aware of Sartre’s and Foucault’s 
philosophical incompatibilities, this chapter aims to draw continuities between the two 
figures through the theme of the aesthetics of self-constitution. I would like to show in 
this respect that Sartre’s notion of the project can be thought as a technique of self.  
 
For the purpose of my argument, I will mostly focus (though not exclusively) 
on the ‘late Foucault’149. I will start with an overall appreciation of Foucault’s famous 
disagreements with Sartre. After that, I will elaborate on Foucault’s reading of the 
aesthecization of the subject. In doing so, I will jump back to Sartre in order to present 
Words as an early theorization of a technique of existence in which Sartre defends an 
aesthetics of self-constitution which, I believe, Foucault could have been sympathetic 
to. The chapter will end on the circumstances of the constitution of the subject through 
the interplay of power and freedom using Sartre’s least existentialist work: The 
Critique of Dialectical Reason.  
 
My argument is the following: both Sartre and Foucault argue for the creative 
construction of the individual. But while Sartre’s ethics remains turned towards an 
egological ethics of commitment that revolves around the necessity of freedom; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 In the introduction, I have stressed that Foucault’s work can divisible into three significant periods; 
that of archaeology, genealogy and ethics. This distinction is accepted by most scholars, yet some 
disagree. For example, Colin Koopman suggest that such division is unnecessary and that Foucault’s 
body of work is homogeneous, insofar as his overall project remain in “the critical tradition of Kant”. I 
will play it safe by acknowledging the existence of three Foucaults (that can also be referred as the 
epistemic, the political and the ethical Foucault, the latter being the object of my interest here). See: 
Colin Koopman, Genealogy as Critique: Foucault and the Problems of Modernity (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2013), p.18 
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Foucault’s ethics of subjectivation puts the emphasis on power at the cost of freedom. 
As we will see in the next chapter, Stiegler intends for his part to politicize the issue 
of self-cultivation in order to reactivate the possibility for democratic freedom.  
 
2.1 SARTRE AND FOUCAULT: RIVALRIES AND INCOMPATIBILITIES 
 
 
Sartre’s and Foucault’s philosophical disagreements are justly famous. In an interview 
for L’Arc in autumn 1966, Sartre accuses Foucault and the Structuralists of promoting 
a new ideology and of abstracting the concept of the subject for the hegemony of 
impersonal forms and signs.150 He also calls his successor “the last barrier the 
bourgeoisie can still erect against Marx”. Foucault responds to this criticism with a 
pinch of irony: 
 
I would say two things in response. First, Sartre is a man with too much important work to do 
— literary, philosophical, political — to have the time to read my book. In fact, he hasn’t read 
it. Consequently, what he says about it can’t seem very pertinent to me. Secondly, I’ll confess 
something to you. I was in the Communist Party some time ago for a few months, or a little 
more than several months, and at that time Sartre was defined for us as the last rampart of 
bourgeois imperialism, the last stone of the edifice, etc. So it’s with amused astonishment that 
I find this phrase coming from Sartre’s pen now, fifteen years later. Let’s say that he and I have 
turned around the same axis151. 
 
And when Sartre reproaches Foucault for showing contempt for the concept of history, 
Foucault declares that he would be delighted if he managed to kill what he sees as a 
“philosophical myth of history152”, arguing that, on the other hand, his work has been 
well received by historians. As such, it has usually been common for scholars to 
oppose the two thinkers, for the first is famous for perpetrating the Cartesian tradition, 
which revolves around the cogito as the foundation of knowledge, while the second is 
popular for asserting the co-relation of the political body and discursivity. On his 
supposed Cartesian allegiance, Sartre admits to being a Frenchman “imbued with a 
certain rationalism153”, a rationalism that, according to him, culminates in Being and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘Jean-Paul Sartre répond’, L’arc issue 30, 1966. 
151 Michel Foucault, ‘Foucault responds to Sartre’, in Foucault Live; interviews 1966-84, ed. Sylvère 
Lotringer trans. John Johnston (New York; Semiotext(e), 1989) p.40 
152 Michel Foucault, ‘Foucault responds to Sartre’, in Foucault Live; interviews 1966-84, ed. Sylvère 
Lotringer trans. John Johnston (New York; Semiotext(e), 1989) p.41 
153 Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘Itinerary of a Thought’ in Conversations with Jean-Paul Sartre; Perry Anderson, 
Ronald Fraser, Quintin Hoare and Simone De Beauvoir (London, New York, Calcutta; Seagull Books, 
2006) p.11 
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Nothingness, in which he describes the cogito as ‘the sole secure point of departure154’. 
Sartre’s attachment to the absolute autonomy of the individual brought about a number 
of criticisms from his contemporaries155.  
 
This general incomprehension continued with the next generation of thinkers 
who held a certain grudge and disdain for Sartre and his classic existentialism. For 
example, it is in the attempt to break with the discourse of the ontological individual, 
the choice, the notion of responsibility and the dynamic between the question of 
essence and existence, that structuralism came to emerge as a form of anti-humanism. 
However, Sartre’s views on ontological freedom may have been exaggerated, 
especially over  time, precisely because of this need for the French scene of the second 
half of the twentieth century to assert its independence towards the philosopher’s 
influence.156 Articles such as Lyotard’s “A Success of Sartre’s157” illustrate well the 
conflictual atmosphere of the time. Indeed, Lyotard reproaches his predecessor for 
having produced a number of ‘unworthy texts158’ and remembers his reading of Being 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans. Hazel 
Barnes (New York, London, Toronto, Sidney, Tokyo, Singapor: Washington Square Press, 1956) p.244 
155 Such as Claude Lévi-Strauss who writes: 
 
He who begins by steeping himself in the allegedly self-evident truths of introspection never 
emerges from them. Knowledge of men sometimes seems easier to those who allow themselves 
to be caught up in the snare of personal identity. But they thus shut the door on knowledge of 
man: written or unavowed 'confessions' form the basis of all ethnographic research. Sartre in 
fact becomes the prisoner of his Cogito: Descartes made it possible to attain universality, but 
conditionally on remaining psychological and individual; by sociologizing the Cogito, Sartre 
merely exchanges one prison for another. Each subject's group and period now take the place 
of timeless consciousness. 
 
Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (London; Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966) p.249 
156 See Jack Reynolds and Ashley Woodward, ‘Existentialism and Poststructuralism: Some 
Unfashionable Observations’, in The Continuum Companion of Existentialism, eds. Felicity Joseph, 
Jack Reynolds and Ashley Woodward (London: Continuum, 2011) 
 
157 Jean-François Lyotard, ‘A Success of Sartre’s’, foreword in D. Hollier, The Politics of Prose: Essay 
on Sartre. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986)  
158 Jean-François Lyotard, ‘A Success of Sartre’s’, foreword in D. Hollier, The Politics of Prose: Essay 
on Sartre. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986) p. XI 
159 Jean-François Lyotard, ‘A Success of Sartre’s’, foreword in D. Hollier, The Politics of Prose: Essay 
on Sartre. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986) p. XI-XII 
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We mostly remember Sartre for his bold claims such as ‘existence precedes essence’ 
or ‘hell is other people’. Yet, we tend to forget that Sartre changed his views on 
multiple occasions. Despite his attempts to “provide a philosophical foundation for 
realism” and “to give man both his autonomy and his reality among real objects160”, 
Sartre eventually reframed his discourse around the circularity between praxis and 
matter in Critique of Dialectical Reason. Thus, he says: 
 
I posed the problem in this way because I was ignorant of dialectical materialism, although I 
should add that this later allowed me to assign certain limits to it — to validate the historical 
dialectic while rejecting a dialectic of nature, in the sense of a natural process which produces 
and resolves man into an ensemble of physical laws161. 
 
It is true that throughout his writings, Sartre consistently argued that a human being 
can always make something out of what is made of her, hereby continuing to place the 
subject’s freedom at the center of his philosophy. But he is also forced to acknowledge 
that “man constructs signs because in his very reality he is signifying162”. This means 
that the individual is not only a producer, but an object produced through social 
relations, that is, through a signifying system conditioning, modelling and constituting 
the individual as a person: 
  
The world is outside; language and culture are not inside the individual like stamps registered 
by his nervous system. It is the individual who is inside culture and inside language; that is, 
inside a special section of the field of instruments163. 
 
 
The fact that Sartre conflates the subject with history is a good example of the shift 
from absolute freedom to situated freedom. In Anti-Semite and Jew: An Exploration 
of the Etiology of Hate, Sartre acknowledges indeed that freedom is never total but 
operates within the limits of a situation, and “it is this situation that must be modified 
from top to bottom164”, implying that individual freedom necessitates the freedom of 
others and is always enacted within the present social order. The contingent social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘Itinerary of a Thought’, in Conversations with Jean-Paul Sartre; Perry Anderson, 
Ronald Fraser, Quintin Hoare and Simone De Beauvoir (London, New York, Calcutta; Seagull Books, 
2006) p.11 
161 ibid, p.11 
162 Jean-Paul Sartre, Search for a Method, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1963)  
p.152 
163 Jean-Paul Sartre, Search for a Method, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1963)  
p.113 
164 Jean-Paul Sartre, Anti-Semite and Jew: an exploration of the etiology of hate, trans. George J. Becker 
(New York; Schocken Books, 1948) p.107 
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arrangements form what Sartre calls the practico-inert. It is a web of meanings and 
past experiences that are sedimented and interiorized by the cultural/political order. 
Such a frame limits and circumscribes the individual’s freedom, so one cannot be 
purely free, but free in relation to a certain context.  
 
Freedom is always in tension between the praxis (the individual’s spontaneous action) 
and the inert (inorganic matter). In this respect, the individual’s autonomy is 
conditioned, but not dominated or overpowered by the inertness of the situation she is 
entangled within. This means that even though the later Sartre of the Critique of 
Dialectical Reason may seem to ‘dissolve the subject into the structures that traverse 
her165’, as is observed by Christina Howells, Sartre is actually striving to maintain both 
poles of man-as-producer and man-as-product in his conception of subjectivity and 
individuality166.  In this respect, Sartre is still ‘resolutely refusing to slip into an easy 
acceptance of either thesis or anti-thesis’, so that his notion of the subject may be 
‘deferred or deconstructed, but is not relinquished167’, Howells argues. This dialectic 
of transcendence and facticity constitutes the crux of Sartre’s model of selfhood and 
invites us to think of his work as something in-between the humanism of existentialism 
—that which asserts the individual as the origin of meaning— and the determinism of 










	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 Christina Howells, ‘Conclusion: Sartre and the deconstruction of the subject’, in The Cambridge 
Companion to Sartre, ed. Christina Howells (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) p.342 
166 Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘Itinerary of a Thought’, in Conversations with Jean-Paul Sartre; Perry Anderson, 
Ronald Fraser, Quintin Hoare and Simone De Beauvoir (London, New York, Calcutta; Seagull Books, 
2006) p.7 
167 Christina Howells, ‘Conclusion: Sartre and the deconstruction of the subject’, in The Cambridge 
Companion to Sartre, ed. Christina Howells (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) p.342  
	   69	  
2.2 FOUCAULT AND THE SUBJECT  
 
  
Foucault’s approach intends to articulate a history of problems, of tensions, of 
conflicts, as well as it intends to articulate a history of solutions to these very problems. 
Hence, what draws Foucault’s attention is how these problems have emerged or 
disappeared or been transformed, arranged and rearranged, deconstructed and 
reconstructed, through time. Foucault’s intuition is that to each problem corresponds 
a historical shift, whether this shift is sudden or progressive. The cultural acceptance 
of the inner self is one of them168.  The goal of Foucault’s enterprise, as explains Colin 
Koopman, is to provide a “diagnosis of the difficulties that motivate the continued 
elaboration of ourselves in the present169”. By “problematization”, Foucault does not 
mean to decipher an inner truth beyond power and discursivity. Power and 
discursivities are what ground truth itself, insofar as truth is produced within a field of 
constraints and not simply discovered. It is therefore those processes of production 
that Foucault is interested in, whether they concern knowledge or the subject. But 
during his early career, Foucault did not give much importance to the subject as a 
determining principle of knowledge formation. Indeed the archeological method 
intended to question the conditions of possibilities of knowledge. Genealogy, on the 
other hand, examined the production of regimes of truths and the effects of power. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168  Foucault writes:  
We have passed from a pleasure to be recounted and heard, centering on the heroic or 
marvelous narration of “trials” of bravery or sainthood, to a literature ordered according to the 
infinite task of extracting from the depths of oneself, in between the words, a truth which the 
very form of the confession holds out like a shimmering mirage. Whence too this new way of 
philosophizing: seeking the fundamental relation to the true, not simply in oneself-in some 
forgotten knowledge, or in a certain primal trace-but in the self-examination that yields, 
through a multitude of fleeting impressions, the basic certainties of consciousness. The 
obligation to confess is now relayed through so many different points, 'is so deeply ingrained 
in us, that we no longer perceive it as the effect of a power that constrains us; on the contrary, 
it seems to us that truth, lodged in our most secret nature, "demands" only to surface; that if it 
fails to do so, this is because a constraint holds it in place, the violence of a power weighs it 
down, and it can finally be articulated only at the price of a kind of liberation.  
Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume I: An Introduction (New York: Vintage Books, 
1980) p.59-60 
169 Colin Koopman, Genealogy as Critique: Foucault and the Problems of Modernity (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2013), p.219 
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other words, archaeology focused on the discursive, whereas genealogy revolved 
around the body. 
 
As such, Foucault was very harsh towards Sartre’s work. He did not hesitate to 
describe the Critique of Dialectical Reason as “the magnificent and pathetic effort of 
a man of the nineteenth century to think the twentieth170”. In retrospect, it could be 
said that Sartre’s major influence in the intellectual scene did not leave Foucault much 
choice other than that of accepting to live in his shadow or break away from the 
existentialist heritage. The issue will be to find out whether the return to the question 
of the subject in the late Foucault could be interpreted as the taking up of a  Sartrean 
legacy171. 
 
While we can reunite Sartre and Foucault together regarding their 
understanding of the constitution of the self, I do not wish to draw naive conclusions. 
It is not because Sartre acknowledges the power of social determinations that he can 
be qualified as Foucauldian before Foucault, and it is not my intention to say so. Sartre 
comes from a tradition (namely phenomenology) that still posits the I as key founder 
of experience. On Foucault’s philosophical position Beatrice Han argues: “Foucault’s 
definition clearly seeks to break with the philosophical tradition that subordinates 
experience (be it as Erfarhung or Erlebnis) to subjectivity in order to give it an 
objective definition172.” As such, Foucault understands the subject as constituted 
within structures of power and knowledge. If perhaps, one can perceive a similar 
process of in Sartre’s acknowledgement of man-as-product and man-as-producer173, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Michel Foucault, Dits et écrits 1954-1988 4 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1994) volume 1, p.541-541 
171 To describe Foucault as Sartrean does not sound that antinomic, for they share few things in common: 
“Like Sartre, Foucault began from a relentless hatred of bourgeois society and culture and with a 
spontaneous sympathy for marginal groups such as the mad, homosexuals, and prisoners. They both 
also had strong interests in literature and psychology as well as philosophy, and both, after an early 
relative lack of political interest, became committed activists”. See the Stanford Encyclopedia article 
on Foucault: Gary Gutting, and Johanna Oksala, ‘Michel Foucault’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 




172 Beatrice Han, Foucault’s Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the Historical, trans. 
Edward Pile (Stanford, California; Stanford University Press, 2002) p.155 
173 I says that it is a possibility, but I do not think that the term “co-extensivity” suits Sartre’s philosophy 
very well. The dynamics tying the individual to the situation is dialectical in the sense that they may 
form and deform each other, but are not giving birth to each other and expanding through each other. 
Besides, Sartre’s philosophical approach tends, for most parts, to abstract the subject from its concrete 
environment, as if the subject was more a metaphysical residue than a historical product (which may be 
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Foucault’s approach remains slightly different by focusing on circuits of production, 
in which human beings participate. In other words, Foucault’s analysis aims at the 
impersonal; it thus favors an analysis of relationships. Sartre’s interest, on the other 
hand, revolves first and foremost on the experience of the individual. Besides, Foucault 
describes relations, whereas Sartre tends to assign a value (whether negative or 
positive174) to these processes.  
 
Regarding the conception of the subject, Foucault is reluctant to acknowledge 
the transcendental “I”175, as he wishes to distance himself from earlier philosophical 
traditions, which posit the human essentially through the equation subject-
consciousness176.  
 
In all my work I strive instead to avoid any reference to this transcendental as a condition of 
possibility for any knowledge. When I say that I strive to avoid it, I don’t mean that I am sure 
of succeeding. My procedure at this moment is of a regressive sort, I would say; I try to assume 
a greater and greater detachment in order to define the historical conditions and transformations 
of our knowledge. I try to historicize to the utmost in order to leave as little space as possible 
to the transcendental. I cannot exclude the possibility that one day I will have to confront an 
irreducible residuum which will be, in fact, the transcendental177.  
 
 
In this respect, Foucault is not a phenomenologist. While phenomenology may be 
interpreted as “the attempt to think man from the point of view of man178”, the aim of 
the archeological method is to liberate fields of discursivity from anthropocentric 
accounts. For example, as notes Andrew Cutrofello, Foucault does not use the notion 
of “historical a priori” the same way as Husserl. It has “nothing to do with conscious 
intentions”. Hence, Cutrofello explains that “whereas for Husserl the task of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
a consequence of Sartre’s self-confessed Cartesianism). If his late work aims to place back the subject 
in its socio-historical situation, I believe that it is insofar as the two remain thought independently from 
each other.   
174 My understanding of positivity and negativity in this precise section shall not be understood as a 
synonym for moral conceptions of right and wrong or good and evil. My point is that Sartre’s 
understanding of Man-as-producer expresses the assertion of spontaneous freedom, while Man-as-
product is viewed as the limitation of that very freedom. It is in that that I perceive these definitions 
being positive and negative. The same way “value” shall be heard here as a synonym for connotation, 
more than as a deep philosophical concept.  
175 Michel Foucault, ‘Historian of culture’, in Foucault Live; interviews 1966-84, ed. Sylvère Lotringer 
trans. John Johnston (New York; Semiotext(e), 1989) p.78 
176 especially from the 17th (with Descartes) up to the 20th century (culminating with Sartre and Merleau-
Ponty) 
177 Michel Foucault, ‘Historian of culture’, in Foucault Live; interviews 1966-84, , ed. Sylvère Lotringer 
trans. John Johnston (New York; Semiotext(e), 1989) p.79 
178 Andrew Cutrofello, Continental Philosophy: A Contemporary Introduction (New York and London: 
Routledge, 2005) p.87 
	   72	  
genetic phenomenologist was to reconstruct the process by which successive strata of 
the historical a priori were laid down by a living consciousness, for Foucault the task 
of the archeologist is to treat textual marks as indicative “monuments” rather than as 
expressive “documents””179. This difference of interpretation, I believe, is crucial to 
note, for it seems that Stiegler, who positions himself in a lineage deriving from 
Foucault, understands the historical a priori in the way Husserl does. In that sense, 
Stiegler’s conception of the subject could be said closer to Sartre’s than Foucault’s. 
Unlike Foucault, Sartre thinks the textual mark as expressive rather than 
indicative. In this respect, he makes of language an object connected to psychology, 
insofar as mental mechanisms and the formation of the laws of language remain 
intertwined: 
Because we are men and because we live in the world of men, of work, and of conflicts, all the 
objects which surround us are signs. By themselves they indicate their use and scarcely mask 
the real project of those who have made them such for us and who address us through them. 
But their particular ordering, under this or that circumstance, retraces for us an individual 
action, a project, an event (…) Signification comes from man and from his project, but they 
are inscribed everywhere in things and in the order of things. Everything at every instant is 
signifying and significations reveal to us men and relations among men across the structures 
of our society. But these significations appear to us only insofar as we ourselves are 
signifying180. 
Such psychological aspect of language was rejected by the early Foucault who tried in 
the Archelogy of Knowledge to grasp discourse in its manifest existence, that is, to 
analyze it as an independent system of functioning; 
One must be able to make an historical analysis of the transformation of discourse without 
having recourse to the thought of men, to their mode of perception, their habits and the 
influences to which they have submitted181.  
 
This approach appears very structuralist insofar as structuralism, instead of focusing 
on the correspondence between mind and world, intends to show that meaning is extra-
subjective and that language deploys a system of signification independent from 
human action.  Yet, Foucault did not like being associated to the structuralist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179  Andrew Cutrofello, Continental Philosophy: A Contemporary Introduction (New York and London: 
Routledge, 2005) p.87 
180 Jean-Paul Sartre, Search for a Method, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1963) 
p.155-6 
181 Michel Foucault, ‘The Archeology of Knowledge’, in Foucault Live; interviews 1966-84, ed. Sylvère 
Lotringer trans. John Johnston (New York; Semiotext(e), 1989) p.47 
	   73	  
movement and deplored being labeled as such by public opinion182. While he agrees 
that formal relationships can exist and operate when the subject is not truly conscious, 
and while he reckons that with linguistics, logic and ethnology, “one arrives at the 
discovery of a sector which stands outside consciousness”, he refuses to think these 
structures as an ahistorical whole.  
 
 
Foucault’s philosophy takes a new turn when focusing on the technologies of 
the self. This shift of interest from power relations to the subject left scholars 
perplexed. It appears indeed that the concerns of the late Foucault have little to do with 
the concerns of the early Foucault, whose aim was, at that time, to develop an archaeo-
genealogical method for analyzing discursivity, power, and regimes of production183. 
But tired of being branded as a mere thinker of power relations, or a historian of truth, 
insofar as truth is a discourse constructed in the episteme184 of a civilization, Foucault 
declared in 1984 that the nature of his investigations should rather be understood as 
the attempt to think subjectivation as “the process through which results the 
constitution of a subject, or more exactly, of a subjectivity which is obviously only 
one of the given possibilities of organizing a consciousness of self”185. If, on the one 
hand, he does not intend to minimize the importance of power in the circuits of 
production and signification, he acknowledges, on the other hand, that the notion of 
the subject still demands our attention 186. 
 
As such, Foucault’s understanding of the subject still offers an account of 
power, insofar as the two are co-expansive and that the history of subjectivity is also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Michel Foucault, ‘An Historian of culture’, in Foucault Live; interviews 1966-84, ed. Sylvère 
Lotringer trans. John Johnston (New York; Semiotext(e), 1989) p.80 
183 Garry Gutting, ‘Introduction, Foucault: A User’s Manual’, in The Cambridge Companion to 
Foucault, ed. Gary Gutting (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 
p.4 
184 Episteme should not be understood as mere historical category but rather as a set of “relationships 
which existed between the various sectors of science during a given epoch”. Michel Foucault ‘An 
Historian of culture’, in Foucault Live; interviews 1966-84, ed. Sylvère Lotringer trans. John Johnston 
(New York; Semiotext(e), 1989) p.76 
185 Michel Foucault, ‘The Return of Morality’, in Foucault Live; interviews 1966-84, ed. Sylvère 
Lotringer trans. John Johnston (New York; Semiotext(e), 1989) p.330  
186 Michel Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, in Essentials Works of Foucault; Power 1954-1984, 
volume three, eds. Paul Rabinow, James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley,( New York, The New Press, 
2001) , p.326 
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the history of modes of objectivation of the subject187. While the genealogy of morals 
he proposes to rearticulate in the History of Sexuality puts the stress on the aesthetic 
of existence, this concern for the aesthetics of the subject is tied with the question of 
ethics. As such, it interrogates the process of self-fashioning through the scope of 
governmentality. Arnold I. Davidson notes that: 
 
On one hand, Foucault wanted to criticize current conceptions of power that, in one way or 
another, perceived current conceptions of power as a unitary system, a critique undertaken 
most thoroughly in Discipline and Punish and volume 1 of History of Sexuality. On the other 
hand, Foucault wanted to analyze power as a domain of strategic relations between individuals 
and groups, relation whose strategies were to govern the conduct of these individuals188. 
 
In this respect, Foucault’s concern for the self is directed towards the technologies of 
the self. By technologies of the self are understood all the ways and forms in which 
one governs her thoughts and conduct. Foucault’s interest for the cultivation of the self 
culminates in the third volume of History of Sexuality, titled ‘Care of the Self’.  
 
The precept according to which one must give attention to oneself was in any case an 
imperative that circulated among a number of different doctrines. It also took the form of an 
attitude, a mode of behavior; it became instilled in ways of living; it evolved into procedures, 
practices, and formulas that people reflected on, developed, perfected, and taught. It thus came 
to constitute a social practice, giving rise to relationships between individuals, to exchanges 
and communications, and at times even to institutions. And it gave rise, finally, to a certain 
mode of knowledge and to the elaboration of a science. In the slow development of the art of 
living under the theme of the care of oneself, the first two centuries of the imperial epoch can 
be seen as the summit of a curve: a kind of golden age in the cultivation of the self-it being 
understood, of course, that this phenomenon concerned only the social groups, very limited in 
number, that were bearers of culture and for whose members a techne tou biou could have a 
meaning and a reality189.  
 
 
While I intend to elaborate further on care through a comparative reading of Foucault’s 
and Stiegler’s input on the topic, the aesthetics of the subject Foucault is discussing 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187  Arnold Davidson, ‘Ethics as Ascetics: Foucault, the History of Ethics and Ancient Thought’, in The 
Cambridge Companion to Foucault, ed. Gary Gutting (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994) p.118 
188 Arnold Davidson, ‘Ethics as Ascetics: Foucault, the History of Ethics and Ancient Thought’, in The 
Cambridge Companion to Foucault, ed. Gary Gutting (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994) p.118-119 
189 Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality: Care of the Self, trans. Robert Hurley (New York; Pantheon 
Books, 1986) p.44-45 
	   75	  
Foucault’s views on self-cultivation received strong criticisms from Pierre 
Hadot, himself a specialist in Ancient Philosophy. Hadot reproaches Foucault for 
romanticizing the principle of care in focusing too much on identity, selfhood and 
individuality, for the Greeks did not share the same understanding of the subject as we 
do today, and even less of the individual190.  What the Greeks may have identified 
under the notion “self” was the idea of divine reason191. Besides, the exercise was not 
so much turned towards the transformation of self, but its surpassing192, for the aim 
was to find harmony with the totality of the world. Read from this angle, it is difficult 
to imagine self-cultivation as a form of pleasure taken in oneself, for pleasure was not 
compatible with moral life193. Hence, Hadot maintains care as a universalization 
principle 194.  
 
Hadot’s expertise of Ancient thought leads him to recognize care as a rather 
austere ethical practice, regulated and rationalized, whereas Foucault’s estheticism is 
valuing self-cultivation as a poietic experience. To create oneself as a work of art 
implies for the latter an ethics of self-enhancement. It is therefore not a quest for 
universal standards, as it is the case for Hadot. However, Foucault’s ethics does not 
invite mere self-absorption, for the point of departure of care is the creative activity 
itself. James W. Bernauer and Michael Mahon write on this issue: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 Deleuze elaborates on this issue and argues that the Greeks introduce an aesthetics of subjectivation, 
more than of the subject per se. While the term of “subject” resonates with modern subjectivity, we can 
largely assume that Foucault was aware of that. Besides, History of Sexuality focuses on modes of 
subjectivation, that is, on the set of practices through which one does transform herself, not on the 
subject qua consciousness. On this last note, Deleuze reminds us that if Foucault talks about memory 
(hence unveiling an Heideggerian dimension to his work through the double issue of memory and 
forgetting), he skilfully avoids the issue of consciousness. See: Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, trans. Sean 
Hand (Minneapolis, London; University of Minnesota Press, 1988) p.107-108  
And as we will see later, Stiegler will reproach Foucault for not having emphasized consciousness in 
his conception of bio-power and it is this underestimation of the theme of consciousness that will lead 
Stiegler to rethink bio-power through what he coins as psychopower. 
191 Arnold Davidson, ‘Ethics as Ascetics: Foucault, the History of Ethics and Ancient Thought’, in The 
Cambridge Companion to Foucault, ed. Gary Gutting (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994) p.121 
192  Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, ed. Arnold L. Davidson, trans. Michael Chase (Oxford 
Uk, Cambridge USA: Blackwell, 1995) p.207 
193 Hadot argues that Foucault confuses volupta (pleasure) with gaudium (joy). He thus writes: “If the 
Stoics insist on the word gaudium/ ‘joy’, it is precisely because they refuse to introduce the principle of 
pleasure into moral life. For them, happiness does not consist in pleasure, but in virtue itself, which is 
its own reward.” See: Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, ed. Arnold L. Davidson, trans. Michael 
Chase (Oxford Uk, Cambridge USA: Blackwell, 1995) p.207 
194 Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, ed. Arnold L. Davidson, trans. Michael Chase (Oxford 
Uk, Cambridge USA: Blackwell, 1995) p.211 
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Foucault deprives the self of the illusion that it can separate itself from the world. Medical, 
economic, political and erotic dimensions of life shape the moral experience of the self, as his 
last work shows; thus, Foucault always presents his notion of self-formation as a struggle for 
freedom within the confines of a historical situation. The subject for Foucault is an “agonism”, 
a “permanent provocation” to the knowledge-power-subjectivity relations to us. This agonistic 
self is “not the decontextualized self of inwardness, but a self that becomes autonomous 
through a stylization of the concrete possibilities that present themselves to us”. Foucault’s 
ethics is an invitation to a practice of liberty, to struggle and transgression, which seeks to open 
possibilities for new relations to self and events in the world195. 
 
 
Overall, when describing and analyzing the histories of madness, sexuality, 
government, clinical medicine, prison, disciplines and procedures of punishment, 
Foucault is dissecting the history of concepts, deciphering the unconscious of 
knowledge, and demonstrating how movements of thought are closely connected with 
the shaping of identity — in the sense that the conception of the human depends on 
intellectual structures and vice versa. The production of the subject is co-extensive 
with the socio-political body and the contemporary episteme she is embedded within. 
In this respect, History of Sexuality is no exception to the rule. If it first intended to 
study “the modes according to which individuals recognize themselves as sexual 
subjects”, it does so in suggesting that these modes of subjectivation imply the 
recourse to discipline196, which itself suggests the influence of regimes of power 
articulating discursivities of truth.  
 
In his attempt to show how psyche, subjectivity, personality and consciousness 
are modelled through social procedures, Foucault aestheticizes less the individual than 
the whole circuits of power inherent to political life. Hence, my reading of Foucault 
does not suggest that he is reintroducing a philosophy of the subject, or reviving 
Sartre’s legacy. On this point, I do not believe either that the ethical Foucault is 
incompatible with the epistemic and political Foucault197, for all three seem, in my 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 James Bernauer and Michael Mahon, ‘The Ethics of Michel Foucault’, in The Cambridge 
Companion to Foucault, ed. Gary Gutting (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994) p.154 
196 The theme of discipline jumps from the context of the carceral to that of aesthetics, yet it is still the 
same discipline Foucault is talking about.  
197 Beatrice Han explains at length how Foucault’s return to the subject stands in contradiction with his 
archaeology and genealogy. To her mind, Foucault’s critical project is stuck between an empirical and 
transcendental account of the subject and leave scholars in an impasse. I do not deny that Foucault’s 
account on the ethics of subjectivation is problematic, but at this stage, and for this specific argument, 
I am directly taking inspiration from Koopman who claims: “In sum, my claim is that reading critical 
problematization as Foucault’s central philosophical task enables us to assess the periodization of his 
work from a new perspective. This new assessment helps us see why there is just one Foucault (a 
problematizing Foucault) rather than, as the standard stories have it, three (on one read, an epistemic 
Foucault, a political Foucault, and an ethical Foucault, and on another read, an early, middle, and late 
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view, to converge in the History of Sexuality in which the aesthetics of existence is 
itself an object of episteme and politics. Sartre, for his part, does not emphasize as 
much on the political dimension of the aesthetics of self-constitution. It remains mostly 
an egological experience, private and intimate, and sometimes, paranoiac. This is what 




2.3 THE SUBJECT IN SARTRE’S WORDS 
 
Sartre was reluctant to proceed to a decentralization of the subject in language, 
which is precisely what he accuses the structuralists of doing198. Yet, as this section 
intends to demonstrate, he acknowledges the force of discourse as an instrument for 
self-constitution.  
In his research on Flaubert and Jean Genet, Sartre admits, for example, that what 
interested him in the first place was the transformational process at stake between 
writing and one’s own experience of identity, as he puts it himself:  
 
The reason why I produced Les Mots is the reason why I have studied Genet or Flaubert: how 
does a man becomes someone who writes, who wants to speak of the imaginary? This is what 
I sought to answer in my own case, as I sought it in that of others199. 
 
 
Thus, the aim of this section is to (almost) provide a text-commentary on Sartre’s 
Words in order to bring to light major themes which find, in my point of view, a 
resonance with Foucault’s conception of the aesthecization of the subject. Whereas 
Nick Farrell Fox suggests that Words is the theorization of Sartre’s conception of 
identity formation through language200, I am formulating a broader claim; it is the 
theorization of the process of individuation through technicity (whereas language is 
understood as itself a technique). The performativity of the text has been closely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Foucault)”.  Cf: Colin Koopman, Genealogy as Critique: Foucault and the Problems of Modernity 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013) Introduction p.18 
198 Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘Jean-Paul Sartre répond’, L’arc issue 30, 1966. 
199 Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘A plea for Intellectuals’, in Between Existentialism and Marxism: Sartre on 
Philosophy, Politics, Psychology, and the Arts, trans. John Mattews (Pantheon Books: 1983)  
200 Nik Farrell Fox, The New Sartre  (New York, London; Continuum, 2003) p.22 
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analysed by John F. Whitmire Jr201, who regrets that “the shelf space devoted to Words 
among philosophers is notably small202” and I hope this section will reverse the trend. 
 
The attempt to reconnect Sartre and Foucault on the theme of self-fashioning is not 
new, as it already was the focus of Phyllis Sutton-Morris’ article on “Self-creating 
Selves”, which stresses that: 
 
In his later work, Foucault not only shares with the early Sartre the view that there is no fixed 
original essence of an individual, but also shares the view that instead of seeking to discover a 
nonexistent, original, true self, one might engage in actively forming the self as a work of art203. 
 
 
Following Sutton-Morris’ suggestions, I believe that Sartre’s Words deploys many 
insightful ideas on the process of subjectivation that prefigure Foucault’s views on 
care and the aesthecization of the subject. Whereas Sartre does not explicitly cover the 
issue of technologies of the self, we can reasonably assume that his farewell to 
literature was modelled through the prism of ‘existential psychoanalysis’, which 
revolves on the disclosure/adoption of the fundamental project. Yet, I am not going to 
focus on the concept of ‘existential psychoanalysis’ per se. Instead, I will argue that 
the development of the project of existence bears similarities with what Foucault has 
in mind when describing technologies of the self as an apparatus which “permits 
individuals to effect by their own means, or with the help of others, a certain number 
of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct and way of being, so 
as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, 
wisdom, perfection or immortality”.204 Sartre’s autobiography can thus be viewed as 
an attempt to theorize “this dialectical interdependence of the subject and language by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 John F. Whitmire, ‘The Double Writing of ‘Les Mots’: Sartre's ‘Words’ as Performative Philosophy’, 
Sartre Studies International, vol. 12, no. 2, 2006, pp. 61–82. JSTOR, JSTOR, 
www.jstor.org/stable/23511004. 
202 John F. Whitmire, ‘The Double Writing of ‘Les Mots’: Sartre's ‘Words’ as Performative 
Philosophy’, Sartre Studies International, vol. 12, no. 2, 2006, pp. 61–82. JSTOR, JSTOR, 
www.jstor.org/stable/23511004. p.61 
203 Phyllis Sutton Morris ‘Self-Creating Selves: Sartre and Foucault’, American Catholic Philosophical 
Quarterly 70, 4 (1997): 537–49.  
204Michel Foucault, ‘Technologies of the Self’, in Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel 
Foucault, eds. Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman and Patrick H. Hutton (Amherst: University of 
Massachusets Press, 1988) 
	   79	  
showing how identity is formed thought its expression in words”205. But I will show 
also, that while Sartre’s account of subjectivity is constituted through a negative 
tension between the individual and her material environment, Foucault’s description 
of power relations enables us to acknowledge the existence of some sort of positive 
outcome (even though Foucault does not necessarily think through the moral prism of 
negativity or positivity and remains mostly factual in his account of the constitution of 
the individual). To borrow Nick Farrell Fox’s formulation, I argue that “the difference 
between the Sartrean and Foucauldian subject is not so much about the existence of a 
meaningful center (…), but the way this meaning is produced by the Sartrean subject 
in ontological-individual rather than in socio-linguistics terms”206.  
 
2.3.1	  WORDS	  AND	  ACTIONS	  
 
It seems to me, that all the so-called literature of the self— private diaries, narratives of the 
self, etc. — cannot be understood unless it is put into the general and very rich framework of 
these practices of the self. People have been writing about themselves for two thousands years, 
but not in the same way. I have the impression — I may be wrong— that there is a certain 
tendency to present the relationship between writing and the narrative of the self as a 
phenomenon particular to European modernity. Now, I would not deny it is modern, but it was 
also one of the first uses of writing. So it is not enough to say that the subject is constituted in 
a symbolic system. It is not just in the play of symbols that the subject is constituted. It is 
constituted in real practices— historically analysable practices. There is a technology of the 
constitution of the self which cuts across symbolic systems while using them207. 
 
Words belongs to multiple genres. It is autobiographical, fictional, but also 
philosophical. Hence, the same way No Exit could be seen as a prolongation of the 
Sartrean approach on the objectification of the subject through the gaze of the other, 
echoing some passages of Being and Nothingness, Words theorizes the constitution of 
the subject through language and the process of learning. Furthermore, I will argue 
that Sartre offers us, knowingly or not, a method for the practice of the self. Thus, it 
seems appropriate to regard the book as a literary work of philosophy; a philosophical 
fiction which has for its main theme the writing of the self. Hence, Words is not so 
much about Sartre’s childhood, but about the emergence of Sartre as individual. Said 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205  Nik Farrell Fox, The New Sartre, (New York, London: Continuum, 2003) p.22 
206 Nik Farrell Fox, The New Sartre, (New York, London: Continuum, 2003) p.22 
207 Michel Foucault, ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics: an Overview of Work in Progress’, in The Foucault 
Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York : Pantheon Books, 1984) p.369 
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otherwise, the text narrates the unfolding of Sartre-as-project. As a result, the structure 
of Words follows the essential steps of any regular process of self-transformation. The 
initial situation introduces an invisible character, whose name is never mentioned. 
Then, the young Sartre gains some consistency when discovering literature. It is 
through reading and writing that he acquires a sense of identity. In the final situation, 
the reader meets Sartre the grown man, Sartre-the-author, that is, the final product of 
the creative activity he chose to undertake and to commit to, all through his life. Hence, 
Words crystalizes Sartre’s major claims regarding the self: it theorizes the concept of 
project as the constitution of the individual, as well as presenting the self as object of 
a creative activity, arguing for the inter-dependence of language, thought and selfhood. 
While it could be read as the performance of what Sartre has in mind by ‘existential 
psychoanalytic’, Words exemplifies overall his conception of literature as action by 
disclosure208.  
Given this context, Words emerges as a strong exemplar of the Foucauldian 
idea of aesthetic subjectivation. This is because the text, in its very title, suggests 
straight away the therapeutical dimension of Sartre’s enterprise. Though the polysemy 
has been lost in the English translation, the original title Les mots (words) can be heard 
as Les maux (pain/trouble)209. Both curative and poisonous, Words echoes the 
pharmacological dimensions within the process of writing. It is through writing that 
Sartre’s encounters himself. Before that “there was only a play of mirrors210”, as he 
confesses throughout the pages of his work. Writing and reading stand as 
mnemotechnical supports, through which Sartre becomes autonomous, hereby curing 
himself from his difficulties of being211. On the other hand, words are provoking pain. 
As it is revealed in the book, Sartre is terrible speller and struggles to learn the basic 
rules of grammar. Thus, the same way Foucault thinks care as pedagogical exercise, 
requiring the individual to comply to a set of rules and constraints, Sartre describes his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 Jean-Paul Sartre, What Is Literature? trans. Bernard Frechtman (London: Methuen, 1950) p.23 
209  In ‘The Double Writing of "Les Mots": Sartre's "Words" as Performative Philosophy’, John F. 
Whitmire Jr. brings to the reader’s attention that the original title was Jean sans terre, which translates 
as Groundless Jean. Though bearing many significations, this title was most likely to emphasize Sartre’s 
lack of possessions. In my view the original title can also be heard as “Jean s’enterre”/ Jean buries 
himself, which I think illustrates well the purpose of the text (namely to totalize Sartre’s own identity) 
and corresponds to Sartre’s views on the essence of selfhood, which can only be totalized in death. 
However, I will focus on the final title, which fits better my argument regarding the cultivation of self.  
210 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Words, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: George Braziller, 1964) p.153.  
211 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Words, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: George Braziller, 1964) p.245 
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commitment to his existential project as a discipline. The cultivation of self is a 
positive carving out of the individual, but as carving out, it also implies a form of 
violence upon the self, which Sartre is very aware of, and which is also a theme one 
can find in Foucault212.  
Sartre is reluctant to characterize his text as autobiographical and describes it 
instead as a piece of fiction213. And this makes complete sense. Words is not an 
autobiography for it does not (and cannot) totalize Sartre’s essence —which is what 
Sartre intended to do when writing on Flaubert and Saint Genet, arguing that Self only 
finds its essence in death. In short, it is not an autobiography in the sense that it is not 
a testimony. Less than a genealogy, Words illustrates self as the object of storytelling. 
Sartre affirms an intimate connection between the subject and the process of writing, 
which is not specific to Words: 
 
At the age of thirty, I executed the masterstroke of writing in Nausea – quite sincerely, believe 
me – about the bitter unjustified existence of my fellowmen and of exonerating my own. I was 
Roquentin; I used him to show, without complacency, the texture of my life214.  
 
Sartre rejects writing as a neutral composite215 and advocates for the continuity 
between the author and the text. For him, language plays a significant role in the human 
condition, as both alienated and alienating. It cannot exist outside its practise or its 
usage. Thus, Sartre could not agree less with the structuralist attempt which was 
precisely to remove the speaker from language. Words does apply this idea: the same 
way individuals speak and are spoken to through language, the author writes and is 
written through a text.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 In an interview with Paul Rabinow, Foucault says that: “It may have been an extremely painful 
exercise at first and required many cultural valorizations before ending up transformed into a positive 
activity”.  
see Michel Foucault, ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics: an Overview of Work in Progress’, in The Foucault 
Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984)  p.369  
Besides, when describing the multiple self-forming exercises one would need to go through in the third 
tome of the History of Sexuality, Foucault does insist on their physically and psychologically demanding 
character. The violence of the activity of care will be taken up again by Stiegler. 
213 In his interview with Michel Contat he refers to Words as “un roman auquel je crois” (a novel in 
which I believe) Jean-Paul Sartre, Sartre: an interview with Michel Contat, trans. Paul Auster and Lydia 
Davis, 7 august 1975, also available in Situations X ( Paris; Gallimard 1976).  
214 Jean Paul Sartre, The Words, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: George Braziller, 1964) p.251. 
215 Reference to Roland Barthes who claims the opposite in his essay ‘The Death of the Author’, Image, 
Music, Text, trans. Stephen Heath (London: Fontana, 1977) 
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So far, references to technics may not come across as particularly obvious. 
Nevertheless, technicity remains a significant part of the subtext here. While the 
written may be assimilated to a mere representation of language, it has in Sartre’s work 
a function that, I think, surpasses representation. Beyond their nominative power, 
words possess a constitutive power, because they are the necessary tools for the self-
forming activity. It is in this sense that the theme of technicity emerges in Sartre’s 
work.  
 
A clear example of this dynamic is when Sartre explains how he took his pen 
for a sword216. This is not only to acknowledge with the salutary value of writing, not 
only to assert the close and necessary bound between language and the person who 
makes use of language, but also to render evident its instrumental character217; the fact 
that it is used218. If words can be transformed into a sword — that is, into a weapon 
which enables the individual to either attack or defend himself — it is because 
language serves a mode of action; a mode of action which is directed to a mode of 
being. Self-exegesis is crucial for Sartre; it is conceptualized as a form of self-
cultivation insofar as it aims to cultivate a sense of self-awareness. But that does not 
mean he values simply any form of exegesis. In What Is Literature? Sartre favours 
prose language at the expense of poetry. While prose writing is praised for its clarity 
and efficiency, poetry is accused of being opaque. Unlike Heidegger who defends the 
philosophical and political virtues of poetry, Sartre argues that the playful character of 
poetry cannot fully serve the authenticity one should strive to attain. Hence, Sartre 
views prose writing as superior to poetry, precisely because of its transparency. On 
this essential feature of literature, Suzanne Guerlac writes: 
 
 
To become an appropriate tool for engaged writing, Sartre affirms here, language needs to be 
cleansed of propagandistic distortions and broadened to meet the needs of the contemporary 
situation. What is more, however, it is literature that is called upon to perform this task. 
Literature, then, does not presuppose a transparency of language that it must honor or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 Jean Paul Sartre, The Words, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: George Braziller, 1964) p253. 
217 This may sound reductive or clumsy, but the theme of technicity in Sartre’s work does not go much 
further beyond the theme of instrumentality.  
218 Sartre’s comments on the instrumental character of language echoes Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
investigations when the latter describes words as tools. “Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a 
hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws. — The functions of 
words are as diverse as the functions of these objects.” See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, second edition (Oxford, UK; Basil Blackwell, 1958) 
p.6 
	   83	  
accommodate. Instead, it is the responsibility of literature to save language from ruin, to 
“restituer aux mots leurs vertus”. Transparency thus becomes a gift of literature, an “art without 
art” in the Longinian sense, or even an achievement of style— something like Flaubert’s mot 
juste or the mythic écriture blanche219. 
 
Suzanne Guerlac explains that, for Sartre, the essence of literature precisely lies in this 
effort of transparency, in the overcoming of the antinomy between word and action, in 
order to attain a discursive truth, which is that of the subject and his vécu220. Indeed, 
Sartre writes in his essay “For Whom Does One Write?”:  
 
In short, literature is, in essence, the subjectivity of a society in permanent revolution. In such 
a society it would go beyond the antinomy of word and action. Certainly in no case would it 
be regarded as an act; it is false to say that the author acts upon his readers; he merely makes 
an appeal to their freedom, and in order for his works to have any effect, it is necessary for the 
public to adopt them on their own account by an unconditioned decision. But in a collectivity 
which constantly corrects, judges, and metamorphoses itself, the written work can be an 
essential condition of action, that is, the moment of reflective consciousness221. 
 
In this respect, the committed prose would be the realisation of Sartre’s ideal: “to speak 
is to act222”. The ideal of transparency, that is, of authenticity, not only implies, but in 
fact requires the instrumentality of language.  
 
 
To conclude this section: language is problematized in Words as a technique 
of self, for it is thought of as an instrument serving the activity of self-fashioning 
insofar as language cannot be removed from subjectivity. When Sartre claims he began 
his life amidst books223, he is suggesting that in order to be a subject one needs the 
object. And this is what, I think, Words is about; the process of subjectivation through 
objectification. But this gives rise to a strange paradox: in Sartre’s approach, the 
subject becomes herself by conforming (or committing) to practices. However, in 
order to commit to these practices, I first need to acknowledge myself as a subject of a 
commitment224. It is only insofar as I recognize myself as a subject of commitment, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 Suzanne Guerlac, ‘Sartre and the Powers of Literature: The Myth of Prose and the Practice of 
Reading’, MLN 108.5 (1993): 805-824. 
220 Christina Howells develops further the theme of the vécu in Sartre’s Theory of Literature (London; 
The Modern Humanities Research Association MHRA Texts and Dissertations volume 14, 1979).  
221 Jean-Paul Sartre, What Is Literature?, trans. Bernard Frechtman (London: Methuen, 1950) p.159 
222  Jean-Paul Sartre, What Is Literature?, trans. Bernard Frechtman (London: Methuen, 1950) p.22
  
223 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Words, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: George Braziller, 1964) p.40 
224 This will be developed further in the next chapter. Suffice to day at this stage that Phyllis Sutton-
Morris has encountered the same paradox. See: Morris, P. S. (1997), ‘Self-Creating Selves: Sartre and 
Foucault’, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 70, 4 (1997): 537–49. 
	   84	  
that is, as already subjected, that I can articulate my project. Hence, Sartre’s conception 
of subjectivity depends on a prior form of subjectivity, which is that of free agency 
that is enabling me to choose. In this respect, it is my mode of being that affects the 
mode of my actions. On this issue John F. Whitmire Jr notes: 
 
No matter how much conditioning is laid upon us, there will remain, deep down, and perhaps 
largely obscured (but never eradicated), some sense of freedom or agency; and we see precisely 
that in Les Mots: an interiority that remains exceedingly vibrant and alive. It is this of freedom, 
this auto-affective comprehension of freedom and subjectivity, that pervades Words, provides 
it with its tensions, and keeps it from falling into the somewhat more claustrophobic analysis 
of the factors conditioning Flaubert in The Idiot of the Family.225 
 
 
Foucault apprehends the same issue by stating the opposite: I recognize myself as 
subject only insofar as I am already acting; it is therefore my actions that affect my 
mode of being226.  Hence, the subject is only an effect of practices when Sartre’s mode 
of individuation starts with an auto-affective form of subjectivity. But overall, the fact 
that Sartre defends the inherence of agency is revealing of his reluctance to conceive 
subjectivity as passive before social structures. This brings us back to the issue of 





2.3.2	  THE	  NECESSITY	  OF	  COMMITMENT:	  AUTHENTICITY	  AND	  BAD	  FAITH	  
 
Words is the illustration of Sartre’s own project of existence; that of becoming 
an author. On a larger scale, I argue that the book describes the existential project as 
the commitment to transcendence. But such a statement brings about some questions: 
What sort of commitment is Sartre talking about? And to whom do I commit? Once I 
have clarified these issues, the difficulties regarding the central role given to 
commitment in the activity of self-fashioning will be then addressed.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 John F. Whitmire, “The Double Writing of ‘Les Mots’: Sartre's ‘Words’ as Performative 
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226 I will go back to the aporia of self-constitution in the next chapter. 
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Defined as the “original relation which the for-itself chooses with its facticity 
and with the world”, the project is a transcendent meaning that stems from the 
reflective exercise in which exploring oneself is already choosing/creating oneself. But 
for Sartre the project is groundless insofar as the individual can always reinvent herself 
throughout her life. The roots of the existential project do not derive from a prior reality 
or a prior logic; the project is instead irrational for it is freely chosen by the subject. 
The fundamental project lacks foundation and is “that by which all foundations and all 
reasons come into being227”. Hence, the choice of self implies a choice of existence, a 
choice of reasoning; it is profoundly ethical and yet prelogical, as David A. Jopling 
argues228. This is probably the reason why it shares some common features with a 
sense of religious vocation. Indeed, Sartre renders this analogy explicit in Words when 
describing the strong impression literature had on him: “I had found my religion: 
nothing seemed to me more important than a book. I regarded the library as a 
temple229”.  
This religious tone in Sartre’s work is odd and suggests that the project of 
existence shall be understood as a practice of conversion of oneself to oneself. After 
all, it is suggested throughout the pages of Being and Nothingness that one can access 
an authentic life after going through a radical conversion230.  But if this is truly the 
case, the operation of conversion would imply the return to a faithful original being. 
Foucault picked up this inconsistency231. And he suspects that behind the concept of 
authenticity, Sartre is in fact recognizing the necessity for the individual to be true to 
herself. While Sartre’s use of religious language may be puzzling in some ways, the 
“corrupted being” he is referring to shall not be understood as the acknowledgement 
of an inner self. If Foucault is right when pointing out the necessity for Sartre to 
commit, he is mistaken in assimilating this need for commitment with that of the 
reunification with a true self. Sartre is not concerned about truth (which revolves on 
right and wrong), but about worth (which brings about the Kantian notions of respect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans. Hazel 
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and diginity). Indeed, authenticity only serves the necessity of commitment, which in 
turns, enables the elaboration of values232. Therefore, it is the notion of commitment 
that remains the key in Sartre’s work, more than authenticity itself, which acts more 
as a justification for commitment.  
When Words narrates the author’s own conversion attempt from bad faith to 
authenticity, it is still commitment that is valued more than authenticity. Yet, the need 
for authenticity taints the activity of self-fashioning with frustration. Bad faith 
characterizes the subject caught in mimesis, while authenticity is the access to a certain 
form of independence; it is the transcending of role-playing. Hence, the concept of 
authenticity presents itself as an ethical horizon and requires the subject to fully 
embrace herself as a responsible agent. In Words, the young Sartre is caught in self-
deception because he is complying to social rituals, fitting himself to the requirements 
and expectations of the role he has been assigned by his family, that of impersonating 
a well-behaved child: 
 
In a word, I give myself; I give myself always and everywhere; I give everything. I have only 
to push a door to have—I too—the feeling of appearing on the scene. I place my blocks on top 
of each other, I turn out my mudpies, I yell. Someone comes and exclaims. I've made one more 
person happy. Meals, sleep, and precautions against bad weather are the high points and chief 
obligations of a completely ceremonious life. I eat in public, like a king: if I eat well, I am 
congratulated; my grandmother herself cries out: "What a good boy to be hungry!" 233 
 
What we then learn from the text is that authenticity starts with lucid consciousness 
and the will to act upon one’s situation. For Sartre, the burden of human existence lies 
in the irreconcilable conflict between facticity and transcendence. Mostly developed 
in Being and Nothingness, this conflict condemns the individual to an infinite 
commitment towards himself, but also to infinite self-deception insofar as “we can 
never radically escape bad faith234”. On this, Words ends with a bitter note, which 
expresses the impossibility of this ontological reunification and the impossibility for 
satisfaction as he acknowledges that “my pure choice did not raise me above 
anyone”.235 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232 For Sartre, the essential property of the world is to be absurd, but this absurdity can be surpassed, 
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233 Jean Paul Sartre, The Words, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: George Braziller, 1964) p.32 
234 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology, trans. Hazel 
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The point I want to focus on here is the following: while Sartre argues that 
writing, as part of culture, “does not save anything or anyone236” and that “it does not 
justify237”, he also realizes that writing offers a “critical mirror238” through which 
selfhood gets thicker. However, Sartre still regards writing as “the product of man239” 
in which self would only be projected and not constituted. This lack of consideration 
for the constitutive role of technics is, for example, evident at the end of the novel 
when he writes: “Without equipment, without tools, I set all of me to work in order to 
save all of me240”. Ironically, this is not what his novel illustrates, simply by virtue of 
existing as a written text. Hence, my point is not to say that Sartre knowingly 
conceptualized the aesthecization of the subject through mnemotechnics before 
Foucault, although I am convinced Words shall be read this way. Instead, the point is 
that the testimony of Sartre’s identity formation through technics (essentially writing 
and reading) is manifest in the text. This amounts to a sort of performative 
contradiction in Sartre’s approach that enables us to more directly link Sartre with 
Foucault, but also with the theme of technics. Interpreted this way, one should also 
bear in mind that Sartre’s model of creative self-constitution mainly focuses on the 
outcome of the process: the future version of me I’ll never attain. As a result, Sartre’s 
conception of subjectivation is programmed to self-deceit241, because of the 
preponderance of the themes of commitment and authenticity, whereas Foucault’s 
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Both Sartre and Foucault come to argue that the individual is caught in a 
situation and that there is nothing outside the situation. It thus means that the process 
of self-making is invariably grounded in the material field, circumscribed in a socio-
cultural network and dependent of external forces. But they differ in the way they 
apprehend the formation of human social relationships. The object of this section will 
be to show how Sartre constrains the individuation process in a dialectic of power and 
freedom. By contrast, Foucault thinks the subjectivation process in terms of co-
dependence between power and freedom.  
In the Critique of Dialectical Reason, Sartre distances himself from the 
Cartesian tradition which makes the ego the sole departure of everything, to conceive 
instead a model of subjectivity grounded in the practico-inert. In other words, the 
individual is free and capable to act upon herself insofar as practical activities and 
material structures always precede and condition her mode of being;  
It would be quite wrong to interpret me as saying that man is free in all situations, as the Stoics 
claimed. I mean the exact opposite: all men are slaves insofar as their life unfolds in the 
practico-inert field and insofar as this field is conditioned by scarcity242.  
 
If the practico-inert, understood as the “activity of others in so far as it is sustained and 
diverted by inorganic inertia243”, grounds any form of sociality, such passive activity 
can be counter-acted, or negated, through free praxis. According to Sartre, praxis 
characterizes a mode of action as “the negation of matter (in its present organization 
and on the basis of a future re-organization)244”, while on the other hand, matter 
organizes itself as the “negation of action245”.  In short, the subject constitutes herself 
through a series of negations, the same way freedom is understood as a negating 
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principle. Transcending the original facticity one is entangled within means rejecting 
the inert structures of a situation, refusing to live in scarcity to enter into the realm of 
existence. By scarcity, Sartre designates a state of survival where human basic needs 
are met. Existence on other hand refers to a way of living in which the individual is 
standing out, that is, able to project herself. Scarcity is what stamps human relations 
into the affect, the pathologic and material dependence, while existence is turned 
toward the cultivation of autonomy.  As such, Sartre’s conception of freedom shall be 
understood in terms of a dialectical circularity246 between praxis (as the negation of 
the inert) and matter (as the negation of praxis). As Nik Farrell Fox explains while 
discussing Sartre’s work through a post-modernist lens, the dialectical bond between 
the inertness of matter and free praxis “reveals a double element at work247” which is 
that of objectification and objectivity. Objectification in the sense that the material 
object is altered, transformed, in the individual’s hands; objectivity because matter 
absorbs and reconditions human praxis. In this respect, matter and praxis endlessly 
respond to each other through the principle of interiorization-exteriorization: 
In the univocal milieu of interiority, it re-exteriorizes the praxis of the conqueror as the 
interiorizing synthesis of the practical field. And as signification-exigency it reflects his being 
to the producer as the inert exteriority of a slave in the milieu of interiority. But, by mortgaging 
the worker's freedom by its imperative inertia, it transforms, through itself, the free praxis 
which confronts the worker into a mere inertia of exigency. And, in a way, every freedom, both 
in the milieu of the Other and in its own milieu of interiority, experiences its own inertial limit, 
that is to say, its necessity. As soon as multiplicity becomes indefinite (in the practical and 
serial sense), the multiplication of actions and responses is unified in the object which posits 
itself for itself as a negation of everyone by everyone (and, later, as a common object) … the 
fleeting unity of the object which affirms itself in opposition to everyone is in reality the 
negation of everyone, and of everyone for everyone in everyone's practical field, in so far as it 
becomes a negative, inert unity in the object248. 
 
The same way praxis acts as a force of oppression upon the material field, the inert 
sediments itself as a negative unity that affirms itself in opposition with human praxis. 
According to what has been said, Sartre’s philosophy is glued in a dialectic of power 
and freedom, both acting upon the other as a negative force. Hence, the subject is the 
product of the opposition between activity and passivity, individuated through 
dynamics of restriction, oppression and exploitation.  
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The late Sartre could be read as close to Foucault in presenting the individual 
as the product of a material field and power relations. However, as I said, Sartre 
essentially conceives power as a restrictive force exerted against the individual. In 
contrast, Foucault presents power as a force circulating among individuals. Indeed, it 
appears that regimes of power are crystalized and consolidated through the social 
bond. The individual is not the victim, or the mere toy of systems of  political 
dominations; he or she cannot be reduced to an inert material on which power is 
exercised. Instead, the individual is the element of its articulation249, which means that 
one is less an object of power, than a complicit subject. Thus, if “power” may resonate 
as a monolithic concept, it is far from being a repressive system confining individuals 
into a state of isolation. Foucault argues that power is in fact enabled by circuits of 
socialization.  
Power must by analyzed as something which circulates, or rather as something which only 
functions in the form of a chain. It is never localized here or there, never in anybody's hands, 
never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised 
through a net-like organization. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they 
are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power. They are 
not only its inert or consenting target; they are always also the elements of its articulation. In 
other words, individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application250.  
 
Foucault claims that power is not absolute, but dispersed and expressed through social 
circuits and relations. Though normative, techniques and procedures of power are 
productive, for they aim at the enhancement of the individual.  
For Sartre, freedom and power are necessarily opposed. Power is indeed 
foreign to the subject, while freedom belongs inherently to the subject insofar as it is 
because one is free that one is responsible. In this sense, power is for Sartre what 
challenges the individual’s responsibility and limits her own freedom. For Foucault, 
they act as complementary in the sense where freedom is constructed and conditioned 
by disciplinary norms. The subject being always subjectified in a situation evolves in 
a system of power:  
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We are not trapped. We cannot jump outside the situation, and there is no point where you are 
free from all power relations. but you can always change it. So what I’ve said does not mean 
that we are always trapped, but that we are always free—well, anyway, that there is always the 
possibility of changing ...resistance comes first, and resistance remains superior to the forces 
of the process; power relations are obliged to change with the resistance. So I think that 
resistance is the main word, the key word, in this dynamic251.   
 
As the capacity to alter the dominant mode of discourse, freedom is not the opposite 
of power, but its outcome. This means that freedom is in fact already enabled and 
constrained252 in disciplinary techniques. For Sartre, freedom starts with a form of 
detachment with the practico-inert; it starts with nothing rather than something, for it 
is nothingness, after all, that fundamentally characterizes the human being in his view.  
On the other hand, Foucault’s conception of freedom originates in the process of 
appropriation of the material ensemble, insofar as compliance leads to resistance. Yet, 
resisting does not mean rebelling against an established order. Whereas Sartre believes 
that self-making lies in the tension between facticity and transcendence (that is, 
between constraints of the material field and the surpassing of one’s factical 
condition), Foucault is prudent enough to not let his discourse fall into this kind of 
dialectic. On the dynamics linking power and freedom, he argues instead that one 
cannot be thought as a distinct phenomenon or entity, independent from the other: 
 
We must reposition the power relationships within the struggles and not suppose that power 
might exist on one side, and that on the other side lies that upon which power would exert 
itself; nor can we suppose that the struggle develops between power and non-power. Instead 
of this ontological opposition between power and resistance, I would say that power is nothing 
other than a certain modification, or the form, differing from time to time, of a series of clashes 
which constitutes the social body253. 
 
Continuing on the path of dialectic would, on the reverse, entrap philosophical 
discourse in the endless and binary logic of the ruler and the ruled, the dominant and 
the dominated, which is what Foucault wishes to break with. Instead of reinforcing 
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oppositions, Foucault aims to think beyond them. Power does not merely designate 
coercive institutions such as the state, the army or the prison; it rather designates a 
system of relation that defines, categorizes, compartmentalizes, regulates, administers. 
As such, power must be apprehended as a discursive regime that produces individuals’ 
modes of freedom.  
Hence, if in the Foucauldian perspective, structures of dominations are 
correlated and co-expansive with one’s capacity for freedom, Sartre’s analysis of the 
practico-inert seems, on the contrary, to represent freedom as a mode of action 
inevitably obstructed by the material field. But if that is the case, it also means that 
freedom outside power can eventually exist, when Foucault argues for the necessary 
codependency of the two.  The fact that Sartre always opposed freedom to power at 
least enabled him to not conflate the former with the latter. On the contrary, Foucault’s 
work tends to another reading, which makes freedom an object of power.  We will see 
in the second half of the thesis how Foucault’s legacy, on this precise point, turns out 
to be problematic and how Sartre’s belief in an a priori freedom may come as useful 
to fight the generational malaise diagnosed by Stiegler.  
 




In sum, the purpose of this section was to draw continuities between Sartre and 
Foucault on the theme of self-fashioning. As has been discussed, Foucault goes beyond 
Sartre’s dialectical tension between facticity and transcendence, subject and matter, to 
describe a process of individuation immanent to forms of social relations. Accused by 
Sartre of making subjectivity the hostage of impersonal structures or social circuits, 
Foucault notes, more subtly, that the subject produces power as much as it is produced 
by it. Another point of divergence covered by this section is that of the activity of self-
making:  for Sartre the cultivation of self is motivated by an irreducible freedom and 
is turned towards the maximization of such freedom, when Foucault rather puts the 
emphasis on the continual practice of power, posited as the horizon of human 
existence. He thus argues that one is always constrained in a network of power 
relations. Besides, Sartre’s aesthetics of existence appears as quite individualistic and 
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tends towards self-absorption, despite his efforts to think the subject in a dialectical 
tension with her social environment. In bringing care into the sphere of power-relation, 
Foucault’s overcomes Sartre’s solipstic account of self-therapeutics and throws it into 
the socio-political realm. However, Foucault was also aware that the principle of care 
could not be reutilized as such254. As we will see in the next chapter, it is Stiegler who 
manages to resuscitate care in the contemporary political context, but this won’t be 
without a cost.  
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 Michel Foucault, ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress’, in The Foucault 
Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984) p.343  
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This chapter aims to present Bernard’s Stiegler’s work regarding the technical 
constitution of self and focuses on how he reutilizes the concept of care in the 
contemporary context. As such, this section will be divided into two parts: while the 
first part will be dedicated to the invention of the human (who are we?), the second 
part will address the question of its preservation (what do we want?)255. Through a 
close reading of the first volume of Technics and Time regarding the narrative of the 
origin, I intend to rearticulate Stiegler’s thoughts on the concept of technogenesis, 
which shall be defined as the co-evolutive process between technics and the human. I 
will conclude that it is because the formation of the individual intimately depends on 
the technical, that one needs to take care of oneself. Hence, the second part of the 
chapter will be devoted to Stiegler’s reading of Foucault and his own insight on the 
status of care as means to combat the current state of disaffection which is marked by 
irresponsibility.  
For Stiegler, technics stands as the horizon of humanity, insofar as it constitutes 
its very origin. As such, Stiegler argues, technics is at the roots of what it means to be 
human, so that the questioning of humanity involves the questioning of technicity. The 
reason for this, as will be demonstrated throughout the first half of the chapter, lies in 
the co-relation between the human and the technical, so that the history of technics is 
tied to the history of thought256. For Stiegler, there is no world out there except the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255 Richard Beardsworth, ‘Technology and Politics: a Response to Bernard Stiegler’, in Stiegler and 
Technics, eds. Christina Howells and Gerald Moore (Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press,2013) 
p.211 
256 On this issue, Stiegler argues: 
“Humanity’s history is that of technics as a process of exteriorization in which technical evolution is 
dominated by tendencies that societies must perpetually negotiate. The “technical system” is constantly 
evolving and rendering the “other systems” that structure social cohesion null and void. Becoming 
technical is originarily a derivation: socio-genesis recapitulates techno-genesis. Technogenesis is 
structurally prior to socio-genesis—technics is invention, and invention is innovation—and the 
adjustment between technical evolution and social tradition always encounters moments of resistance, 
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world humans build for themselves. But positing the human’s profoundly technical 
character shall not be an excuse to simply exploit what technology has to offer; it is in 
fact the very reason why one must be careful. In this respect, the decadence that 
Stiegler perceives today257 becomes a moral issue, for it is now up to the human to 
affirm her responsibility, to win back autonomy, and to appropriate new technologies. 
This is what constitutes for him the core of the battle for intelligence. Drawing on the 
late Foucault, Stiegler therefore affirms care as means of salvation, that is, as a 
technique to save us from technics.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
since technical change, to a greater or lesser extent, disrupts the familiar reference points of which all 
culture consists. Technics can thus appear to be the opposite of “the spirit of the age,” of “civilization,” 
of “the human” itself, though it is humanity’s very destiny.” (Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time; 
Disorientation, trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009) Introduction, p.2) 
257 What is decadent nowadays for Stiegler is the fact that new technologies have deprived us of our 
status of user to become instead consumers. This shift has been favored by the rise of capitalism and 
more precisely, the acceleration of rhythms of production. This discourse resonates for example with 
Arendt’s Human Condition. 
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3.1.1	  Deconstructing	  the	  Discourse	  of	  the	  Origin	  
 
 
In an interview, Foucault wonders: “if self-analysis is a cultural invention, why 
does it seem so natural and pleasurable to us?” Foucault aimed to show how cultures 
of self, of subjectivity and subjectivation were posed and composed throughout time, 
yet he could not find an answer to that very question. This is because Foucault, while 
sympathetic to the tightening of the human and the technical, would not have 
considered technics as a constitutive part of the human. Yet this would  resolve, I 
believe, Foucault’s problem; if technologies of selves seem so natural and pleasurable 
to us, it may be because technics already lies at the origin of the constitution of self.  
 
It has been explained at length in previous chapters how the self is not a given but 
an imaginary and social construct. However, for Phyllis Sutton-Morris, this is far from 
being satisfying. In ‘Self-Creating Selves: Sartre and Foucault’, she shares her 
concerns:  
 
If the claim is made that the self forms or creates itself, what or who is it that does the creating? 
Wouldn’t the self already have to exist to be creative, and if the self pre-exists its own creation, 
how can the self be a product of that creative activity?258  
 
 
If her worries sound legitimate, perhaps asking “Who or what does the creating?” is 
not the right way to approach the issue. Perhaps, the solution to the origin of self does 
not lie in the origin. This is what I take from my reading of Stiegler who suggests that 
the question surrounding the origin does not so much revolve around who or what does 
the creating, hence implying the prior existence of an outside constitutive of an inside, 
but on how the creating is done. And I argue that for Stiegler, the how of the human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 Phyllis Sutton Morris, “Self-Creating Selves: Sartre and Foucault”, American Catholic Philosophical 
Quarterly 70, 4 (1997): P.537 
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lies in its technogenesis. By technogenesis, inspired from Simondon’s concept of 
ontogenesis, Stiegler means that technicity and humanity equally ground each other 
through the mutual process of becoming. In this respect, technogenesis is what enables 
Stiegler to give a transcendental account of the emergence of the human through “an 
empirical account of the emergence of technology259”. Stiegler thus explains that 
human beings exteriorize and interiorize themselves in and through technics, thereby 
continuously transforming and enriching themselves by the means of technical 
adoption.  
 
Overall, Stiegler’s originality regarding the thinking of technology and the 
thinking of the human is to identify the origin of the human as a lack of origin. Yet, 
this is not to say that humans have simply no origin. The Stieglerian discourse is not a 
discourse of negation. It deconstructs the narrative of the origin to better reconstruct 
it, so that Stiegler thinks the origin of the human as a positive absence. In doing so, he 
thus turns the weakness pinpointed by Sutton-Morris, namely the aporia of self-
creation, into a strength, for the human emerges in the aporetic moment of the origin. 
For Stiegler, it is through the lack that humans differ and exist.  
 
But to prove his point, Stiegler needs to first deconstruct the metaphysics of 
presence that has long been glued to the narrative of the origin. This is what he intends 
to do through his critique of Rousseau’s Discourse On the Origin of Inequalities 
Among Men in Technics and Time. Secondly, he must rehabilitate the absence as the 
necessary condition of presence. This is done principally with the help of Derrida’s 
work and the conceptualisation of différance, which Stiegler reappropriates in order to 
posit technics as the condition of human existence. Stiegler then refers to Simondon 
and presents the human as an invention insofar as it does not find its origin in an 
identifiable foundational moment, but in the endless coupling of the living and the 
inert. Besides, the human is an invention because its emergence depends on technics.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 Michael Lewis, ‘Of a Mythical Philosophical Anthropology: The Transcendental and the Empirical 
in Technics and Time’, in Stiegler and Technics, eds. Christina Howells and Gerald Moore (Edinburgh; 
Edinburgh University Press,2013) p.53 








The first volume of Technics and Time starts with the following remark: there 
has been in the history of philosophy a constant opposition between the human and 
technics. Such an opposition also illustrates the opposition between the human and the 
animal, nature and culture, as well as the on-going conflict that Derrida notices 
between speech and writing. This is not without consequences for the status of 
technology as an object of thought: 
 
The question of philosophy is entirely, and since its origin, that of the endurance of a condition 
that I call technological: simultaneously technical and logical, initially forged on the axis that 
forms language and tools, which is to say, on the axis that enables man’s externalisation. [. . .] 
Since its origin, philosophy has been marked by this technological condition, but via its 
repression [refoulement] and denegation, and the difficult project I have undertaken is to show 
that philosophy begins with the repression of its ownmost question.260  
 
The argument is simple; in repressing technics, philosophy repeatedly articulated the 
question of the origin of the human independently from that of the technical. Thus, 
Stiegler intends to correct this mistake in advocating for the continuity between the 
two, so that technics and the human are not opposed, but standing as the condition of 
each other’s emergence.  
 
However, this does not mean that humans and technical objects are born as one 
and the same. They differ from each other and the acknowledgement of their difference 
is crucial for understanding what Stiegler means by technogenesis. The point is not to 
reduce technology to the human or vice-versa, but to acknowledge the technical 
character of the human and its determining role in the evolution of the individual. It is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260 As quoted by Christina Howells and Gerald Moore, ‘Introduction: Philosophy — The Repression of 
Technics’, in Stiegler and Technics, eds. Christina Howells and Gerald Moore (Edinburgh; Edinburgh 
University Press,2013) p.6 
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to come to terms with the belief that technics “leads us down the road to decay by 
depriving us of our originary power261”, precisely because technics constitutes the 
human’s originary power.  
 
In order to successfully conjugate the human with technics, Stiegler 
invites us to go back in time, outside time, up to the question of origin.  
 
But the question of the possibility of the human, of its origin, of the possibility of an origin of 
the human, cannot itself forget the question of the possibility of origin as such. To discourse 
on the origin of the human is always also, explicitly or not, to discourse on origin in general—
on what is, on the principle and the origin of being. The question of origin is that of principles, 
of the most ancient, of that which, ever since and forever, establishes what is in its being. The 
question of origin is the question of being262.  
 
Here, Stiegler has recourse to a philosophical anthropology263, using the mythical 
discourse to state what is going to be at the core of his philosophy: the human is a 
technical invention. Though this approach may be puzzling, it has to be read as the 
“transcendental deduction of the conditions for the possibility of the human264”. To 
pursue this deduction, Stiegler initiates a discussion with Rousseau and his Discourse 
On the Origin of Inequalities Among Men265. While Rousseau acknowledges a certain 
relation between the evolution of the human and that of technics, he does so in such a 
way that technics only intervenes in the course of history to corrupt the nature of the 
human, so that technics is an accident, which constitutes the second origin of the 
human. In distinguishing the essential from the accidental, Rousseau’s Discourse on 
the Origin reinforces the opposition between nature and culture, for it is arguing for a 
pre-technological state of the human. Indeed, by the means of this speculative account 
of the origin of the human, Rousseau confronts us with a primitive state of humanity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. Richard Beardsworth and 
George Collins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) p115 
262 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. Richard Beardsworth and 
George Collins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) p. 95 
263 see Michael Lewis, ‘Of a Mythical Philosophical Anthropology: The Transcendental and the 
Empirical in Technics and Time”, in Stiegler and Technics, eds. Christina Howells and Gerald Moore 
(Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2013) 
264 Michael Lewis, ‘Of a Mythical Philosophical Anthropology: The Transcendental and the Empirical 
in ‘Technics and Time’’, in Stiegler and Technics, eds. Christina Howells and Gerald Moore 
(Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press,2013) p.55 
265 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, trans. G. D. H. Cole, Rev. J. H. 
Brumfitt, and J. C. Hall. (London: Everyman's Library, 1973) 
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where everything is found close at hand and where individuals are self-sufficient. 266 
Then comes the fall, which stands as the origin of inequality. The fall is the 
exteriorization of the human into technics267 and symbolizes for Rousseau the passage 
to the realm of mortality. In this respect, the human’s nature originates in the loss of 
her essence, which coincides with the appearance of the tool. This cannot be satisfying 
for Stiegler. Hence, he is more sympathetic to the work of André Leroi-Gourhan who 
demonstrates the inherent technicality of vertebrate forms. This includes therefore the 
humans and animals. Christopher Johnson writes: 
Leroi-Gourhan treats the functional anatomies of animal forms as different engineering 
solutions to the vital requirements of mobility and prehension in different environmental 
conditions. At each stage of a given evolutionary sequence, a ‘balance’ or equilibrium is 
achieved between organs dedicated to locomotion and the forward-facing organs dedicated to 
orientation and prehension – what Leroi-Gourhan terms the ‘anterior field’ (champ antérieur). 
Leroi-Gourhan emphasises that the development of nervous systems to ‘control’ the operations 
of the anterior field is secondary to the development of the skeleton, the mechanical 
infrastructure which articulates movement. As Stiegler comments, quoting Leroi-Gourhan, 
‘mobility, rather than intelligence, is the “significant feature”. According to this interpretation, 
the evolutionary singularity which will distinguish the human from proximate animal forms 
such as the primates is not the brain but the feet: the emergence of full bipedalism permits a 
further ‘liberation’ of the anterior field, freeing the hands for more complex and mediated 
interaction with the material world268.  
 
Leroi-Gourhan’s account of the human evolutionary process unsurprisingly inspired 
Stiegler, who, in turn, claims that the human emerges through the structural coupling 
between the human and technics. Leroi-Gourhan’s instrumental maieutics teaches us 
that the hominization process is articulated around the double interaction between the 
cortex and the tool. However, Stiegler becomes soon critical of Leroi-Gourhan, for the 
latter reintroduces a second origin in his account of human evolution, hence repeating 
Rousseau’s mistake. Put otherwise, Leroi-Gourhan’s work suggests a shift in the 
process of humanisation in which the appearance of the homo sapiens constitutes a 
clear rupture with the earlier stages of the human, such as the Zijanthropus and the 
Neanderthal.  For Stiegler, this position is not tenable with Leroi-Gourhan’s earlier 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
266 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. Richard Beardsworth and 
George Collins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) p.116 
267 Stiegler quoting Rousseau, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. Richard 
Beardsworth and George Collins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) p.116 
268 Christopher Johnson, ‘The Prehistory of Technology: On the Contribution of Leroi-Gourhan’, in 
Stiegler and Technics, eds. Christina Howells and Gerald Moore (Edinburgh; Edinburgh University 
Press,2013) p.37 
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demonstrations as it is to go back to a certain form of essentialism269 in which one 
would acknowledge that the homo sapiens is qualitatively and intrinsically different 
from the Zijanthropus and the Neanderthal; it is to assume that the homo sapiens 
“shows signs of another type of intelligence, a spiritual and creative intelligence” 
which is “not immediately dependent on the technical intelligence of its origins”270.   
This is where Rousseau’s notion of deviation271 becomes particularly 
interesting, for it enables us to grasp human evolution as deferral and not as a series of 
shifts and ruptures. The problem is that Rousseau’s account of the deviation lacks 
consistency272. Rousseau’s anthropology starts with the acknowledgement of a state of 
perfection. Insofar as we understand perfection as fullness, a difficulty arises. This 
difficulty, Stiegler argues, is that of the impossibility of movement which is the 
impossibility of deviation itself. Indeed, one is either perfect and has no reason to 
deviate, or one has never been perfect and has been deviating all along,273. Hence, 
Stiegler’s solution is to argue instead for the continuous deferral of the human in 
technics, so that when Rousseau understands the origin as a primary fullness of being, 
Stiegler turns that same origin into a principle of distancing.  
 
In choosing to retain from Rousseau’s transcendental anthropology the concept 
of deviation, Stiegler aims to deconstruct the discourse of the origin by suggesting the 
human’s lack of origin and assuming deviation as an always already existing dynamic. 
In doing so, Stiegler not only comes to terms with the metaphysics of presence that 
involves the understanding of the origin as full presence from which humans have been 
degenerating, he also frees technics from the discourse of corruption it has long been 
associated with, so that when Rousseau could only see in deviation a form of regress, 
Stiegler is able for his part to apprehend it as the possibility for progress. Moving away 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 Christopher Johnson, ‘The Prehistory of Technology: On the Contribution of Leroi-Gourhan’, in 
Stiegler and Technics, eds. Christina Howells and Gerald Moore (Edinburgh; Edinburgh University 
Press,2013) p.50 
270 Christopher Johnson, ‘The Prehistory of Technology: On the Contribution of Leroi-Gourhan’, in 
Stiegler and Technics, eds. Christina Howells and Gerald Moore (Edinburgh; Edinburgh University 
Press,2013) p.39 
271 Écart in French. It translates as deviation, gap or interval, but it can also imply a certain form of 
misconduct, a lack, a failure and a default.  
272 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. Richard Beardsworth and 
George Collins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) p.101 
273 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. Richard Beardsworth and 
George Collins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) p.119 
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from Rousseau to better reutilize the work of Leroi-Gourhan and, more significantly, 
of his mentor Derrida, Stiegler will identify the originary deviation as a technological 
differentiation.   
 
 




Technics and Time takes Derrida’s Of Grammatology for direct inspiration. Like 
Derrida, Stiegler proposes a reading of Leroi-Gourhan’s Gesture and Speech and 
reuses Rousseau’s work on the natural deviation within nature. While Derrida intended 
to stress the repressing of writing in the history of thought, Stiegler aims to show, for 
his part, the repressing of technics274.  
 
Différance, argues Stiegler, stands as the quasi-transcendental condition for the 
human to emerge as technical being. Drawing on Derrida’s Grammatology, Stiegler 
thus defines différance as the reciprocal coupling of spatial differing and temporal 
deferring275. For both thinkers, différance is an arche-writing. This means that 
différance is an inscriptive process enabling all inscriptive processes. But while 
Derrida leaves différance into the domain of abstraction, hereby suggesting that 
différance always escapes meaningful (re)presentation, Stiegler locates the principle 
of différance in technics, hence deploying a programmatology. 276 Unlike Derrida, it is 
not différance that enables technics to emerge, but technics that generates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 Christopher Johnson, ‘The Prehistory of Technology: On the Contribution of Leroi-Gourhan’, in 
Stiegler and Technics, eds. Christina Howells and Gerald Moore (Edinburgh; Edinburgh University 
Press,2013) p.34 
275 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. Richard Beardsworth and 
George Collins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) p.139  
276 Stiegler argues on this issue: “The history of the gramme is that of electronic files and reading 
machines as well—a history of technics—which is the invention of the human. As object as well as 
subject. The technical inventing the human, the human inventing the technical. Technics as inventive 
as well as invented. This hypothesis destroys the traditional thought of technics, from Plato to Heidegger 
and beyond” see: Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. Richard Beardsworth and 
George Collins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) p.137 
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différance277. Understood so, if we have to speak of the origin of the human, that origin 
is double; empirical and transcendental. Stephen Barker writes on this issue: 
 
For Derrida, originary différance is a principle entirely independent of the experiential; for 
Stiegler, grammatisation only occurs through technical objects, as mnemotechnics: the 
experiential is a consequence of technics and of its concretisation in technical objects. Stiegler 
refers to this as the ‘originary prostheticity’ of the experiential (as consciousness). Because for 
Derrida all semiological systems are distinct from ‘arche-writing’, difference precedes the 
technical. Stiegler radicalises this notion by insisting on the a priori technicity of ‘organised 
inorganic matter’: technics, in the form(s) of technical objects, provides the conditions for all 
inscription (…) As is made clear in Ecologies of Television, this equivalency means that 
Stiegler is in fundamental disagreement with Derrida regarding the relationship of technics and 
the artifactuality of technical objects within time. While for Derrida différance maintains an 
integrity that is affected by technics only in the sense that the technical is a form of the 
reification of différance, for Stiegler technics is the support for any organic subjectivity, the 
‘technical synthesis’ providing the irreducible empirical base for human agency278.  
 
Though one could interpret the Stieglerian move as a betrayal of Derrida’s intention 
to keep différance in the elusiveness and openness of its ongoing movement, Stiegler 
does not merely materialize différance in technical objects. His point is more subtle as 
he presents technics itself as a différantial process279.  
 
On a phenomenological perspective, technics therefore appears as the starting 
point of everything, even of time and space. After all, the first volume of Technics and 
Time intends to demonstrate how the temporality of Dasein already depends on the 
acknowledgment of its fundamental technicity. This is why, according to Stiegler, the 
genius of Heidegger was to have presented Dasein280 in Being and Time as the user of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277 For Stiegler différance belongs to the genetic, unlike Derrida who understands it mainly as a logical 
principle. See:  Miguel de Beistegui, ‘Science and Ontology: From Merleau-Ponty’s reduction to 
Simondon’s Transduction’, in Gilbert Simondon: Being and Technology, edited by Arne de Boever, 
Alex Murray, Jon Roffe and Ashley Woodward (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012) p.168 
278 Stephen Barker, ‘Techno-pharmaco-genealogy’, in Stiegler and Technics, eds. Christina Howells 
and Gerald Moore (Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2013) p.267-8 
279 This point is crucial to understand Stiegler’s views on technics as he does not refer to machines or 
objects, but to an abstract orgasitional force, which is that of instrumentality.  
280 Stiegler’s definition of Dasein: “Dasein, the ‘entity which we are ourselves’, is the guarantor of being 
in its temporality, a temporality that is also its truth as the history of be- ing. It is characterized by four 
traits: temporality, historiality, self-understanding, and facticity.” see: Technics and Time, 1: The Fault 
of Epimetheus, trans. Richard Beardsworth and George Collins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1998) p.5 On the temporality of Dasein, Stiegler states later on: “Dasein is the being who differs and 
defers [l'étant qui diffère]. A being who differs and defers should be understood in a twofold sense: the 
one who always puts off until later, who is essentially pro-jected in deferral, and the one who, for the 
same reason, finds itself originarily different, in- determinate, improbable. The being who defers by 
putting off till later anticipates: to anticipate always means to defer. Dasein has to be: it is not simply—
it is only what it will be; it is time”   cf: Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. Richard 
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equipment281.  
In conjugating différance with the inscriptive process of technics, it is not that 
Stiegler accidentally restores a metaphysics of presence in empiricizing what should 
have stayed in the domain of the transcendental or quasi-transcendental. He in fact 
suggests the reverse; technical differentiation supposes a metaphysics of absence282. 
In this respect, the genesis of the human is not purely technical. To better express his 
point, Stiegler once again has recourse to mythical discourse and uses the story of twin 
brothers Epimetheus and Prometheus as told in Plato’s Protagoras. The story is 
simple; when Epimetheus forgets to provide humans with qualities necessary for their 
survival, Prometheus intends to correct his brother’s mistake by endowing humanity 
with the gift of tekhne. Here is when things get complicated; Prometheus stole fire (as 
the representation of the first tekhne) from the gods. The gift is the result of a theft, so 
that Prometheus only repeats his brother’s gesture, himself committing a fault to make 
up for Epimetheus’ fault. If Stiegler chooses to have recourse to mythical narrative, it 
is not for the mere purpose of entertainment or to simply follow Rousseau’s path in 
sketching his own transcendental anthropology, but because the lack can only be 
mythical283. The lack is in fact the quasi-cause of the human. This means that humans 
are not defined by what they have, but by what they don’t have. The lack is therefore 
the first quality of the human; a quality that is a non-quality. Stiegler reutilizes here a 
Deleuzian concept which derives itself from the Stoic heritage. A quasi-cause in, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Beardsworth and George Collins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) p.231 
281 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. Richard Beardsworth and 
George Collins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) p.219 
282 See Daniel Ross, ‘Pharmacology and Critique After Deconstruction’, in Stiegler and Technics, eds. 
Christina Howells and Gerald Moore (Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2013)   
283 Michael Lewis develops on this issue and notes: “Stiegler explicitly avows that the co-invention of 
human and tool produces ‘the illusion of succession’. Rousseau’s enduring merit, for Stiegler, is to have 
noticed the necessity of this fiction. It is impossible to decide which comes first, subjectivity’s need of 
being supplemented by empirical technics, or the tool’s assumption of a transcendental function: it is 
an ‘aporia’, a moment of undecidability in which neither of two opposed routes is navigable: ‘the aporia 
always ends up hardening into a mythology that opposes two moments [. . .] This is an excellent 
archetype of the discourse of philosophy on technics, relating through a fiction, if not by a myth, how 
the man of pure nature is replaced by the man of the fall, of technics”  
see: Michael Lewis, ‘Of a Mythical Philosophical Anthropology: The Transcendental and the Empirical 
in ‘Technics and Time’’, in Stiegler and Technics, eds. Christina Howells and Gerald Moore 
(Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press,2013) p.65 
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this respect, what “produces the effect of sense out of non-sense284”. The myth of 
Prometheus and Epimetheus mentioned above exemplifies perfectly the concept of 
quasi-cause, insofar as the ontological deficiency of the human produces indeed an 
effect on what it means to be human. This effect or accident is that of technics itself, 
which emerges from an absence of pure cause.  
 
Stiegler wants the reader to retain two things from the myth:  1) the essence of 
the human lies in its prosthetic character, which also marks its difference 2) Technics 
do not compensate for something that has been lost, it makes up for something that 




3.1.4	  Stiegler	  and	  Simondon	  on	  Transduction	  
 
 
Stiegler argues that it is a mistake to simply reduce the question of technics to “the 
specified domain of tools, of instruments, if not [simply] machines”285. Instead, he 
stresses that all human actions are the result of a technical conditioning, that is, a 
process of fashioning. Technics in the sense of tekhne designates in this respect broad 
skills such as politeness, elegance, rhetoric or poetry286. Technique refers on the other 
hand to specialized skills, so that one would speak of the technique of craftsman, the 
doctor or the architect. Despite these distinctions, Stiegler claims that one cannot 
delimit the sphere of technics insofar as technics traverses life in general287.   
Refusing the instrumentization of technics, that is, its reduction to the domain of 
instruments, does not involve the complete and simple negation of its instrumental 
character, though. Leaving aside the old-fashioned conception of technicality as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
284 Daniel Smith and John Protevi, ‘Gilles Deleuze’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 
2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/deleuze/>. 
 
285 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. Richard Beardsworth and 
George Collins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) p.93 
286 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. Richard Beardsworth and 
George Collins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) p.93-94 
287 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. Richard Beardsworth and 
George Collins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) p.93-94 
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means serving ends, his work intends to frame the technical as a vectorial/regulative 
process288, which concerns the living as a whole and not just the inert. In line with 
what has been said before regarding the impossibility to think the origin, unless it is 
posited as a non-origin, it will be stated that for Stiegler, the technical and the human 
co-constitute each other.  
Simondon appears as an excellent starting point for Stiegler, for he claims that 
“form does not precede matter289”. As a consequence, one does not start with the 
question of being, but with the process of becoming itself, which Simondon calls 
individuation. As Anne Sauvagnargues notes: 
 
By presupposing the hierarchical subordination of matter to a transcendent form, the 
constituted individual is considered to be explicable on the basis of a principle of individuation 
anterior to it. However, the presupposition of a preformed principle of individuation that 
transcends the operation of individuation renders the becoming of the individual as a real 
process impossible to explain. Simondon therefore challenges the notion that the process of 
individuation can be considered in a unitary manner, and refuses to presuppose that the 
principle of this individuation can be conceived as a formal cause exterior to the real process. 
Purely nominal, abstract and explicative, the principle of individuation must become the 
genetic principle contemporary with real individuation290. 
Starting from the Simondonian becoming of being, which Stiegler takes as the mutual 
coming-together of the human and the technical, the next step will be now to describe 
in more details the nature of this relational process.  
 
The ongoing movement of the mutual process of becoming between an 
individual and its milieu is what Simondon calls the process of transduction291. 
Transduction stands at the core of the ontogenetic. Stiegler claims for his part that it is 
also transduction that ties the human and the technical together. By transduction, 
Simondon originally meant the process in which two opposite terms are traversed and 
transformed by an energy homogenizing what used to be heterogeneous. Read from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288 This issue will be covered in more details in the fifth chapter.  
289 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. Richard Beardsworth and 
George Collins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) p.59 
290 Anne Sauvagnargues,’ Crystal and Membranes: Individuation and Temporality’, in Gilbert 
Simondon: Being and Technology, eds. Arne de Boever, Alex Murray, Jon Roffe and Ashley Woodward 
(Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2012) p.57 
291 Christina Howells and Gerald Moore, ‘Introduction: Philosophy — The Repression of Technics’, in 
Stiegler and Technics, eds. Christina Howells and Gerald Moore (Edinburgh; Edinburgh University 
Press, 2013) p.5 
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this angle, transduction owes its productivity to both destruction and construction, 
entropy and negentropy; it is a process of change that feeds on the constant renewal 
and partial resolution of tensions. Stiegler, on the other hand, leaves aside the entropic 
character of the transductive to focus on its negentropic force through the means of 
tekhne292, for what interests Stiegler is the resolution of conflicts, not the conflicts 
themselves293.  
The same way Stiegler technicized the Derridean legacy on différance, Stiegler 
comes to technicize the Simondonian understanding of the transductive in presenting 
the latter as the technical itself. As a result, one could say that transduction is the 
technical becoming of the individuation of being294. In this respect, we passed from a 






3.1.5	  Instrumental	  Maieutics	  and	  the	  Technicality	  of	  Consciousness	  
	  
 
Not only does the transductive transform, it trans-subjectifies. This is why 
Stiegler incorporates the circular relationship of the who and the what in his reading, 
which he encountered with Leroi-Gourhan. Thus, he wonders: 
The relation binding the "who" and the "what" is invention. Apparently, the "who" and the 
"what" are named respectively: the human, and the technical. Nevertheless, the ambiguity of 
the genitive imposes at least the following question: what if the "who" were the technical? and 
the "what" the human? Or yet again must one not proceed down a path beyond or below every 
difference between a who and a what?295  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292 The individuating power of the transductive is characterized by Stiegler as “the negentropizing of 
the entropic becoming” in Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. Richard Beardsworth 
and George Collins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) p.187 
293 See Bernard Stiegler, ‘The Theater of Individuation: phase-shift and resolution in Simondon and 
Heidegger’, in Gilbert Simondon: Being and Technology, eds. Arne de Boever, Alex Murray, Jon Roffe 
and Ashley Woodward (Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2012) 
294 Anne Sauvagnargues, ‘Crystal and Membranes: Individuation and Temporality’, in Gilbert 
Simondon: Being and Technology, eds. Arne de Boever, Alex Murray, Jon Roffe and Ashley Woodward 
(Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2012) p.57 
295 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. Richard Beardsworth and 
George Collins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) p.135 
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The who refers to the development of the mind and the what to the growth of the 
technical milieu. Stiegler’s work suggest that both terms are driven by certain 
tendencies, which is that of the techno-logical. What Stiegler coins as tendency is what 
Leroi-Gourhan has identified as the field of determinism that “dictates that humans 
will engage with their external environment (milieu) in predictable and convergent 
ways”296.   In fact, the structural coupling of the mind and the technical milieu, which 
is in other words the instrumental maieutic between the who and the what297, enables 
Stiegler to give an empirical account of the emergence of consciousness.  
 
If one remembers well, Sartre describes consciousness as uncaused. It belongs 
therefore to the transcendental. Yet, Stiegler seems by the means of Leroi-Gourhan’s 
instrumental maieutics and Simondon’s work on transduction to technicize 
consciousness itself298. On a broader scale, the originality of Stiegler’s work is to 
indeed suggest that humans are not capable of achieving transcendental subjectivity299, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
296 Christopher Johnson, ‘The Prehistory of Technology: On the Contribution of Leroi-Gourhan’, in 
Stiegler and Technics, eds. Christina Howells and Gerald Moore (Edinburgh; Edinburgh University 
Press,2013) p.35 
297 Full quote: “Cortex and tools are differentiated together, in one and the same movement. It is a 
question of a singular process of structural coupling in "exteriorization," an instrumental maieutics, a 
"mirror proto-stage" in which the differentiation of the cortex is determined by the tool as much as that 
of the tool by the cortex, a mirror effect in which one, informing itself of the other, is both seen and 
deformed in the process, and is thus transformed. It is straightaway this couple that forms the original 
dynamic in a transductive relation” 
see Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. Richard Beardsworth and George Collins 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) p.176 
298 On theorizing consciousness, Stiegler mostly draws from the work of Husserl. Briefly put, Husserl 
argues that consciousness is always the consciousness of something, hereby suggesting from his reading 
of Brentano, that the nature of consciousness lies in its intentionality. It means that consciousness is 
always directed towards objects, which Husserl, extending on Brentano’s work, takes as the condition 
for consciousness to emerge at a first place, so that the object constitutes consciousness (and is 
constituted by consciousness in return). As we have seen earlier, Sartre’s works on self and 
consciousness are also inspired by Husserl. Hence, Stiegler and Sartre are closer that we may imagine 
on the theme of individuation, even if Sartre did not put the emphasis on technics. In the case of Sartre 
and the early Husserl, consciousness is transcendental. But for Stiegler, it is already technically 
conditioned.  
Stiegler argues that the flux consciousness is cinematographic, for example: “Consciousness does work 
like a movie projector; not only a projector but also a machine for capturing, recording, splicing, editing, 
post-production, mixing and special effects. The movies are an exteriorization of the structure of 
consciousness. Consciousness is a cutting room, a central control room, because it edits the flow of 
primary, secondary and tertiary retentions”.  
Bernard Stiegler, Philosophising by Accident: Interviews with Élie During, edited and translated by 
Benoît Dillet (Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2017) p.100 
299 Michael Lewis, ‘Of a Mythical Philosophical Anthropology: The Transcendental and the Empirical 
in ‘Technics and Time’’, in Stiegler and Technics, eds. Christina Howells and Gerald Moore 
(Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press,2013) p.63 
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that is, of spontaneously positing themselves as being the founders of their own 
experience. Instead, humans need technics and are always preceded by technics:  
In this way the technical object allows the human being to relate to time while simultaneously 
anchoring this relation within a history. This goes some way towards explaining why Stiegler 
describes his work as an archaeology of reflexivity300.  
 
 
As such, technics is what enables consciousness to be formed. To be more precise, it 
is the condition of possibility for the spontaneity of the reflective activity301. While 
Sartre’s and Stiegler’s accounts both located freedom within consciousness, the former 
considered psychological freedom to be absolute and irreducible to the human insofar 
as one is always choosing and that a choice is conscious. Stiegler, on the other hand, 
argues that consciousness remains vulnerable to the technical milieu, insofar as it is 
the product of this milieu. This means that my very freedom to think can be 
jeopardized. In this respect, one must take care of oneself. The questions will be to 





3. 2 THE PRESERVATION OF THE HUMAN:  
 
 
3.2.1	  A	  Politics	  of	  Care	  
 
 
The following sections will investigate how Foucault’s and Stiegler’s reading of 
care first overlap and how they diverge insofar as Stiegler politicized what Foucault 
mostly approached from the angle of aesthetics302.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300  Michael Lewis, ‘Of a Mythical Philosophical Anthropology: The Transcendental and the Empirical 
in ‘Technics and Time’’, in Stiegler and Technics, eds. Christina Howells and Gerald Moore 
(Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press,2013) p.54 
301 Richard Beardsworth, ‘Technology and Politics: A Response to Bernard Stiegler’, in Stiegler and 
Technics, eds. Christina Howells and Gerald Moore (Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2013) 
p.210  
302 Michel Foucault, ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress’, in The Foucault 
Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984) p.350 
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In his article on ‘Stiegler and Politics’, Richard Beardsworth writes that “Stiegler’s 
philosophy of technology has argued for reason and for institution at a moment in 
critical theory and postmodern debate when there remains a strong and debilitating 
suspicion of the dominating tendencies of post-Enlightenment reason and its 
institutions”. Stiegler’s work on Taking Care of Youth and The Generations303, which 
I propose to turn to for this section, illustrates Beardsworth’s statement well, for in 
pinpointing the generational malaise individuals are confronted with, Stiegler does 
indeed favour a return to institutions as guarantors of a healthy political future. This 
optimism towards institutions is motivated by his reading of Foucault who 
demonstrated that through ostensibly repressive structures, institutions enable the 
production of the individual, and that the repressive is not necessarily what negates, 
but the condition for constructing and ordering social relations. However, Foucault 
was not a defender of institutions. Though he acknowledged their productive force, he 
did not see systems of disciplinary powers has a viable system of care 304.  For Stiegler, 
we are currently plunged into a state of intellectual regression, that is, of social 
immaturity. To combat this immaturity, we must discipline ourselves. Though his 
conservative tone may be questionable and could be the object of strong criticism, to 
be fully understood it needs to be read in conjunction to his account of psychopower.  
New technologies, Stiegler argues, have perverted the process of self-
formation (or individuation, as Stiegler prefers to call it) in short-circuiting the stream 
of consciousness. In other words, our techno-cultural environment is encouraging 
practices of desubjectivation insofar as it stimulates “regressive identification 
processes” and leads to “crowd psychology”305.While acknowledging the power of 
Foucault’s work, Stiegler believes that Foucault underestimated the psychological 
impact of technologies on individuals, for his theory of biopower mostly discusses the 
issue from a somatic perspective. In this respect, not only is biopower insufficient to 
describe the disastrous effects of new technologies on the psychic constitution of the 
individual, but it needs to be refined by the notion of psychopower insofar as it is not 
the body that constitutes the main political target anymore, but the very structure of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303 Bernard Stiegler, Taking Care of Youth and the Generations, trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2010) 
304 Oliver Davis, ‘Desublimation for Education in Democracy’, in Stiegler and Technics, eds. Christina 
Howells and Gerald Moore (Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2013) p.173 
305 Bernard Stiegler, Taking Care of Youth and the Generations, trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2010) p.62 
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consciousness. As we have seen earlier, especially with Sartre, consciousness is 
essential to the process of self-formation. It is the condition of possibility of 
subjectivation, but as transcendental as it is, Stiegler tells us that it depends on the 
empirical ground of technics.  Hence, the challenge is to reinstall practices of 
subjectivation at the core of political concern. While for Stiegler this implies an odd 
return to the institutions of the French Third Republic, it finally suggests that in order 
to combat the negative effects of new technologies, one needs to have recourse to their 
older counterparts. Adopting healthier technologies is indeed the only way to adopt a 
healthier relationship with oneself.  
 
3.1.2	  Carelessness,	  Consumerism	  and	  the	  Generational	  Malaise	  
 
Psychopower, Stiegler tells us, refers to strategies of power that penetrate the 
unconscious in order to subvert the aesthetic pleasure of desire in favor of the instant 
demands of drives. One of the main consequences is that it tends to reduce the 
individual to the function of consumer. In short-circuiting desire, essential to the 
process of individuation, the consumerist values spread by the entertainment industries 
trap individuals in a meaningless existence.  
 
This meaningless existence is that of disenchantment, Stiegler argues, and is 
fuelled by self-disinterest and carelessness. In other words, it seems that, for Stiegler, 
we attain another stage in the formation of the individual, which is that of dis-
identification; a dis-identification provoked by practices of de-subjectivation. The 
challenge is to turn these practices of de-subjectivation into practices of subjectivation 
— to transform carelessness into carefulness. Identifying care as the cornerstone of his 
politics of the self, Stiegler also quickly associates care with the notion of respect: 
 
What do these children deserve; what do "our" children deserve; what do children deserve, 
who(so)ever they are? Do they not deserve, at least, to have fathers, grandfathers, and a family 
(which is fundamentally always adoptive) within which they can play, and through doing so 
learn to respect, that is, to love, and not merely to fear? What does it mean to play with one's 
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daughter or grandson? It means to laugh and to "forget about time" with them-to give them 
one's time, and to give it not merely to their brains but to the formation of their nascent attention 
by concentrating one's adult attention on their juvenility-as imagination306.  
 
The claim that needs to be retained is the following: we have lost respect for ourselves 
and others. Unlike Kant, dignity and self-respect are not innate attributes of the human. 
Instead, they are skills to be acquired and practiced. Put otherwise, it is through the 
heteronomy of the exercise of care that one gains autonomy. Taking care of oneself is 
for Stiegler, what we owe to each other; it is the condition for the reinvention of the 
human and a political imperative.  
 
Stiegler’s writing can sometimes be dramatic but this shall not overshadow his 
statement, which is that new technologies affect the individual’s cognitive faculties. 
The statement does not come across as particularly original, as this issue has been 
investigated by Katherine Hayles. However, the Foucauldian reading that Stiegler 
injects to it may be worth of attention, for Stiegler is giving another dimension to 
Foucault’s still very influential model of biopower and makes the relationship between 
the techno-cultural and the development of mental life a political issue. By new 
technologies, Stiegler understands technologies that are designed for the era of the 
digital.  In being the agents of economic powers and in supporting industries of 
entertainment, digital technologies dis-educate people because they reduce the 
aesthetic experience of knowledge to a mere object of consumption. The triumph of 
capitalist values and the obsession for profit symbolize the decline of the human. 
Indeed, individuals are not able to think of themselves other than through their 
possessions; through what they have instead of who they are.   
In such circumstances, children are encouraged to construct themselves as referential 
individuations (but having neither authority nor intelligence), resulting in identification not with 
parents, nation, or any idealized object but with merchandise and brand names. 307 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306 Bernard Stiegler, Taking Care of Youth and the Generations, trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2010) p.14 
307 Bernard Stiegler, Taking Care of Youth and the Generations, trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2010) p.62 
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In this case, identity is another object of hyper-consumerism; it has been turned into 
branding. In order to fight the branding of the individual, Stiegler suggests that we 
must reinvent the social, as it is the condition for the reinvention of the human. 
Carelessness is a state of immaturity in which individuals refuse or do not simply know 
how to be responsible. The task will be therefore to instil maturity and responsibility 
again. This can only be done through the means of education.  For Stiegler, education 
is the cornerstone of a healthy social structure, as it guarantees the transition from 
childhood to adulthood. Thus, he suggests that in struggling to educate its own 
children, contemporary societies are in fact struggling to transmit responsibility, and 
this causes a generational rupture. It is through the intergenerational relationship, the 
connection between youth and the eldest, that culture can indeed be preserved and 
expanded.  
These living ancestors then serve as transmitters of experience accumulated across many 
generations, connecting the child with dead ancestors; this transmission process is the very 
formulation and formalizing of the reality principle in its many forms of knowledge (knowing 
how to live, knowing what to do, knowing how to think [savoir-vivre, savoir-faire, savoir-
theorique]. Such transmissions are precisely the pleasure principle's objects and media—the 
objects and media of sublimation308.  
 
Hence, it has become urgent to reconsider the relation between generations, but also 
the relation towards technologies insofar as they enable the social bond and stand as 
the necessary support for knowledge transmission. Overall, the problem identified by 
Stiegler deals with the question of cultural heritage, that is, the transgenerational, as 
the condition for inventing new futures. But inventing is not nihilating. For Stiegler, 
the question of the preservation of the human comes as crucial. In fact, it is through its 
preservation that the human can be reinvented.  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
308 Bernard Stiegler, Taking Care of Youth and the Generations, trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2010) p.7 
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A reading of Foucault is especially necessary and promising: Foucault also showed that the 
techniques of the self, as techniques of psychical organization, are always already techniques 
of collective organization – which he demonstrates in his analysis of the correspondence of 
Seneca with Lucilius.  On the other hand, Foucault did not see coming the question of 
psychopower, whereby marketing, from the emergence of the programme industries, 
transforms the psychotechniques of the self and of psychic individuation into industrial 
psychotechnologies of transindividuation, that is, into psychotechnologies threaded by 
networks, and as the organization of an industrial reticulation of transindividuation that short-
circuits traditional and institutional social networks309. 
 
 
Stiegler salutes Foucault for having shown that technologies are indeed 
constitutive of the psycho-social formation of the individual. However, he also 
reproaches Foucault for having underestimated the growth of programming industries 
as new regimes of domination. According to Stiegler, new technologies differs from 
traditional craftsmanship, for they disrupt the process of appropriation, that is, the 
internalisation of automatisms, which is essential for individuation. Deprived of his or 
her role as artisan, the individual is proleterianized, Stiegler says, precisely because of 
the annihilation of the intimate relationship binding the worker and the product 
together. Proleterianization isn’t just for Stiegler the transformation of workforce into 
resources of exploitation, as Marx described it, but the loss of one’s abilities and, 
widely speaking, the pauperization of minds due to the massive exteriorization of 
knowledge into technologies.  Whereas Marx deplored that alienation  and the 
acceleration of production left labor masses unable to consume what they produce, 
Stiegler asserts that masses of today — or audiences— are confronted with the reverse; 
we are unable to make what we consume. This loss of productivity is symptomatic of 
disindividuation, which characterizes the process of disappropriation of knowledge, 
and ultimately encourages the formation of an immature social body ready to serve 
consumerism. As such, the subject as consumer is “exactly what Foucault’s theory of 
biopower does not allow to be thought310”.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309 Bernard Stiegler, ‘Within the limits of capitalism, economizing means Taking Care’, in 
Telemorphosis: Theory in in the Era of Climate Change (vol.1), ed. Tom Cohen (Michigan: Open 
University Press, 2012) p.107 
310 Bernard Stiegler, Taking Care of Youth and the Generations, trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford: 
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Behind the phenomenon of consumerism initiated by the “American way of 
life”,311 Foucault struggles to fully conceive of the psychological impact of 
technologies on individuals, for his theory of biopower revolves on the body. Yet, the 
excess of production coupled with the digitization of our environment, which is the 
end of spaces of enclosures, leaves us with no choice other than substituting the 
Foucauldian concept of docile bodies for that of docile consciousnesses.  Instead of 
policing the individual’s gestures, psychopower penetrates the unconscious to subvert 
desire for drives: 
 
This destruction of desire (which is also to say, of attention and care), which leads to a drive-
based economy, that is, an essentially destructive economy, is a new limit encountered by 
capitalism, this time not only as mode of production but also as mode of consumption defined 
as way of life, that is, as biopower become psychopower312. 
 
Consumption sustains an economy of jouissance and waste. Stiegler retraces the 
etymology of consumption: derived from the Latin consummare, which first meant 
fulfillment before being understood as a synonym for loss (perdere) or destruction 
(destruere), consumption refers to a drive-based energy, that is, an urge to satisfy the 
customer’s needs. So understood, consumption is the opposite of care, for 
consumption is based on the systematic destruction of its object. In this sense, 
consumption sustains an economy of abandonment. Objects are turned into expedients, 
which means they are de-symbolized. As such, they respond to addicted consumers 
instead of relating to desiring subjects. According to Stiegler, it is precisely the 
liquidation of desire that affects the feeling of existing313. The liquidation of desire 
plunges the individual in a state of hopelessness, so that what dominates instead is the 
feeling of futility and disgust. The hollowness of the economy of jouissance promoted 
by industrialization and capitalism is entropic because it exacerbates symbolic misery. 
In short-circuiting desire, essential to the process of individuation, consumerism traps 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
311  Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise, trans. Stephen 
Barker (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011) p.17 
312 Bernard Stiegler, ‘Within the limits of capitalism, economizing means Taking Care’, in 
Telemorphosis: Theory in in the Era of Climate Change (vol.1) ed. Tom Cohen (Michigan: Open 
University Press, 2012) p.110 
313 Bernard Stiegler, What Makes Life Worth Living: on pharmacology, trans. Daniel Ross (Cambridge: 
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humans into meaningless survival. Incapable of projecting themselves and of forming 
any aesthetic attachment to their environment, individuals subsist instead of existing. 
This progressive bestialization of the human is what Foucault has not considered while 
elaborating on biopower. More precisely, Foucault has not seen that, as a weapon of 
psychopower, consumerism destroys minds to penetrate the id and unleash morbid 
impulses.  
According to Stiegler, new technologies — as the agents of psychopower— 
disrupt concentration in introducing a state of hyper-vigilance and hyper-connectivity. 
This is principally caused by the dilution of the ‘spaces of enclosure’ Deleuze discuses 
in Postscript on the Societies of Control, in which the line between public and private, 
the outside and the inside, are blurred, thereby plunging the individual into the 
continuous and distracting stream of information. “The informational saturation”, 
Stiegler argues, “dissocializes the consumer of that information. Knowledge and 
understanding must be psychically assimilated and made one's own, whereas 
information is merchandise made to be consumed. Information, unlike knowledge in 
general, is therefore ‘disposable314’”. In other words, the continuous stream of 
information does not enable us to appropriate adequately that information and to 
transform it into an object of knowledge as the information is made to be absorbed, 
not to be reflected upon, critiqued or challenged. Information, like any other 
commodity, follows the logic of the market; it is endlessly produced and destroyed. 
And like any other commodity, it is aimed to engender short-term profit 
The proleterianization315 of minds occurs through this phenomenon of 
merchandization — and therefore destruction— of knowledge. In the age of 
information, the individual struggles to form any aesthetic attachment to singular 
objects. The impoverishment of the aesthetic experience, provoked by global 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
314 Bernard Stiegler, Taking Care of Youth and the Generations, trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2010) p.184 
315 On the meaning of proleterianization, Stephen Barker’s own footnote may be useful, as he comments: 
"Proletarian" for Stiegler does not mean "worker" nor "exploited worker" in the traditional Marxian 
sense, but rather the cog in the social wheel that has been deprived of all skills, let alone expertise, thus 
of knowledge, and thus of any participation in the critical process of collective intelligence (and thus of 
identity). The Stieglerian prole has no savoir-faire and thus no savoir- vivre.  (see Bernard Stiegler, 
Taking Care of Youth and the Generations, trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2010) p.213) 
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marketization, is what Stiegler diagnoses as ‘symbolic misery’. Drawing on the work 
of N. Katharine Hayles, Stiegler then distinguishes deep attention and hyper attention. 
Deep attention characterizes autonomous consciousness insofar as this form of 
attention transcends the set of automatisms consciousness has internalized, to critically 
engage with the object of attention. Conversely, hyper attention defines consciousness 
trapped into automatization316.  
Psychopower, Stiegler claims, provokes a state of hyper-vigilance and hyper-
connectivity in short-circuiting the stream of consciousness, which is the stream of 
attention formation, to solicit instead cerebral reflexes. Indeed, hyper-attention is 
precisely what is “dispersed, disseminated” and “undisciplined”317 so that it 
contributes to the impoverishment of processes of cognition. It in fact indicates a break 
in the process of the simondonian (trans)individuation, that is, the psychic and 
collective formation of signification. In this respect, hyper-attention is a mode of 
concentration characterized by its brevity. It is a stimulating process through which 
the nervous system is constantly switching “from one data stream to another318”.  
With the growth of internet, which is also the growth of industries of data, the 
mental faculty of relating oneself towards an object has become increasingly difficult. 
Stiegler blames again consumerism as it is consumerism that blocks the possibility for 
culture. To restore a sense of culture would consequently involve fighting hyper 
attention and cultivate instead deep attention.  
Attention is also the name of civility as it is founded on philia, that is, on socialised libidinal 
energy.  This is why the destruction of attention is both the destruction of the psychical 
apparatus and the destruction of the social apparatus (formed by collective individuation) to 
the extent that the later constitutes of system of care, given that to pay attention is also to take 
care.  (It is also to watch out, which is taken up in the emphasis I will put on destruction.)  Such 
a system of care is also a libidinal economy, wherein a psychical apparatus and a social 
apparatus hook up, whose destruction today is engendered by technological apparatuses.319  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
316 For Stiegler, automatization is the acquisition of reflexes as opposed to the integration of skills of 
automaticity. As one can see, the line between automaticity and automatization is very thin, which is 
another reason why the individual must learn to make a good use of technics.  
 
317 Bernard Stiegler, Taking Care of Youth and the Generations, trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2010) p.77 
318 Bernard Stiegler, Taking Care of Youth and the Generations, trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2010) p.79 
319 Bernard Stiegler, ‘Within the limits of capitalism, economizing means Taking Care’, in 
Telemorphosis: Theory in in the Era of Climate Change (vol.1) ed.Tom Cohen (Michigan: Open 
University Press, 2012) p.104-5 
	   118	  
 
Indeed, deep attention is a mode of attention that is called mature because it is 
socialised in educative procedures. Attention as philia grounds the collective — the 
transindividual milieu — and guarantees the transmission of knowledge. The whole 
purpose of education would be then to cultivate deep-attention.  
In short, we have passed from the negentropic phase of biopower to the 
naturalization of entropy, for it is entropy that psychopower feeds on.  Drawing on the 
theorist Joseph Schumpeter who thought the capitalism of the mid-twentieth century 
in terms of creative destruction, Stiegler argues indeed that psychopower promotes an 
economy of destructive destruction. Overall, biopower and psychopower express two 
distinct modes of violence: biopower characterizes itself through productive 
imperatives, while psychopower is inscribed in a logic of aesthetic destruction in 
which consumers are mere consuming consumer items320. For all these reasons, it is 
essential for Stiegler to rethink the imperative of autonomy and responsibility through 
the revival of care321.  
 
 
3.2.4	  Care	  and	  Autonomy	  
 
 
Foucault shows interest towards care as a technology of the self and argues that 
it must certainly be something that contemporary societies should take inspiration 
from322. On the other hand, he was not arguing that Greek Ethics should be resuscitated. 
Paul Veyne writes: 
 
Greek ethics is quite dead and Foucault judged it as undesirable as it would be impossible to 
resuscitate this ethics; but he considered one of its elements, namely the idea of a work of the 
self on the self, to be capable of reacquiring a contemporary meaning, in the manner of one of 
those pagan columns that are occasionally reutilized in more recent structures323. 
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capitalism, economizing means Taking Care’, in Telemorphosis: Theory in in the Era of Climate 
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322 Michel Foucault, ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress’, in The Foucault 
Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984) p.350 
323 Paul Veyne, ‘The Final Foucault and His Ethics’, Critical Inquiry 20, no. I (Autumn 1993), 7.  
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It is thus to Stiegler that we owe the politicization of the Ancient model of 
subjectivation. Stiegler stresses the therapeutic powers of care when he updates this 
concept for the contemporary context. As Sophie Fuggle notes, Foucault mainly 
understood care as “souci”, whereas Stiegler puts the emphasis on “soin”324.  Stiegler 
thus transforms the Foucauldian ethos of existence, mostly self-exegetic, into a 
curative activity. But as it will be shown, it is the exercise of autonomy that constitutes 
for both the key element of care. 
 
As discussed by Foucault in his series of lectures at the Collège de France in 
1981-2, The Hermeneutics of the Subject,325 the question that motivates the principle 
of care is, “which tekhne do I have to use in order to live as well as I ought to 
live?”326The goal of the enterprise was to foster and nourish some self-respect (dike); 
a sense of worthiness that would be the originary impulse for living a healthy and 
virtuous life. However, care as technology of Self should not be seen as an early form 
of individualism or an excuse for narcissism. Self is for Foucault a potential, a relation 
of forces, an emergent set of properties the individual has to master in order to 
constitute himself as subject. Understood in this way, care as tekhne was presented 
above all by Foucault as the deployment of a means of self-governance, for the activity 
required in fact to find the right balance between the powers of passion and reason; to 
resist in order to gain autonomy. As Aurelia Armstrong puts it: 
 
Rather than imagining autonomy as an innate capacity for self-determination or as the 
achievement of freedom from all forms of social constraint, Foucault holds that it consists in a 
more modest practice of self-formation which depends on cultivating an “artistic” approach to 
those codes of conduct, patterns of identification and regulatory norms which are the cultural 
sources of the self. Thus, the degree of autonomy one enjoys will depend on the extent to which 
one is able to use these cultural sources of selfhood as resources in one’s attempts to intervene 
in the formation of one’s own identity. Foucauldian autonomy, then, is not opposed to social 
regulation. Rather, it consists in the struggle to subvert the project of normalization by wresting 
the power of regulation from the ends of disciplinary control in order to deploy this power in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
324 Sophie Fuggle, ‘Stiegler and Foucault: The Politics of Care and Self-Writing’, in Stiegler and 
Technics, eds. Christina Howells and Gerald Moore (Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2013) 
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325 Michel Foucault, L’herméneutique du sujet, cours au Collège de France (1981-1982), eds. François 
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the service of self-creation327.  
In other words, what captures Foucault’s interest is the creation and the governance of 
self through training (askêsis), that is, the production of the autonomous subject in the 
regulatory practice of care. 
 
Care is for both Foucault and Stiegler the condition for self-constitution, 
identification and reflexivity. However, while the work of the late Foucault taught us 
to acknowledge the transformative effect that technologies have upon us, Stiegler 
pushes the Foucauldian influence a little bit further. Instead of viewing those as a mere 
material support, or hypomnemata, hence reducing technologies to a receptacle of 
human activity, Stiegler goes beyond this assumption and turns technics into the 
empirico-transcendental condition of the human. Having said that, not only can we 
elaborate a hermeneutics of the self through technological devices, but the relation to 
oneself is inevitably technologically enacted. Whereas Foucault may have sensed the 
organisational value of technologies and allowed us to think the significant inter-
relation between the human and the technical field, the Stieglerian move is to posit 
their necessary concomitance. The individual, says the latter, forms himself as a 
singular being, through the bodily interiorization/exteriorization of technics, that is, 
the progressive adoption of skills from the repetitive use of the instrument. It is an 
individuation process insofar the individual gains autonomy through automaticity. 
Stiegler thus declares in an interview with Anaïs Nony:  
 
Auto is the common root of two words which are opposite in the philosophical tradition: 
automata and autonomy. To be autonomous in ancient Greek philosophy — although it is also 
still the case with Kant and even later, for example for the Frankfurt School— to be 
autonomous is the opposite of being in automatic behavior. And I disagree with that. I believe 
that this point of view, which is a very classical, metaphysical point of view, is completely 
wrong, because in reality, to become really autonomous you must integrate a lot of 
automatisms. For example, if you want to become an autonomous pianist you must transform 
your body into such a thing like the piano. But this is the case for all your knowledge, and 
knowledge is a set of automatisms incorporated in the body. 328 
 
 
In fact, Stiegler dismantles the Kantian opposition between autonomy and 
heteronomy. In addition to that, autonomy is not a given anymore or the mark of the 
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328 Bernard Stiegler, ‘Bernard Stiegler on Automatic Society: As told to Anaïs Nony’, Third Rail 
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human, but a characteristic that must be taught and cultivated. Autonomy, Stiegler 
argues, is achieved through the adoption of heteronomy. On that issue, Foucault’s and 
Stiegler’s positions are not that different, insofar as they both suggest that the subject 
never ceases to be herself but might experience different degrees of autonomy, of 
resistance, or will to power.  Put otherwise, autonomy requires discipline. As such, the 




Finally, and this is what should be retained for the moment: both Foucault and 
Stiegler associate care with the exercise of autonomy. While Foucault makes of 
autonomy the finality of care, Stiegler reverses the issue in presenting autonomy as 
what justifies the exercise of care. But in doing so, Stiegler transforms what was 
understood by Foucault as a choice of existence329 into a duty.  
 
3.2.5	  The	  Duty	  to	  Care	  
 
Technologies of psychopower contribute to the weakening of the social bond; 
they capture consciousnesses, and imprison individuals into shame and disgust.  
 
The paralysis individuals are going through during the era of hyper-attentional 
technologies could be comparable to the stultitia pinpointed by Foucault in his analysis 
of Seneca’s De Tranquilita330. The same way Foucault identifies the stultus as a form 
of self-neglect (non-rapport à soi) from the one who does not want him or herself, 
Stiegler argues that the general attitude of self-disgust and disenchantment which 
prevails today, is a state of sickness born from a disinterest from the self towards itself. 
Stiegler thus sees in the Hellenistic principle of care an exit and a cure that may enable 
us to combat what he calls the “reign of stupidity”. Such a liberation implies the freeing 
of thought from the age of information in favour of technologies of spirit. By 
technologies of spirit, Stiegler means technologies that contribute to the expansion of 
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knowledge and valorise these objects of knowledge. But this can only be done in 
preserving teaching, reveals Stiegler, a task rendered even more difficult now with the 
liquidation of adulthood and childhood. Indeed, the progressive infantilization of 
adults coupled with the licence new media offers to minors, subvert the generational 
identification process, essential for an individual to become responsible and enter the 
social sphere. For Stiegler, the re-establishment of a generational hierarchy requires 
the restoration of institutions, that is, the reintroduction of teachers and learners, 
majors and minors, educators and educated. It is about reasserting a model of 
instruction as the substitute of ignorance, an enterprise that has been neglected in 
Foucault’s philosophy: 
 
Foucault's analysis of academic institutions never addresses public instruction as a historic 
process passing through the Enlightenment, that is, through “modernity”, in the sense that he 
gives this word in his treatment of Kant. Most important, and reciprocally, Foucault does not 
seem to see the developing power of marketing and the historical regression it represents as 
the identifying characteristic of our globalized age, exempting it from problematizing the 
programming industries’ power and the marketing strategies that are those industries' 
manifestation. As a result, obviously he also cannot see the war that marketing, as the "science" 
of societies of control, is waging against programming institutions331. 
 
The idea of education is central to individuation, and though both Foucault and Stiegler 
perceive care as the remedy for stupidity (stultitia), each approach the issue of 
transmission differently. Foucault insists on his reading that it is educere that 
stimulates the principle of care. This word is a synonym of help; the action of educere 
affects the subject’s mode of being, and pushes the individual to want himself or 
herself.  It is an “éduction”, says Foucault, a mode of action on the subject’s mode of 
being. Such an enterprise requires the figure of a guide, not here to instruct the 
individual with truths and theories, but to accompany him or her in the subjectivation 
process, so that in fact, the guide and the student mutually construct each other through 
technical supports. For Foucault, it is largely an encounter, a provocation of desire 
(philia) and of curiosity332 that would lead the subject to experiment and surpass 
himself. Though Foucault does not deny during his lectures at the Collège de France 
the institutional aspect of the Hellenistic Skholê, he minimizes its importance to value 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
331 Bernard Stiegler, Taking Care of Youth and the Generations, trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2010) p.122 
332 This could be another point of divergence between Foucault and Stiegler. Indeed, Foucault thinks 
care through an economy of curiosity when Stiegler puts the emphasis on the necessity to develop an 
economy of attention, as it is through the consolidation of attention that one develops curiosity.  
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instead the relationship between the philosopher and the student. Care is in other words 
a principle of mutuality forged throughout the intimacy or friendship between the 
educator and the educated. Stiegler is right in that sense; Foucault avoids the question 
of public instruction. He rather demonstrates throughout his interpretation of Ancient 
texts that the adoption of an ethics presupposes the adoption of an ethical attitude. 
Stiegler, on the other hand, understands education in terms of educare, hereby 
emphasizing on the transmissional process binding the instructor and the instructed in 
a hierarchical relationship. Indeed, what prevails for Stiegler is the configuration of 
the individual through institutional programs. For Sophie Fuggle, this is where lies the 
whole irony of Stiegler’s reappropriation of Foucault: 
 
Stiegler locates a duty of care in the nineteenth-century educational apparatuses criticised 
precisely for their lack of care by Foucault, who identifies them with normalising processes 
that produced knowledge about a subject not in order to nurture and develop individual 
subjectivity but rather to regulate, cure and control333.  
 
In this respect, Stiegler suggests that it is the duty of programming institutions to take 
care of the self.  
 
Care is part of Stiegler’s political program; a political program that is primarily 
aesthetic. This is rendered evident for example with the figure of the amateur334, which 
Stiegler aims to return to. But Stiegler’s aesthetics of self is quickly overshadowed by 
the demands of reason, so that the issue of creativity quickly flirts with the conformity 
of institutions. As we know, Enlightenment was described by Kant as the emergence 
of man from his state of self-incurred immaturity335. Yet, Stiegler transforms the 
“audacity to know336” of Aufklärung to a duty that involves the subjection to an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
333 Sophie Fuggle, ‘Stiegler and Foucault: The Politics of Care and Self-Writing’, in Stiegler and 
Technics, eds. Christina Howells and Gerald Moore (Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2013) 
p.200 
334 The “amateur” is described by Stiegler in opposition with the figure of the consumer, so that the 
amateur is the one “who wants to know”. Taking Care of Youth and the Generations, trans. Stephen 
Barker (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010). p.70 
335 Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’, trans. H. B. Nisbet (London: 
Penguin, 2009) 
336 Michel Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. 
Catherine Porter (New York: Pantheon Books 1984) p.35 
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authority, when care, as it has been emphasized earlier, is supposed to favour 
subjectivation. On Stiegler’s sympathy to institutions, Oliver Davies notes; 
 
In Taking Care Stiegler salutes the vision of statesman Jules Ferry, who made secular state 
primary education compulsory in France in the early 1880s, in the following terms: ‘for Jules 
Ferry it was a matter of substituting secular sublimation for religious sublimation’ and, by 
making primary education a legal obligation, of instituting ‘a positive power of sublimation – 
as a discipline of transindividuation that in turn fosters the political maturity that is the essence 
of Aufklärung’. Michel Foucault, in his account of disciplinary power and its institutions in 
Discipline and Punish, is accused by Stiegler of having failed to acknowledge this ‘positive 
power of sublimation’ and in particular of having failed to understand that the Ferry laws were 
democratising ‘technological’ instruments, in that they made it clear that the State’s 
expectation of all of its children was that they accede to literacy and thereby to political 
maturity. Foucault failed to see the Third Republic’s school system for what it was: a system 
of care designed to form deep attention on an industrial scale and thereby to make France a 
mature democracy. Foucault is not alone, Stiegler suggests, in his one-sided view of 
Republican schooling; his ingratitude and indeed his ignorance is felt to be typical of an over-
privileged generation of theorists associated by Stiegler with May ’68337.  
 
However, in fearing the withdrawal of authority, Stiegler falls into the trap he himself 
denounces; that of authoritarianism. The reason for that lies probably in his own 
account of Enlightenment. Indeed, Stiegler mostly retains from Enlightenment the 
triumph of reason over obscurantism, but in putting the stress on the rationalizing 
process of Enlightenment, he may fall right into what Foucault calls the ‘blackmail of 
the Enlightenment’. Indeed, the risk of Enlightenment resides in subverting the 
philosophical ethos, understood as the practice of criticism through ontological 
investigations, for the systemization of instruction. The systemization of instruction, 
through the revitalization of a certain love for institutions, is nevertheless what Stiegler 
wishes to bring forward by the means of national education338. 
 
This system of metacare, such as national education, aims to disseminate in 
people’s minds a sense of national culturalism, in straight opposition to the hollow 
individualism promoted by technologies of psychopower. Quite surprisingly, Stiegler 
compares the activity of care with the dedication to a cult339. Such an approach 
transforms the question of education, or care, into a procedure of normalization 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337 Oliver Davis, ‘Desublimation in Education for Democracy’, in Stiegler and Technics, eds. Christina 
Howells and Gerald Moore (Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2013) p.173 
338 Bernard Stiegler, Taking Care of Youth and the Generations, trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2010) p.179 
339 Bernard Stiegler, Taking Care of Youth and the Generations, trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2010) p.178 
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grounded in faith, which is dangerous, not to mention puzzling, as faith is the opposite 
of critique. Yet, Stiegler sees in contemporary societies controlled by industries and 
economic powers, a social disaster, due to the liquidation of culture; a disappropriation 






3.3 KEY POINTS 
 
 
While Foucault views the ancient principle of care as a desirable art of living, 
he does not clearly elaborate on its political implications and rather defends the arts of 
the self on an aesthetic level. Stiegler, on the other hand, explicitly turns care into a 
political imperative, insofar as it aims to cure the ills of techno-culture.  
 
Stiegler argues overall that individuals only exist in and through technics. Yet, 
he claims that new technologies are drastically impacting the quality of human 
existence, for they progressively deprive people from their autonomy and their 
freedom to think. As the agents of cultural capitalism, technologies of psychopower 
impede on the psycho-social formation of the individual, so that a meaningful relation 
to oneself and aesthetic objects in general is hardly possible.  
 
Stiegler thus draws an unflattering portrait of our current technoculture and 
worries about the future of the human. In Automatic Society: The Future of Work 340, 
he is indeed mortified with the automatization of existence and the state of permanent 
connectivity this automatization has introduced. According to Stiegler, we are 
currently living in societies of hyper-control, for our everyday life depend on “mobile 
devices such as the smartphone, domestic devices such as web-connected television, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
340 Bernard Stiegler, Automatic Society: The Future of Work, trans. Daniel Ross (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2016)  
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habitats such as the smart house and smart city, and transport devices such as the 
connected car”341.  
 
Stiegler is right when affirming that a majority of people consume 
technologies, but do not know how to use them. He is also right when hinting at the 
necessity to be educated about the digital. But though it is undeniable that digital 
technologies are opening new processes of individuation, he tends to have a paranoiac 
discourse concerning the controlling power of computer technologies. Indeed, as much 
as the digital is now a key component of our existence, its effectivity as a system of 
control and surveillance is far from being infallible. The second part of the thesis 
proposes therefore to assess Stiegler’s vision of psychopower, articulated around the 
pervasiveness of systems of control and the impoverishment of meaning, in engaging 
in a discussion with Turkle, Galloway and Chun.  
 
Three points will be examined: 
— The psychological and ontological intimacy between technologies and the 
human 
— The aesthetical power of the network 
— The effectiveness of panoptical control  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
341  Bernard Stiegler, Automatic Society: The Future of Work, trans. Daniel Ross (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2016) p.16 
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INTRODUCTION 




Sartre, Foucault and Stiegler share a common interest for the aesthetics of the 
self as they are convinced that the conscious relation to oneself is crucial for the 
development of a meaningful existence in which one could be (relatively) free within 
current socio-political circuits. Sartre describes selfhood as an imaginary construct, 
whereas Foucault stresses that selfhood emerges throughout power relations. Stiegler, 
for his part, argues that selfhood is constituted in and through technics. All three 
suggest in this respect that it is because no self is given to us that one needs to elaborate 
a reflective relationship with oneself.  All three agree that the cultivation of the self 
implies at its core the cultivation of freedom, insofar as the conditions for the 
realization of freedom are located in consciousness. Finally, all three see in the 
cultivation of the self a way to escape, resist or sublimate a negative force; for Sartre 
this is the other, for Foucault the ‘eye of power342’ as we shall see now, and for Stiegler 
the technologies of psychopower.  
 
 
From Foucault to BigBrotherism: 
 
Before moving on to the second half of the thesis which intends to assess 
Stiegler’s insight on psychopower, drawing on the works of Turkle, Galloway and 
Chun, I would like to reflect on Foucault’s influence on Stiegler’s understanding of 
the power-control paradigm343. As I have explained in the previous chapter, Stiegler’s 
conception of psychopower is directly inspired by Foucault’s biopolitics. Biopower is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
342 Michel Foucault, ‘The Eye of Power’, in Power/Knowledge; Selected Interviews and Other Writings 
1972-1977, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, Josh Mepham and Kate Soper (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1980) p.146-165 
343 Considering that Sartre has not debated the political implications of his aesthetics of the self, leaving 
it into the domain of psychoanalysis, I am going to focus essentially on Foucault and Stiegler for the 
moment.  
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defined as the government, that is, the regulation and administration of bodies344. For 
Stiegler, biopower has evolved into psychopower insofar as it is not the normalisation 
of bodies that constitutes the main political issue, but the standardization of 
consciousnesses. Control is for both theorists a key term which remains largely 
unquestioned, insofar as it is immanent to the dynamic of power-relations. While 
Foucault’s model of biopower hints at the control of behaviors in which the moral 
reformation of the individual comes as an effect of the disciplining of the body, 
Stiegler shows that apparatuses of psychopower intend to directly control minds. This 
does not mean that the body is completely removed from the equation; the fact that 
Stiegler puts the emphasis on the psychic rather than the somatic only indicates that in 
the current strategies of power Foucault’s theory of the management of life and its 
living is not sufficient to apprehend with precision how the governance of mental life 
plays out in the current age of media. As such, it would be wrong to simply assume 
that psychopower has replaced biopower, even though the latter might seem to grow 
more obsolete with time. Instead, they coexist.  
 
 
Despites its anachronisms, Foucault’s contribution remains largely influential, 
as Stiegler acknowledges in What Makes Life Worth Living.345 But what if the 
Foucauldian legacy was not enlarging but narrowing or skewing our conception of 
power?  In his article ‘Social Control After Foucault’, Michalis Lianos writes that 
ideologies of control have led to an unjustified mistrust towards systems of social 
organization and are still feeding our paranoiac phantasms: 
 
 
Theoretical ‘BigBrotherism’ undoubtedly seduces us as much with its simplicity and its capacity to mark 
our thoughts, as with its interpretation of control and domination. However, after scratching the surface, 
one rapidly discovers the limits of these analyses that look at contemporary control as part of a larger 
scheme of socio-political domination or hegemony. An obvious pitfall is that we are asked to accept a 
‘Big Brotherism’ without ‘Big Brother’. This, besides the injustice done to Orwell, speaks more of our 
need to subject the development of a highly technological environment to conceptual schemata that refer 
to the pre-modern world or at most to the emergence of modernity (…) Building socio-technological 
dystopias peopled by clones and cyborgs responds to this heterogeneous melange of perspectives which 
fails to take into account an essential point: the organization and the nature of power cannot remain 
immutable and subject to atemporal criteria whilst sociality transforms itself in a radical way. Once the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
344 Bernard Stiegler, Taking Care of Youth and the Generations, trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2010) see chapter ‘Biopower, Psychopower and Grammatization’ pp. 124-
143 
345 Bernard Stiegler, What Makes Life Worth Living?, trans. Daniel Ross (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2013) p.84 
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dynamics of the social universe are disregarded, it is easy to produce dark visions by simply focusing on 
the likely operation of future technological systems, which will presumably become more complex and 
accurate in their interaction with human behavior, social, private or intimate346.  
 
This mistrust towards structures of social organization is what I propose to explore for 
this introduction; it shall be read as a preview for the last chapter in which I will draw 
on Wendy Hui Kyong Chun to examine the effects of ideologies of control in our 
conception of freedom. As such, I intend to show that Stiegler’s Foucauldian approach 
of psychopower perpetuates a paranoiac account of control and surveillance. I will 
explain that such misunderstanding derives from a certain misconception of 




Bentham’s Panopticon and Foucault’s Prison? 
 
 
Foucault’s biopolitics present a positive model of power insofar as social 
structures were, according to it, designed to optimize human resources and effectively 
organise populations. According to Foucault, biopower has progressively 
complemented and replaced sovereign power. Sovereignty “permits the foundation of 
an absolute power”347 which “encompasses the totality of the social body”348 and is 
mostly defined “in terms of the relationship sovereign-subject”349. Hence, the power 
of the sovereign was mostly restricted to the ability to take life or let live. Biopower 
rather aims at the mobilization and enhancement of life than at its oppression. A 
common metaphor used to illustrate the effects of biopower on the administration of 
bodies is that of the panopticon, which Foucault borrows from Jeremy Bentham. 
Foucault describes the panopticon as follows:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
346 Michalis Lianos, ‘Social Control After Foucault’, Surveillance and Society, 1/3 (2003) p.418 
347 Michel Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’, in Power/Knowledge; Selected Interviews and Other Writings 
1972-1977, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, Josh Mepham and Kate Soper (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1980) p.105 
348 Michel Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’, in Power/Knowledge; Selected Interviews and Other Writings 
1972-1977, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, Josh Mepham and Kate Soper (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1980) p.104 
349 Michel Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’, in Power/Knowledge; Selected Interviews and Other Writings 
1972-1977, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, Josh Mepham and Kate Soper (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1980) p.104 
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The Panopticon is a ring-shaped building in the middle of which there is a yard with a tower 
at the centre. The ring is divided into little cells that face the interior and exterior alike. In each 
of these little cells there is, depending on the purpose of the institution, a child leaning to write, 
a worker at work, a prisoner correcting himself, a madman living in madness. In the central 




In many respects, Foucault’s reading of the panopticon struggles to convince 
Bentham’s scholars.  Bentham’s specialist Anne Brunon-Ernst explains for example 
in her article ‘Deconstructing Panopticism into the plural Panopticon’ that Foucault’s 
understanding of the utilitarian model of the perfect surveillance state is incomplete, 
for Foucault concentrates most of his reading on the prison. She reminds us that 
Bentham developed four models and that the prison was only one of them. The prison 
panopticon is the commonly known one; it involves, as mentioned in the quote above, 
a circular building and a central inspector. The second model is that of the pauper 
panopticon, which was largely inspired by its predecessors in terms of architecture. 
However, it involves a more complex system of management and is designed 
especially for the indigents and the disabled. So far, these two versions do not 
contradict or challenge Foucault’s interpretation very much. The third model is called 
the chresthomathic panopticon, which is a structure designed for pedagogical 
purposes. Here again, we are confronted with an all-seeing master teaching his or her 
pupils without being seen. In this paradigm, Brunon-Ernst says, the purpose is not 
control but the transmission of knowledge. Though it involves a certain level of 
management, the aim is purely pedagogical. The fourth model is that of the 
constitutional panopticon, sometimes called the reversed panopticon. In this 
architectural arrangement that Bentham imagined in order to draw the ideal 
government, the ministers of the state are under the eye of the public opinion; it is not 
the masses that are disciplined, but the government. In exposing these four models, 
Brunon-Ernst laments the fact that Foucault’s understanding of Bentham’s panopticon 
has not stressed enough these differences. Instead, Foucault’s investigations focus on 
the prison discipline and seem to expand its internal structures of control and 
surveillance to the other three panopticons. If Foucault’s account of the prison is not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
350 Passage from ‘Truth and Juridical Forms’ as quoted by Anne Brunon-Ernst ‘Deconstructing 
Panopticism into the Plural Panopticon’, in Beyond Foucault: New Perspectives on Bentham’s 
Panopticon, ed. Anne Brunon-Ernst (Farnham, England; Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate, 2012) p.29.  
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inaccurate, according to Brunon-Ernst, it does not give scholars the full picture. To her 
mind, Foucault’s reading of Bentham implies that these four panopticons share a set 
of defining features that can be reducible to the carceral system.  She argues that:  
 
The four different panopticons are not only different names given to the same project at 
different times in Bentham’s long career; they also exemplify very different panoptic features, 
which resist any single all-compassing name-tag351.  
 
 She claims in this respect that panopticism is plural and cannot be understood as a 
broad system of surveillance, for the architecture of the prison cannot be simply 
applied to that of the hospital or the state administration. She thus concludes that the 
wide reception of Foucault’s work in academia has led to the assumption that ‘prison 
discipline pervades all of Modern Society’352. In this respect, Foucault’s 
reappropriation of Bentham’s legacy is misleading.  
 
Brunon-Ernst’s concerns about Foucault reading of Bentham may be 
questionable, insofar as she seems to read Foucault’s theory of power as a coercive 
system. Even though Foucault has mostly drawn on Bentham’s utilitarian conception 
of the ideal prison, he is not merely suggesting that our society has become carceral. 
Besides, he was aware of the nuances of Bentham’s project353. As such, he does not 
merely conflate the prison discipline with that of other institutions.  In fact, Foucault’s 
argument hints at something more general. Christian Laval notes for his part that 
Foucault saw in Bentham a “technologist of modern governmentality354”. In other 
words, Foucault salutes Bentham for having understood that power is before all a 
structural principle; the key of the panopticon was architecture355. Besides, the society 
in which we live is not, for Foucault, that of the panopticon but that of panopticism, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351 Anne Brunon-Ernst, ‘Deconstructing Panopticism into the Plural Panopticon’, in Beyond Foucault: 
New Perspectives on Bentham’s Panopticon, ed. Anne Brunon-Ernst (Farnham, England; Burlington, 
Vermont: Ashgate, 2012) p.25 
352 Anne Brunon-Ernst, ‘Deconstructing Panopticism into the Plural Panopticon’, in Beyond Foucault: 
New Perspectives on Bentham’s Panopticon, ed. Anne Brunon-Ernst (Farnham, England; Burlington, 
Vermont: Ashgate, 2012) p.41 
353 Michel Foucault, ‘The Eye of Power’, in Power/Knowledge; Selected Interviews and Other Writings 
1972-1977, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, Josh Mepham and Kate Soper (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1980) p.148 
354 Christian Laval, ‘From Discipline and Punish to The birth of Biopolitics, in Beyond Foucault: New 
Perspectives on Bentham’s Panopticon, ed. Anne Brunon-Ernst (Farnham, England; Burlington, 
Vermont: Ashgate, 2012) p.44 
355 Michel Foucault, ‘The Eye of Power’, in Power/Knowledge; Selected Interviews and Other Writings 
1972-1977, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, Josh Mepham and Kate Soper (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1980) p.148 
	   133	  
which is quite different. The panopticon refers to Bentham’s theory, while panopticism 
designates an abstract system of power-relations which is optical and architectural356. 
For Laval, Foucault is not implying that our modern society shall be reducible to 
Bentham’s prison, that is, a social system in which there would be a centralized form 
of power and in which populations are seen without being able to see.  On the contrary, 
Foucault is aware that things are more complex. First of all, he knows that disciplinary 
societies are coming to an end and that another form of power is growing: he is also 
aware that bluntly applying Bentham’s theory of the perfect prison to the current 
political system would be anachronistic and erroneous357. As such, Foucault would 
likely accept Bentham’s fourth version of the panopticon, which Brunon-Ernst claims 
is absent from his texts358, for it corresponds to a democratic form of power in which 
the many exerts an influence over the few. We know that Foucault’s account of 
biopower intends to show in detail that power is not simply something that comes from 
the bottom-up and that it can be distributed and dispatched throughout institutional 
circuits. Indeed, this decentralized account of power will be taken up by Galloway who 
explicitly draws on Foucault on this point and brands him as the thinker of protocol. I 
will discuss this issue in more details in the second chapter of this second part of the 
thesis.   
 
So far, I have stressed that according to Brunon-Ernst, Foucault propagated a 
carceral conception of the panopticon. Laval, on the other hand, explains that 
Foucault’s understanding of Bentham was more nuanced, but he acknowledges that 
this nuance has been underemphasised and therefore not properly taken into account 
in academia359. I find myself on the side of Laval on this issue. I would also be tempted 
to argue that some aspects of Brunon-Ernst’s reading of Foucault is symptomatic of 
this academic misunderstanding. The conflation between the panopticon and the 
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prison building is therefore not so much imputable to Foucault as his followers. 
Nevertheless, what I find compelling in Bruno-Ernst’s argument is that she insists that 
Bentham’s four models of the panopticon were not all apparatuses of control, but 
conceived more largely as communication tools. Hence, control was not inherent to 
practices of surveillance. Foucault, on the contrary, assumes control as a principle 
immanent to the panopticon. Considering Foucault’s popularity in academia, whether 
this concerns the field of politics, philosophy, sociology or to be more specific, that of 
surveillance studies, such a reading is not innocuous. Most scholars, argues Brunon-
Ernst, got familiar with Bentham’s panopticon through Foucault’s lens. As such, most 
scholars are tempted to think the panopticon as a mere device of control, the same way 
they may be tempted to hastily compare the organisation of the social to a prison-like 
structure in which the Foucauldian reading of Bentham would stand as the paranoiac 
truth of our age. According to Brunon-Ernst and Guillaume Tusseau, studies on 
surveillance, control and power cannot escape the decisive influence of Foucault and 
remain to a certain extent panoptical.  
 
At this stage, a few words must be said about the panoptic and the panoptical. 
The panoptical should be distinguished from the panoptic insofar as the panoptic is 
connected with the root principles of Bentham’s panopticon, whereas the panoptical is 
‘a derivative adjective’ that describes more abstract qualities of the panopticon ‘as 
mediated through Foucault’360. This does not mean that Foucault’s theory of control 
and surveillance has been unconditionally accepted or praised.  Brunon-Ernst and 
Tusseau argue that the emergence of neologisms such as ‘cybernetic panopticon’, 
‘Ban-opticon’, ‘Myopic panopticon’ or ‘Global panopticon’, to name a few, conveys 
the idea that “the panoptic paradigm is no longer a fitting model to interpret present-
day surveillance issues361”. Nevertheless, it shows that “society has moved to a post-
panoptical age, which shares some of the features of its panoptical Foucauldian father 
and panoptic Bentham grandfather, as one inherits traits from a relative”362. 
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Social Control After Foucault: 
 
 
It is undeniable, in this respect, that Foucault’s panoptic conception of the 
social has perpetuated the idea of a triangular relationship between power, control and 
surveillance. Deleuze’s account on the societies of control is perhaps the most 
significant example that comes to mind. According to Deleuze, the disciplinary 
societies described by Foucault are in decline, so that we are now confronted with the 
emergence of a new model of power, which is that of societies of control363.  
Disciplinary societies “initiate the organization of vast spaces of enclosure364” in 
which “the individual never ceases passing from one closed environment to 
another”365. With the rise of societies of control, segmented spaces are disintegrated 
and become part of a continuous and malleable circuit in which there is no clear 
distinction between the outside and the inside, the public and the private: “in the 
disciplinary societies one was always starting again (from school to the barracks, from 
the barrack to the factory, while in the societies of control one is never finished with 
anything — the corporation, the educational system, the armed services being 
metastable states coexisting in one and the same modulation, like a universal system 
of deformation”366. While disciplinary societies articulated a system of surveillance 
through administrative numeration, societies of control deploy means of trackability. 
In this situation, control is our “immediate future”367. As such, Deleuze says, “there is 
no need to fear or hope, but only to look for new weapons368”. In his account of the 
societies of control, Deleuze revives the presence of control as the unavoidable effect 
of power structures, in which the latter are both conceived as totalizing (pan) and 
surveilling (optical).  
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As suggested by Brunon-Ernst and Tusseau, current theories of control, 
whether agreeing or disagreeing with Foucault’s insight on the panopticon, remain 
intrinsically connected to his approach. Deleuze is no exception to the rule. However, 
he is not the only scholar to have engaged with Foucault’s panoptic conception of 
power in order to highlight its limitations. A common criticism would be to point out 
for example that Foucault’s theory has not taken into account the role of pleasure, 
which is essential to the expansion of the consumer society. Galloway will tackle this 
issue in showing that procedures of control, such as protocol, enable the individual to 
enjoy his or her freedom. These procedures intend to minimize the risks through the 
deployment of safety measures. As such, they turn pleasure and the experience of 
freedom itself into an effect of control that can be programmable and manageable. 
Stiegler, for his part, will openly criticize Foucault for having failed to conceptualise 
the individual as consumer369, insofar as biopower targets the worker370. If we follow 
the logic of Brunon-Ernst and Tusseau, Galloway and Stiegler, though proposing to 
expand or revise Foucault’s panoptic paradigm of power, are doomed to be 
Foucauldian. And if they are, it is not simply because they engage in a dialogue with 
their predecessor, but because, as Deleuze, they take the effectivity of control for 
granted.  
 
Foucault’s insistence on the eye of power is paranoiac, for it makes observation 
“a constant directing principle”371. In this respect, Brunon-Ernst argues that this 
overemphasis on the gaze led scholars to believe that the panopticon intends to deploy 
a system of continuous visibility and transparency. This may be the case for the first 
model, but not the fourth model, that is, the constitutional panopticon. Indeed, in this 
structural arrangement, the individual could choose at any moment to retrieve herself 
from the public eye in order to enjoy some privacy. This configuration echoes a lot to 
what happens in social networks insofar as users can select contents they feel 
comfortable to share with others and keep less flattering elements of their lives for 
themselves. This analogy may be too simple, but the key idea I would like to highlight 
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is the following: while one may be under the impression that current social networks 
embody a panoptic system of surveillance in which the many (the users) are seen by 
an unseen minority (anonymous agents of economic powers or company leaders), this 
system of visibility is not as coercive or menacing as often imagined. Indeed, one is 
free to not engage in the panoptic game. As mentionned earlier, one could answer to 
Brunon-Ernst that Foucault himself did not understand panopticism as a coercive 
power. Moreover, he was aware that the panopticon did not establish a circuit of 
permanent visibility and was elaborated instead on the dual dynamic between visibility 
and invisibility. Yet, Foucault mostly drew his theory of power on the controlling, 
surveilling and modelling structures of the panopticon, hence giving scholars a very 
partial idea. For Bentham, the disciplinary function of the prison was one only one 
element of his project of governmentality  in which control and surveillance were not 
as preponderant as for Foucault.  
 
What I retain from Brunon-Ernst’s account is that despite the presence of 
surveilling structures, the activity of surveillance is neither a fact or a guarantee. This 
is what I will cover by the means of Chun’s work in the third chapter of this second 
part of the thesis, though I will apply this idea to automated and algorithmic structures 
of surveillance. Besides, Brunon-Ernst explains that if “one understands panopticism 
as supervision, control and correction, then the panopticon defeated its ultimate 
purpose”372. Taken this way, the aim of the panopticon was not to install a hegemonic 
system of surveillance and transparency in a fashion that may remind us Orwell’s Big 
Brother in the novel 1984. Instead, “the aim of surveillance was for the people 
monitored to internalise surveillance so that surveillance would in the end be 
necessary”373. Put otherwise, “panopticons are built so that no more panopticon will 
be needed”374. Hence, the panopticon is not the emblem of disciplinary societies as it 
is the case for Foucault; it does not intend to produce more surveillance, it aims for the 
reverse, namely, the nihilating of surveillance. As such, the panopticon was supposed 
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to be symptomatic of our progressive withdrawal from the disciplinary. Yet, one could 
counter that internalising discipline up to the point that no discipline will be required 
in the future could be a higher and more sophisticated form of panopticism. Such a 
stance would give again the upper-hand to Foucault. I do not discard this possibility. 
Instead, I simply state that Bentham’s theory of the panopticon was supposed to be, in 
its original conception, a temporary model of surveillance in which power and control 
were not the end, but the collateral effects of the panoptic endeavour. On this issue, it 
is fair to assume, as does Brunon-Ernst, that Foucault’s description is incomplete.  
 
One further issue I would like to tackle before moving on to the second part 
dedicated to new media is that of the effectivity of control. Foucault, Deleuze, Stiegler 
and Galloway have all theorized control, giving either a panoptic (Foucault), a 
panoptical (Deleuze) or a post-panoptical (Stiegler and Galloway) account of it.  I 
would like to stress in these last paragraphs that the presence of measures of control 
does not mean that they are necessarily operating, nor that they are running 
successfully. It does not mean either that they are exerted on individuals or that they 
produce any effect on them. Kevin D. Haggerty argues for example that Foucault 
misses out an important aspect of the panopticon, which is that of failure: 
 
The targets of surveillance as depicted in Discipline and Punish are largely passive. What little 
agency they display is directed inward upon themselves in the form of an almost inevitable 
process of acquiescent ‘soul training’. The movement of panoptic principles into new settings 
is presented as entirely frictionless. Surveillance appears to proliferate because it represents a 
self-evident increase in the functionality of power (…) Focusing exclusively on the panopticon 
as an idealized model of power, Foucault elides the fact that even in Bentham’s day the 
panopticon was ultimately an unsuccessful political project, with Bentham serving as the failed 
lobbyist for his utopian architectural dream375. 
 
 
Moreover, Foucault’s account of panoptic power stresses the importance for 
individuals to be conscious that they are under scrutiny. Hence, the surveillance project 
can only be operational if its subjects are aware of its presence and of its internal 
dynamics; “without such an awareness there is no pressure towards ‘soul training’”376. 
In this respect, Foucault’s panopticism is unfit to describe the present structures of 
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surveillance, which aim at the collecting of data. As Haggerty suggests, monitoring 
procedures are routinely conducted without individuals even knowing. And if this is 
the case, one could wonder if this absence of awareness, without completely nullifying 
the effects of control, does not attenuate or limit the so-called influence of power 
structures. Haggerty, for his part, is not trying to minimize the impact of dataveillance, 
yet he believes that Foucault has given too much emphasis to the “normative stance”377 
of the panopticon and has therefore contributed to the spread of a dystopian and 
diabolical model of surveillance.  
 
 Finally, Michalis Lianos states that studies of social control are stagnating since 
Foucault’s intervention on the issue. Like Haggerty, he deplores the demonizing of 
systems of control and surveillance, which are often reduced to simplistic structures 
of domination. To support his claim, Lianos uses the example of the CCTV system, 
implemented on road networks. This dispositif, he says, can be used or become useful 
in several respects; it can be about the introducing of “repressive surveillance (traffic 
offences), detective surveillance (stolen vehicles), the regulation of traffic flow 
(reduction of congestions)”, but it can also reveal itself as a “support for planning 
(recording information on all aspects of traffic), accident prevention (transmission of 
information to drivers on obstacles to anticipate) or the improvement of access times 
for emergency services (breakdowns, accidents)”378.  
Galloway uses a similar analogy and illustrates the effects of contemporary 
orgasitional structures with the image of the road network. Using the highway as an 
example, he aims to show that, far from being restrictive, systems of social control can 
turn out to be liberating.  If Lianos and Galloway would agree on this issue, the 
overemphasis Galloway gives to control would however not be satisfying for Lianos. 
As he argues, control is one of the potential effects of monitoring structures, not its 
grounding principle379. The CCTV system can serve for multiple purposes and these 
purposes or activities cannot be “divisible into categories”380. This is the reason why 
it is crucial to not hastily conflate systems of social organization with those of control. 
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Besides, the latter are not always deployed in order to homogenize social behavior. In 
some cases, it is items and not individuals that constitute the ultimate object of control. 
Lianos writes on this issue: 
The magnetic tagging of products against theft is by now an old practice. A magnetized element 
(button, band, etc.) is attached or inserted into the protected object. Magnetic sensors exist at 
all the exits of the protected space and an alarm is set off if a magnetic tag passes between. 
Besides stores and shops, most libraries use such systems. It is clear from the start both for the 
user and for the observer that this is an anti-theft device. The sensors are visible at the entrances 
and, if the system is to be effective, it is necessary to detect and isolate objects taken in from 
outside which might set off the alarm.  
Hence, the anti-theft device does not intend in any way to monitor the customer’s 
behavior, nor is it particularly concerned to track down the movements of a piece of 
clothes or a DVD; it only detects if the product crosses the limits of the delineated 
space381. Though the presence of an anti-theft device implicitly warns the customer to 
not steal, hence contributing to the spreading of certain norms and values, its aim is 
only to prevent shoplifting.  
 
Facing the Panoptical: 
 
In conclusion, while the panopticon is historically dated, panoptical thought is 
still in effect in the research field, as Deleuze’s societies of control, Stiegler’s account 
of psychopower, and Galloway’s perspective on the protocological indicate. While I 
will explore in more details the psychological impact of new technologies on the 
formation of the individual through a discussion between Stiegler and Turkle, who 
both appeal for more prudence towards our addictive relationship with screens and 
computers, I will then take some distance with Stiegler’s work. By the means of 
Galloway’s contribution on new media, the fifth chapter argues that technology cannot 
be reducible to the techno-logical, that is, an oriented system of meaning that either 
increases or decreases signs and values. Yet, as I mentioned before and as I will 
examine further, Galloway gives too much importance on the procedures of control. 
Though portraying control as a positive effect of the network, rather than a mere 
restrictive measure, Galloway reproduces the Foucauldian normative move in 
understanding control as the grounding principle of social structures rather than one of 
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its side effects. Finally, the major issue to be tackled may not simply be that of our 
relationship with technologies, or the expanding influence of networks of 
psychopower, but more broadly paranoia itself. This is what the work of Wendy Hui 
Kyong Chun suggests. This is not to say that technologies of today are not affecting 
our modes of concentration or that the political reality of psychopower, as told by 
Stiegler, should be discarded. Instead, I state that a bigger emphasis should be given 
to the vulnerability, that is, the limited power of systems of socio-digital organization. 
This in order to counterbalance Stiegler’s vision of psychopower in which control 
appears oppressive and totalizing. Hence, the purpose of the last chapter will be to 
demystify control itself to finally argue that human freedom remains part of the 
equation. Indeed, one of the major misconceptions of our time is to believe that safety 
is incompatible with freedom, so that one is always condemned to give up one or the 
other, claims Chun. More significantly, ideologies of control make the mistake of 
overestimating the power of technologies and their actual efficiency. As such, mistrust 
subsist about digital media insofar as they are often accused of embodying a 
sophisticated apparatus of surveillance.  
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“Mirrors, literal and metaphorical, play an important role in human development. In 
literature, music, visual art, or computer programming, they allow us to see ourselves from 




The purpose of this chapter will be to examine Turkle’s description of 
computers as mirrors of the mind and to show that her research can be read in 
complementarity with Stiegler’s. To do so, this chapter will essentially focus on The 
Second Self. Stiegler argues that technologies are new for the very reason they 
reconfigure our temporal experience through ‘real time’ which is the absorption of 
time within time. The simultaneity and the standardization of subjective experience 
deprives us of our freedom to think for we are taught to identify with brands and 
commodities. In short, Stiegler deplores the poisonous effects of mass culture on our 
creativity and singularity, as much as he deplores the exploitation of desires by 
entertainment industries383: 
 
The programming industries, and more specifically the mediatic industry of radio-televisual 
information, mass-produce temporal objects heard or seen simultaneously by millions, and 
sometimes by tens, hundreds, even thousands of millions of “consciousnesses”: this massive 
temporal coincidence orders the event’s new structure, to which new forms of consciousness 
and collective unconsciousness correspond384. 
 
 
Technologies of real time such as television, radio and more broadly speaking, the 
internet, bond us to the rhythm and ambitions of globalised capitalism; a socio-cultural 
system turned towards excessive production and excessive consumption. Digital 
media only contributed to exacerbate this state of affairs. The internet has become a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
382 The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit, Sherry Turkle, twentieth anniversary edition 
(Cambridge Massachusetts, London England : The MIT Press, 2005) p.146 
383 Christina Howells, ‘Le défaut d’origine’ the prosthetic constitution of love and desire’, in Stiegler 
and Technics, eds. Gerald Moore and Christina Howells (Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2013) 
p.148 
384  As quoted in Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 3: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise, 
trans. Stephen Baker (California: Stanford University Press, 2011) 
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private market of exchange, an “electronic Leviathan385”, in which populations are, 
knowingly or unknowingly, subjected. The analogy to the biblical monster is not 
innocuous for it illustrates Stiegler’s tendency to portray the internet as an 
algorithmic386 monster driven by economic interests and owned by private companies. 
I have stressed that it is not so much technological devices per se but the ideology they 
represent, spread and contribute to reinforce by the very fact of their presence, that 
constitute Stiegler’s main concern. Nevertheless, it is hard not to conflate the medium 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
385 The electronic Leviathan refers to the digital technical system as a whole and its algorithmic 
governmentality.  
Bernard Stiegler, Automatic Society: The Future of Work, trans. Daniel Ross (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2016), p.127-128 
386 Stiegler’s account of the algorithm is debatable, though. It is tempting to accuse internet of being 
voyeuristic and exploitative. Criticising the power of Google and the ascendency of algorithmic 
capitalism, Stiegler argues that computerized machines are progressively depriving us from our ability 
to think His characterization of the digital as a Leviathan, that is, as a gigantic individual “exerting its 
power over the entire earth” finds a resonance with Yuval Noah Harari’s own account of the internet. 
In 21 Lessons for the 21st century Yuval Noah Harari argues that as far as things go, algorithms will be 
able to predict our tastes in proposing artworks all specially designed for us. His point is to say that not 
only work will become automated, but the artistic life itself, and eventually our emotions. His approach 
is for the majority speculative, but Harari seems to take it as an inevitability.  
 
Harari gets even more cynical, suggesting that the algorithm can also control the unpredictable 
and give the impression of randomness to the consumer. In this context, nothing escapes the control of 
the algorithm. Yet, one could respond that insofar as one is still given the possibility to manipulate the 
algorithm and to make the adjustments, one is still left with the capacity to choose. Harari has thought 
about this potential objection and replies that this apparent liberty has nothing to do with us being 
mysteriously free. Our decisions are the product of neuronal activity, and neurons themselves tend to 
behave like algorithms. In consequence, artificial intelligence is likely to anticipate every of our whims, 
so that we would only have to react positively or negatively to the algorithm’s proposition. This up to 
the point the algorithm would know us enough to not disappoint anymore, hence depriving us of 
depriving us of the possibility to choose.  For Harari, the power of the algorithm is limitless, as he 
affirms that the algorithm can even produce next commercial successes, including music hits. All this 
is only a matter of time. In this respect, Harari’s discourse is founded on paranoia as he conflates the 
possibility of automatization with its actuality. The whole argument of Harari lies indeed in his 
conviction that the automatized production of musical hits constitutes our immediate future. However, 
he offers no concrete example to support his claim. He only makes conjectures and predicts the worse.  
 
Luciana Parisi proposes, for her part, to investigate the unpredictability of structures of control 
and leads us to reconsider current models of power and freedom. Questioning the current understanding 
of the computational domain, Luciana Parisi claims in her work on Contagious Architecture that popular 
assumptions regarding the rigidity of algorithms are in the wrong. She argues that “the open-ended and 
negentropic forces of self-organization, cultural analysis has denied algorithms the potential of being 
anything other than a finite set of rules” 
In this respect, Parisi claims that algorithms may constitute the core of the designing processes of today, 
but are imbued with infinity. Hence, Parisi argues that systems of control rely on unaccountable 
elements and patternless data. The algorithm does not predict, but reveals the immanent process of 
programming. As such, she invites us to reconsider the actual power of the algorithm and the rationality 
of programs.  
See: Yuval Noah Harari, 21 Lessons for the 21st Century (London: Jonathan Cape, 2018) and Luciana 
Parisi, Contagious Architecture: Computation, Aesthetics, and Space (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2013) 
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with the message; Stiegler often draws his conclusions from the contents of the 
medium387 and defines symbolic misery as an impoverishment of meaning.  
 
In the face of destructive capitalism, Stiegler makes the reintroduction of 
desire, which is a desire to be, the kernel of his argument and politics of self. As 
discussed in the third chapter such an endeavour necessitates for Stiegler the 
reinvestment of the figure of the amateur and, most notably, the reactivation of the 
self-discipline of care. In more concrete terms, it also involves a politics of open 
source. By open source, Stiegler means the open access to knowledge through the 
implementation of free software and the free teaching of computer programming. 
Hence, his political agenda is to slowly transform the digital technical system into a 
public institution run by volunteers, in order to ensure a democratic and productive 
access to technologies. Said otherwise, Stiegler’s defence of open source technologies 
intends to make of the internet an indeterminate space of shared-knowledge that 
belongs to everyone and no one; a free structure that valorises the user’s experience 
(in contrast with the figure of the consumer).  
 
To my mind, Stiegler’s approach suggests three things: 
 
1) It seems to long for the return of the internet in its early form, namely, the 
cyberspace of the 1990’s, notorious for being “free” and “public”388.  
2) It conflates the medium with the content, insofar as psychopower designates 
strategies of power initiated by programming industries, hence blaming both 
the industry (the power structure) and the program (the message).  
3) It assumes a correspondence between the content/medium and the user. This 
is rendered evident in Stiegler’s appreciation of technics as the concretization 
of drives or desires. But to argue this is to acknowledge the medium as the 
mirror of the human and vice-versa.   
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
387 See his analysis of the Canal J’s T.V campaign in Taking Care of Youth and The Generations or his 
praise of Wikipedia as a contributive platform valorising open-access knowledge in his interview with 
Ariel Kyrou in L’emploi est mort, vive le travail !  
388 Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, Control and Freedom: Power and Paranoia in the Age of Fiber Optics 
(Cambridge Massachusetts, London, England: The MIT Press, 2006) p.37-38 
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For all these reasons, I believe that engaging a conversation between Stiegler and 
media theorist Sherry Turkle, known for theorizing computers as the mirror of human 
minds and for having promoted cyberspace as utopian space for self-exploration at the 
beginning of her career, is necessary and potentially enlightening in relation to the way 
we may conceive of the internet nowadays.  
 
 
4.1 LEARNING TO LIVE WITH TECHNOLOGIES 
 
 
 What are the effects of new technologies? How do they modify social relations 
and our sense of self? These are the questions Turkle is concerned about. She argues 
in The Second Self that the plasticity of virtuality offers a vertiginous opportunity for 
the individual to explore her identity. Indeed, the boundlessness of the internet seems 
to give us all the tools to experience freedom. Alexander Galloway will be critical of 
this issue, arguing that it is control and not freedom that grounds the internet. This 
point will be developed further in conjunction with his reading of Foucault in the 
following chapter.  
 
Yet, Turkle becomes more cautious when suggesting in Alone Together that 
social networks, in the proximity they promote and defend, alter the authentic 
experience of intimacy, deteriorating the spontaneity of human relations and 
weakening our sense of empathy. In an interview, she shares the development of her 
work as follows: 
I wrote my first book really in an effort to get people like me, humanists and anthropologists 
and psychologists, to look at these things with an open heart. That was about at the beginning 
of sociable robotics, the creation of machines that pretended to care about you. That appeared 
to love you. The other big development was devices with the ability to distract you all the time. 
I was very positive on the whole about machines that you physically went to. That you had to 
pull up a chair to. But once these things were with you all the time, I really wanted to study 
how the world changes with that possibility389. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
389 Sherry Turkle, ‘Sherry Turkle: I am not anti-technology, I am pro-conversation’, The Guardian, by 
Tim Adams (October 2015) 
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/oct/18/sherry-turkle-not-anti-technology-pro-conversation   
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As such, she argues that the digital age encourages us to shy away from the 
demands of friendship to prefer instead the companionship of our phones and, “as the 
programs got really good”, to prefer “the illusion of friendship without the demands 
of intimacy390”. It could be tempting to view her as a pro-computer theorist suddenly 
converted to pessimism, but the progression of her thought is not so radical and Turkle 
considers herself neither “pro-computer”391 nor technophobic.  
 
Turkle does not seek to unleash a crusade against the current digital culture, 
though she intends to bring a certain level of awareness on our addictive use of 
electronic devices392. As such, her work aims to show how our affective relationship 
with computers leads us to expect more from technologies and less from each other. 
“As technology develops, it shows us what it wants393”, writes Turkle, hence taking 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
390 Sherry Turkle, Reclaiming Conversation: The Power of Talk in a Digital Age, (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2015, p.7 
391 Sherry Turkle, ‘Interview with Sherry Turkle: ‘We’re Losing the Raw, Human Part of Being With 
Each Other’, Catherine De Lange, The Guardian (May 2013) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/science/2013/may/05/rational-heroes-sherry-turkle-mit> 
392 In Reclaiming Conversation, Turkle investigates the impact of mobile conversation technologies 
such as text messages, phone apps and online chatting through interviews with a mix range of 
individuals. The object of her inquiry is that of the future of conversation in the face of new technologies 
that are designed in tight alignment with human cognition. She expresses her reserves regarding our 
addiction to mobile technologies. Our dependence to the online world, where the flow of information 
is constant, continuous, and almost overwhelming, has led to the fear of missing out. In other words, 
the emotional regime of today is that of maintaining oneself updated, that is, keeping up with the flow 
of news and events. Moreover, our tendency to hide behind the screen has led to a generational fear of 
loss of control and a low tolerance for the unpredictable. Online interactions make us feel safe, 
anonymous and/or invulnerable; we can edit, tailor our profile and show our best persona through well-
chosen photography and thoroughly thought texts. Yet, despite an apparent increase of social 
interactions, instantaneous messaging services impoverish the quality of social relations, Turkle argues. 
For her, the key issue at stake concerns the authenticity of conversation; a conversation that we need to 
reclaim, that is, to make our own. It is not that conversation is disappearing with the rise of mobile 
communications, but it is undeniably losing its spontaneity, continuity and humanity. Turkle makes a 
direct correlation between conversation and empathy. It is throughout our ability to talk to each other 
that we develop a deep and true interest for our interlocutor. Conversely, digitally mediated 
communications decrease empathy and intimacy in general. To claim back the power to talk rather than 
message each other constitute, for Turkle, the first step for a healthy future in which technologies would 
leave a free space for human relations instead of vampirizing them. According to Turkle, we are caught 
in a vicious circle in which our, perhaps natural, discomfort towards the unpredictability of human 
relationships has developed into a dependence to online messaging services. Such reliance on 
communication technologies has unfortunately increased the magnitude of this discomfort, thus giving 
us another pretext to hide behind the screen. This endless cycling is what should be addressed if we do 
not want to be completely dehumanized, Turkle argues. When fustigating the algorithmatization of our 
cultural environment (see footnote 386), Harari shows indeed that this fear of losing control (or lack of 
curiosity in Stiegler’s terms) is precisely what industries are exploiting in proposing to adjust their 
products to the wants of people, up to the point that choice itself would become obsolete. The problem 
is — and Turkle, Harari and Stiegler seem to all agree on this issue —  that we may be bargaining our 
own humanity for the sake of comfort.  
393 Sherry Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect More From Technology And Less From Each Other 
(New York: Basic Books, 2011) 
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issue with the sudden intensified autonomisation of technology394. Once there to 
accommodate us, it turns out that we are now trying to accommodate ourselves with 
the wants of new technologies. This is provoking a major disruption in the relationship 
between humans and machines. A disruption also noticed by Stiegler who describes in 
his later works how we came to relinquish our own autonomy in the context of the 
automatic society, alienated by the very thing that is supposed to free us. Stiegler 
perceives a form of regression in human evolution, as we are no longer able to produce 
what we consume. For Stiegler, we passed from an active to a passive relational mode. 
This psychological passivity towards our own technological environment reinforces 
the power of consumerism and contributes to the decrease of intelligence 395. 
 
 
It is thus urgent for both Stiegler and Turkle to put technologies back in their 
place in order to reinforce a sense of community.  The deterioration of human relations 
Turkle diagnoses, is however not the result of technologies per se, but of the intimacy 
one cultivates towards them. She thus describes the relationship between human 
beings and technologies as a love story which has progressively gone bad. In 
Reclaiming Conversation, she recalls that when her book Alone Together was released 
in 2011, it was often negatively received, precisely because she was alluding to 
difficulties the general audience preferred to stay blind to.  
 
But now, only a few years later, the atmosphere has changed (…) Now, we begin to take the 
measure of how our communications compel us. We have learned that we get a neurotechnical 
high from connecting. We recognize that we crave a feeling of being “always on” that keeps 
us from doing our best, being our best. So we allow ourselves a certain disenchantment with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
394 However, for Stiegler, it is less an issue of autonomisation than automatization, insofar as he 
acknowledges from the outset the autonomy of technical development. This is what he and Leroi-
Gourhan coined as technical tendency. In this case, the autonomy of technics remains bound to its 
relationship with the human, insofar as the autonomisation process is enacted through the instrumental 
maieutics between the technical object and the human mind. Automatization designates, on the other 
hand, the current algorithmic governmentality in which social development is conditioned by 
calculations and less and less by human intervention. Though this nuance between autonomy, 
automaticity and automatization is not really addressed in Turkle’s work, her statements converge 
towards the same broad issue: new technologies are too invasive and as such, alter the quality of human 
existence. 
395 Bernard Stiegler, Taking Care of Youth and the Generations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2010) p.34 
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what technology has made possible396. 
 
The work of Turkle stresses the psychological implications of our addiction to 
technologies. Stiegler, on the other hand, puts a broader emphasis on human ontology, 
insofar as he claims that the technological change we are facing today is a change that 
concerns our very way to be human. As covered in the previous chapter, Stiegler is 
perfectly aware of the effects of screen technologies on people’s mental development. 
Such psychological regression, he believes, was underestimated by Foucault’s 
anatomo-politics397. Overall, the issue for Turkle is to first reactivate empathy, while 
Stiegler’s concern is turned towards the cultivation of autonomy398. Finally, both 
acknowledge the necessity to take action if we want to preserve our human values, as 
well as our freedom. 
 
4.2 THE METAPHOR OF THE MIRROR AND THE MYTH OF NARCISSUS 
 
In the introduction of Alone Together, Sherry Turkle states that “technologies, 
in every generation, present opportunities to reflect on our values and direction399”. 
This assertion denotes her volition to present technologies as modern mirrors, insofar 
as technologies interrogate us as human beings. As such, Turkle describes computers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
396 Sherry Turkle, Reclaiming Conversation: The Power of Talk in a Digital Age (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2015) p.17 
397 Sophie Fuggle, ‘Stiegler and Foucault: The Politics of Care and Self-Writing’, in Stiegler and 
Technics, eds.  Christina Howells and Gerald Moore (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013) 
p.197 
398 I have already explained in the third chapter how Stiegler understands autonomy. I have stated that, 
for Stiegler, the cultivation of autonomy is grounded in the heteronomy of technics. It is important to 
note that Stiegler is reluctant to develop a discourse of restoration of autonomy, probably because of its 
Kantian overtones. Instead, it is the singularity of individuation that should be pursued. Yet, Stiegler’s 
emphasis on singularity seems to imply a return to the “romantic self” which could be close to Sartre’s. 
However, Stiegler rejects such account and simply states that what he understands as singularity is the 
Simondonian process of individuation, that always involve the formation of the I (the psychic) in 
relation to a We (the collective). It could be therefore misleading to argue that Stiegler’s philosophy is 
a philosophy of autonomy. But if I use the word “autonomy” instead of “singularity”, it is because I 
believe that the former is more adequate to describe what Stiegler has in mind than the latter. I also use 
it for rhetorical effect, if I may say, in order to contrast autonomy, not with automaticity, but with 
automatization. Hence, autonomy shall be read, in this thesis, as the Simondonian process of 
individuation in which one develop oneself as singular individual.  
399 Sherry Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect More From Technology And Less From Each Other 
(New York: Basic Books, 2011) p.19 
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as evocative, mostly because they are pro-vocative. What these technologies provoke 
is self-reflection, for they bring about a culture of self-imagery, a culture already 
pointed out by Foucault when investigating the motivations at stake behind the Greco-
Roman practices of self400. In fact, all technologies are evocative, in the sense that they 
are tied to the production of self-image. They bring forth a certain eroticism of the 
image, of the Self presented as artistic project. In What do Pictures Want? W. J. T. 
Mitchell wonders about the power of images on the human psyche. He states the 
following:  
 
The notion of images as life-forms always equivocates between questions of belief and 
knowledge, fantasy and technology, the golem and the clone. The middle space, which Freud 
called the uncanny, is perhaps the best name for the location of images as media in their own 
right. 401 
 
 For her part, Turkle thinks that there is something very specific about computers, 
something very new in the way they provoke us: “The computer is a new mirror, the 
first psychological machine. Beyond its nature as an analytical engine lies its second 
nature as an evocative object”402 .What is at the crux of Sherry Turkle’s argument here, 
is precisely this notion of the uncanny, which comes back regularly throughout her 
work. As evocative objects, computers confront us with the experience of the same 
and the other. Turkle suggests that, as a means of psychological compensation, 
technologies respond to anxiety; “We are insecure in our understanding of ourselves, 
and this insecurity breeds a new preoccupation with the question of who we are. We 
search for ways to see ourselves”403. Turkle describes the mirror as a medium in which 
human beings encounter and familiarize themselves with their own image. Her account 
diverges from Stiegler’s, who rather apprehends the mirror as a sort of inside-out 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
400 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: The Care of the Self vol.3, trans. Robert Hurley 
(Middlesex: Harmondsworth, 1990) p.57  
401 W. J. T. Mitchell, What Do Pictures Want?: The Lives and Loves of Images.(Chicago, Illinois: 
London; University of Chicago Press, 2005). p.295 
402 Sherry Turkle, The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit (Cambridge Massachusetts, 
London England: The MIT Press, 2005) p.279 
403 Sherry Turkle, The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit (Cambridge Massachusetts, 
London England: The MIT Press, 2005) p.279 
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through which consciousness is at the same time projected and crystallized. Yet, both 
are drawing on Lacan’s conception of the mirror stage, which stresses its mimetic-
formative effects: 
 
It suffices to understand the mirror stage in this context as an identification, in the full sense 
analysis gives to the term: namely, the transformation that takes place in the subject when he 
assumes an image — an image that is seemingly predestined to have an effect at this phase, as 
witnessed by the use in analytic theory of antiquity’s term, “imago”404. 
 
But they each propose a different emphasis. For his part Stiegler aims to draw attention 
on the mirror’s formative effects on the individual’s consciousness. As such, what he 
describes is “the evolutionary emergence of human cognition as a succession of 
‘mirror stages’ in which the human achieves self-reflexive consciousness through its 
manual engagement with the material world405”.  Turkle rather focuses on the mimetic 
effects of the mirror as she suggests that our relation with technology is mostly of that 
sort, insofar as we repeat what technologies teach us406. But in Turkle’s perspective, 
the mirror also offers the possibility of another point of view. It acts as a perceptual 
angle by the means of which the self can be grasped as a foreign entity. Hence, the 
mirror epitomizes the uncanny because it enables the conciliation between the identical 
and the non-identical. Put otherwise, it concretizes the experience of self-as-other.   
As a prolongation of her metaphor of the mirror, Sherry Turkle refers to the 
story of Narcissus, which illustrates well, to her mind, the strange nature of 
technologies. Besides, Narcissus’ story shows how she problematizes the notion of 
virtuality as a representational field: 
The story of Narcissus is usually read as a warning against self-love. Narcissus saw his image 
in the water and fell to his death because of his desire to touch it, to be closer to its beauty. But 
there is another way to understand the story. Narcissus fell in love with what appeared to him 
to be another. This image of that other person fascinated him because it objectified a sense of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
404 Jacques Lacan, Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink (New York, London; W. W. Norton and Company, 2007) 
p.76 
405 Christopher Johnson, ‘The Prehistory of Technology: On the Contribution of Leroi-Gourhan’, in 
Stiegler and Technics, edited By Christina Howells and Gerald Moore (Edinburgh; Edinburgh 
University Press, 2013) p.38 
406 Sherry Turkle, Reclaiming Conversation: The Power of Talk in a Digital Age (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2015, p.27 
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beauty of which he had felt only a vague inner sense407. 
 
Narcissus’ beauty is processed through technologies (here the surface of water which 
acts as a natural form of mirror). In that sense, Narcissus is more than a mythical figure 
falling in love with himself, but a tragic character experiencing the technological 
objectification of his body to an image. As Jean Baudrillard says, without an image, 
the body is a “transparent nothing”. It is through the image that Narcissus gains a 
certain sense of selfhood. However, in staring at his own image, Narcissus let himself 
being consumed by that image, instead of assuming (or appropriating) that image. 
Here, Turkle interprets the fable as the story of someone falling in love not with 
himself but with another, or perhaps, with himself as another, that is, at his virtual self. 
Narcissus is confronted with his double; a double which is similar and dissimilar, a 
double which is him and not him. Thus, the image endorses two functions; it reflects 
Narcissus’ real beauty, but distort the real in duplicating it. Narcissus stays paralyzed 
and stares into the water, because he is hypnotized by the image of himself. This 
obsessive contemplation seals his fate.  
 
At this stage, Turkle portrays a rather negative version of narcissism, insofar 
as in the mythical story of Narcissus, the mirror stage has a deadly outcome. In letting 
himself drown in water, Narcissus aims to reach this world of images he fell for, hereby 
performing a radical jump from the real to the virtual. While referring to this Ancient 
myth, Sherry Turkle lays in fact the foundation of what is going to be her main 
interpretation of virtuality, insofar as she claims the latter to be deploying a field of 
(self)-imagery. As such, the virtual is a mirage, Turkle suggests. However, Turkle’s 
account of narcissism is not entirely negative. She in fact suggests that the 
development of a certain sense of narcissism is crucial to the process of identity 
formation. Let us go back to the mirror stage and therefore to Lacan. Sean Homer 
reminds us indeed that we owe to the latter the popularization of the mirror-image. 
According to Lacan’s approach, the mirror is primarily seductive because it captures 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
407 Sherry Turkle, The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit (Cambridge Massachusetts, 
London England: The MIT Press, 2005) p.146 
	   152	  
attention. 
Lacan took the idea of the fascination and capturing properties of the image and above all how 
we shape ourselves according to that image. Lacan’s innovation in ‘The Mirror Stage’ was to 
combine the phenomenological distinction between subject and ego with a psychological 
understanding of the role of images and the constructed nature of the self through the 
philosophical category of the dialectic408. 
 
Self-formation revolves around a certain nurturing of self-love, Lacan argues. Turkle 
seems to agree with that, though the importance of primordial self-love appears more 
clearly in Stiegler’s thought than in hers. 
 
Indeed, Stiegler argues that primordial narcissism is indispensable for the 
development of a healthy social life. One can only love others if one is capable of 
loving oneself in the first instance. Stiegler thus emphasizes the importance of 
primordial narcissism409 in having recourse to Freud, rather than Lacan, and states that 
cultivating a form of auto-eroticism (a desire for oneself and a desire to be) is of 
political necessity, for capitalism does not simply exploit labor anymore but our 
desires. These desires are, as I have covered in the previous section, directed towards 
commodities, not objects and even less towards ourselves as individuals.  
In fact, both Turkle and Stiegler suggest on the larger scale that the formation 
of narcissism is prosthetic. As such, they draw on Winnicott’s theory of the transitional 
object. For Winnicott, the transitional object can be exemplified by the child’s first 
possession which he learns to care for and cherish. This transitional object is already 
the sublimation and the symbolic transposition of maternal care410. For Stiegler, we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
408 Sean Homer, Jacques Lacan (London and New York: Routledge, 2005) p.22 
409 Primordial narcissism shall not be confused with primary narcissism. “Primordial narcissism” is a 
Stieglerian term that derives from Freud’s primary narcissism. The latter designates infantile self-love. 
If Stiegler uses the “primordial” rather than “primary”, it is because he believes that self-love is essential 
to the development of the feeling of existing. The existential issue is absent from Turkle’s account, but 
it would fit her approach.  
410 Christina Howells writes: “The first pharmakon is, according to Bernard Stiegler, the child’s first 
possession, or ‘transitional object’. Psychoanalysis thus allows Stiegler to bring together the child’s 
chronological beginning and the condition of possibility of the pharmacological – that is to say, 
technical – life of an individual. This object, which negotiates the differentiation between subjectivity 
and objectivity, is said to owe its place in psychoanalysis to clinical observation, and is attributed a 
distinct reality within the child’s early development: it appears, says Winnicott, ‘at about four to six to 
eight to twelve months’. Therefore, unlike Freud’s primitive horde of brothers, or Plato’s Egyptian tale 
of the origin of writing in the Phaedrus, Stiegler’s primal scene of pharmacology is not projected onto 
a mythical past, nor are there any warnings, as in Jacques Lacan’s mirror stage, that its position in a 
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struggle to produce transitional objects of love, which are always to some extent, 
objects of self-love. The reason for this struggle is that we are presently conditioned 
to consume. Hence, instead of cherishing objects, we destroy them411. For Turkle, on 
the other hand, the theory of the transitional object justifies her account of the 
computer as an evocative object, that is, an object that mediates personal growth. Like 
Stiegler, she emphasizes its openness, insofar as the transitional object, which is an 
object of care, deploys the transitional space through which encounter between self 
and not-self is possible. In this respect, they both conceive the transitional object as 
“the point of departure for the formation of a healthy psychic apparatus412”.  
 
 Overall, this portrayal of the computer as the mirror of the human presents a 
key issue which is that of technologies being seductive413in their capacities to respond 
to our insecurities and stimulate or develop our feelings of self-love. It means more 
largely that our relationship with technologies is always to some extent pathological 
and addictive. For Stiegler, it seems that the issue we are confronted with today is that 
of the liquidation of primordial narcissism. Turkle argues for her part that it is less a 
lack but an excess of narcissism that is problematic nowadays.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
diachrony is deceptive, even if it allows for ‘wide variations’. According to Stiegler, however, the object 
does not so much exist as consist within the child’s history. In Stiegler’s work, ‘consistence’ applies to 
objects that, by being infinite, open onto a world of idealities where the development of the spirit – 
which makes life worth the pain of living – becomes possible. It is in this sense that Stiegler speaks of 
the pharmakon as the origin of the life of the mind/spirit.”  
Christina Howells, ‘‘Le défaut d’origine’ the prosthetic constitution of love and desire’, in Stiegler and 
Technics, eds. Christina Howells and Gerald Moore (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013) 
p.152 
411 Christina Howells, ‘‘Le défaut d’origine’ the prosthetic constitution of love and desire’, in Stiegler 
and Technics, eds. Christina Howells and Gerald Moore (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013) 
pp.151-164 
 
412  Bernard Stiegler, What Makes Life Worth Living? On Pharmacology, trans. Daniel Ross 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2013) p.3 
413 Stiegler, on the other hand, describes new technologies as addictive. In an interview for the guardian, 
Turkle prefers to stay cautious about such characterization: “If you are addicted to heroin you have to 
give it up completely, go cold turkey. Here it is a different assignment. I am not planning to give up my 
phone. I just need to know what it is good for.” Though acknowledging that we are becoming 
increasingly dependent to technologies, she suggests that this dependency is precisely caused by the 
seductive character of technologies, that is, in the way “they pretend to care”. The issue is therefore 
narcissistic, that is, self-love, when Stiegler argues that it is precisely the lack of self-love that causes 
us to rely morbidly on technologies.  
See: Sherry Turkle, ‘Sherry Turkle: I am not anti-technology, I am pro-conversation’, The Guardian, 
by Tim Adams (October 2015) 
 
 





4.3 THE ROBOTIC MOMENT 
	  
 
While Turkle and Stiegler share the same concern regarding the future of the 
human, their understanding of the role of technology in human life differ.  Stiegler, for 
his part, regards the human as a technical being, but also as quasi-mythical figure, for 
the particularity of the human is to be without origin. The human is an invention 
grounded in the groundlessness of technics. Technics is always already there and 
therefore always in advance. In that sense, human beings are prosthetic characters, 
because they are always already pro-grammed in technics. Unlike Stiegler, Turkle’s 
work does not view technology as a programming activity, but as a support that can 
be programmed414.  In this respect, the field of technology requires a programmer, 
which suggests that human beings are indeed the creators, the producers and/or the 
masters of technology. This means that the role of technology is to “support415” human 
life. While elaborating on the relationship between children and computers, Turkle 
argues that the computer supports forms of personal development, of which she 
identifies three principal stages; that of metaphysics, mastery and identity. Though 
they are all examined with the same interest by Turkle, mastery remains the most 
important of the three416, for it enables the transition from the affective to the cognitive. 
In defining technology as a programmed support, Turkle treats technology as textual, 
that is, as mere surface of inscription. Stiegler’s deconstructivist account, on the other 
hand, presents technology as what enables discursivity, hence suggesting that 
textuality is already technical.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
414 Note that Turkle defines the activity of programming as “premeditated control”. Sherry Turkle, The 
Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit  (Cambridge Massachusetts, London England: The MIT 
Press, 2005) p.104 
415 Sherry Turkle, The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit (Cambridge Massachusetts, 
London England: The MIT Press, 2005) p.192 
416 Sherry Turkle, The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit (Cambridge Massachusetts, 
London England: The MIT Press, 2005)) p.192 
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Our growing discomfort towards artificial intelligence is, according to Turkle’s 
investigations, explained by the fact that technologies are behaving like us, as if they 
were us. However, she also acknowledges that this fear of identity usurpation is a 
belief, rather than a truth. Technologies possess their own alterity that we cannot fully 
comprehend: 
 
In an important sense the computer is irreducible. It is hard to block the temptation to personify 
the computer by saying what it “really” is, hard to block the suggestion that the computer 
“thinks” by saying what it “really” does. It is hard to capture the computer by seeing it in terms 
of familiar objects or processes that existed before it was invented. The computer is not “like” 
anything else in any simple sense417.  
 
This renders our experience with machines uncanny in the Freudian sense of the term 
(unheimlich) because technologies are familiar and unfamiliar at the same time418. On 
this issue, Turkle’s approach has the merit to not reduce particular artefacts to 
overarching structures. In choosing to observe the computer as uncanny, Turkle aims 
to grasp the computer in its singularity; she thus departs from its singularity, that is, its 
alterity. Stiegler does the exact reverse in conflating technology with general 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
417 Sherry Turkle, The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit (Cambridge Massachusetts, 
London England: The MIT Press, 2005) p.248 
418 Turkle writes in The Second Self: “For Freud, the uncanny (das Unheimliche) was that which is 
“known of old and long familiar” seen anew, as strangely unfamiliar”, see: Sherry Turkle, The Second 
Self: Computers and the Human Spirit (Cambridge Massachusetts, London England: The MIT Press, 
2005) p.1 
Lydia Liu gives in The Freudian Robot a more extensive definition of the uncanny, comparing Freud’s 
investigations on the strange character of the automaton with the earlier work of Ernest Jentsch. She 
compares their respective interpretations of A. Hoffman’s short story “Der Sandmann”, rearticulating 
their source of their disagreement. While Jentsch suggests it is the uncertainty and the ambiguity 
between animate and inanimate that cause the feeling of the uncanny; Freud argues that the uncanny is 
the expression of the return of the repressed. As such, it is the unconcealment of what should have 
remained concealed. Regarding Jentsch’s and Freud’s reading of Hoffman’s story, Lydia Liu writes: 
“Jentsch attributes the uncanny effects of the Sandman story to the artistic skill with which Hoffmann 
manipulates intellectual uncertainty in Nathanael and in the reader who identifies with him as the 
narrative unfolds: Is Olympia animate or inanimate? Interestingly, the word unheimlich appears in 
Hoffmann’s story a number of times, often in con- junction with Olympia, which apparently constrained 
Jentsch’s interpretation (…) On this ground, Freud rejects Jentsch’s argument and decides to look 
elsewhere for an answer to the sources of the unheimlich. Freud, who cannot tolerate the idea of 
intellectual uncertainty as an explanation, introduces his alternative reading by displacing the automaton 
as the problem of the uncanny with something else, namely, Nathanael’s ocular anxiety about the 
Sandman”.  
Lydia Liu’s quote: Lydia H. Liu, The Freudian Robot: Digital Media and the Future of the Unconscious 
(Chicago, ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2010). p.212-213 
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tendencies, such as that of grammatization419, so that his understanding of technology 
does not address much the singular or the exception.  
 
Going back to the notion of the uncanny, Lacan teaches us that it concerns not 
only the strangely familiar, but also refers to the horrible, the hostile, and the 
suspicious420.  Consequently, portraying the computer as uncanny is already to mystify 
technology into a sort of monster, but it is also to acknowledge its alterity. While 
Stiegler presents technology as different, he does not address its otherness. The reason 
for that is that technology is not just an entity or collection of entities, for Stiegler, but 
an activity that enables the encounter with the other. Yet, it could be said that Stiegler, 
in contrast to Turkle’s methodology, does not take the opacity of technology into 
account enough421. However, the opacity identified by Turkle remains a problem and 
our tendency to anthropomorphize technology results from this opacity we cannot 
quite understand.  
 
Computers are certainly not the only machines that evoke anthropomorphization. We often talk 
about machines, and even to machines, as though they were people. We complain that a car 
“wants to veer left.” We park it on a slope and warn it to “stay put.” But usually, when we “talk 
to technology,” we know that any voluntary action we may have ascribed to a machine is really 
a series of unambiguously “mechanical” events. We know that the pressure of the emergency 
brake will prevent gravity from pulling a car down a hill. But when we play chess with a 
computer and say that the computer “decided” to move the queen, it is much harder to translate 
this decision into physical terms422.  
 
 
Though anthropomorphism may, to a certain extent, enable us to acknowledge the 
alterity of technology423, it also appears symptomatic of our failure to think 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
419 By Grammatization, Stiegler means the process of formalization of human behavior into writing (and 
technics in general) which, according to him and his reading of Simondon, is constitutive of the western 
mode of individuation. Though Stiegler questions the current process of grammatization throughout 
which human behavior is reproduced, copied and anticipated into endless codes and algorithms, it is not 
necessarily negative. Like most of his key concepts, grammatization is ambiguous, that is, 
pharmacological.  
420 Jacques Lacan, Anxiety: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014) 
421 in fact, technology is often associated with clarity and understandability in Stiegler’s work as he 
defines it either as a grammatizing process, a mean of orientation, but also an orthothetic development. 
See Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time: Disorientation, trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford; Stanford 
University Press, 2009) 
422 Sherry Turkle, The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit (Cambridge Massachusetts, 
London England: The MIT Press, 2005) p.249 
423For Jane Bennett, anthropomorphization allows both identification and differentiation. 
“In a vital materialism, an anthropomorphic element in perception can uncover a whole world of 
resonances and resemblances-sounds and sights that echo and bounce far more than would be possible 
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technologies per se, so that we remain stuck in this uncanny, and perhaps frustrating, 
relationship with the machine. On this issue, Turkle does not offer any solution and 
maintains anthropomorphism as naive, but evocative of our experience of technology, 
which is the uncanny experience of the other. This stance resonates with Stiegler as 
the latter acknowledges that technologies are always mysterious in some kind and that 
we cannot fully understand them. Hence, one will always experience a certain degree 
of naivety in relation to its technical environment.   
 
In The Second Self, Turkle investigates individuals’ eagerness to compare 
themselves to machines, a mode of comparison that is essentially projective: 
 
 
As computers become commonplace objects in daily life—in leisure and learning as well as in 
work—everyone will have the opportunity to interact with them in ways where the machine 
can act as a projection of part of the self, a mirror of the mind. The Rorschach provides 
ambiguous images onto which different forms can be projected. The computer, too, takes on 
many shapes and meanings424.  
 
 
The reason of our fascination-repulsion for technologies lies in the ambiguous images 
technology projects of ourselves. Yet, she also suggests that, unlike the Rorschach test, 
this relationship is not exclusively projective, but also constructive: “When you create 
a programmed world, you work in it, you experiment in it, you live in it”425. What 
Turkle means is that technologies offer a medium for us to explore ourselves, to 
construct and shape or reshape our identity. This could sound like a Stieglerian move 
if she was not reducing the experience of technology as merely subjective, when 
Stiegler argues for his part that technology is equally constitutive of the objective. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
were the universe to have a hierarchical structure. We at first may see only a world in our own image, 
but what appears next is a swarm of "talented" and vibrant materialities (including the seeing self). A 
touch of anthropomorphism, then, can catalyze a sensibility that finds a world filled not with 
ontologically distinct categories of beings (subjects and objects) but with variously composed 
materialities that form confederations. In revealing similarities across categorical divides and lighting 
up structural parallels between material forms in "nature" and those in "culture," anthropomorphism can 
reveal isomorphisms” 
 
 See: Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham, London: Duke University 
Press, 2010) p.98-99 
424 Sherry Turkle, The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit (Cambridge Massachusetts, 
London England: The MIT Press, 2005) p.20 
425 Sherry Turkle, The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit (Cambridge Massachusetts, 
London England: The MIT Press, 2005) p.21 
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However, this divergence may find an explanation with the tradition of thought the 
two descend from. Stiegler draws on phenomenology, which ties the experience of the 
subjective with the objective through the intentionality of consciousness necessarily 
constituted through the object, so that the object is equally constitutive of 
consciousness itself. Turkle gives on the other hand a psychological and 
psychoanalytical account of technology in which technology remains a scripture 
surface for mental activity. Technology is therefore constructive insofar as it posits 
itself as an object in which the human mind can be reflected. And in the era of the 
algorithmic self, this principle of self-reflection has been taken to a new level: 
 
There is the hope that self-reflection could perhaps be made more efficient by technological 
intervention. The list of candidate technologies is already long: a computer programmed to be 
have in the manner of a therapist; devices that help you track your physiology for patterns that 
will help you understand your psychology; programs that analyze the words in your diary and 
come up with a diagnosis of your mental state426.  
 
Once again, Turkle’s psychological account of technology converges towards 
Stiegler’s phenomenological approach and the conclusion they bring up is still the 
same: individuals and machines are caught in an pathological relationship which is on 
the verge of becoming morbid. In fact, Turkle’s investigations suggest that the 
individual’s propensity to humanize the inanimate is the expression of this affective 
relationship, which is, however, not inherent to the relation itself, but the result of our 
interactions with tools and machines. However, with the democratization of 
computers, a new stage has been reached; while we used to give human characteristics 
to objects of our own production, Turkle’s work shows that, with the growth of 
artificial intelligence, we are now keen on technomorphizing ourselves. She thus states 
that “where we once were rational animals, now we are feeling computers, emotional 
machines427”.  
 
While the intellect was a property long reserved to human beings in the history 
of philosophy, insofar as it was constitutive of our ontological difference, the fact that 
it has become programmable, implementable into machines, forces us to reconsider 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
426 Sherry Turkle, Reclaiming Conversation: The Power of Talk in a Digital Age (New York; Penguin 
Books, 2015, p.81 
427 Sherry Turkle, The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit (Cambridge Massachusetts, 
London England: The MIT Press, 2005) p.285 
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our identity. What makes us human? What constitutes our specificity? The growing 
intimacy we share with machines overturns all our certitudes about humanity, argues 
Turkle. For her, it is not that we constitute ourselves through technologies, but rather 
that we model ourselves with technologies. This distinction between the with and the 
through is crucial here, for in her point of view, technologies are evocative objects. If 
they are evocative, it is because they trigger something visceral in us, so that one 
cannot stay indifferent towards the machine: 
People sense the presence of something new and exciting. But they fear the machine as 
powerful and threatening. They read newspapers that speak of “computer widows” and warn 
of “computer addiction.” Parents are torn about their children’s involvement not only with 
computers, but with the machines’ little brothers and sisters, the new generation of electronic 
toys. The toys hold the attention of children who never before sat quietly, even in front of a 
television screen. Parents see how the toys may be educational, but fear the quality of children’s 
engagement with them428.  
 
New technologies “challenge” our notion of mind. What she means is that technologies 
alter (either maximizing or minimizing) the already formed, so that technologies 
always come afterwards, as an addition of the human, whereas for Stiegler, 
technologies stand as an already-there. This leads both theorists to apprehend the rise 
of digital technologies differently. There is no principle of imitation for Stiegler, no 
mirroring effect, only a co-evolution. On the other hand, Turkle argues that in growing 
intimate with technologies, we lose a certain form of humanity, that leads us to expect 
more from artificial intelligence and less from each other. The robotization of the 
social atrophies our own sociability; a sociability which is thought as an innate 
characteristic of the human. There is in consequence a loss of authenticity.  
It may be once again a matter of jargon. Turkle acknowledges that the social is 
technologically mediated, but argues that new technologies modify the quality of 
social space(s). Stiegler would agree with that. But he would specify that the social is 
technologically enabled. Hence, the so-called nature of social space is not altered, but 
it has certainly taken a questionable turn in which the quality of human existence has 
become impoverished. For Turkle, the problem seems to lie in the nature of the media, 
whereas for Stiegler, the point of contention shall be found in the process of mediation 
itself. This means that the issue is structural, orgasitional, before being imputable to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
428 Sherry Turkle, The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit (Cambridge Massachusetts, 
London England: The MIT Press, 2005) p.19 
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specific technical objects. The other point of divergence seems to concern the very 
relationship we seemingly cultivate with technologies. Indeed, Turkle argues that the 
relation of mimesis between human beings and computers reinforces a proximity 
between the two; we are growing closer to computers, becoming dependent to 
smartphones, and isolating ourselves from others.  
Stiegler claims instead that we have been already cut off from our technological 
environment despite this impression of proximity. The challenge of today is to restore 
the intimacy between the object and the individual. For Turkle, new technologies do 
not put an end to the possibility of intimacy; they instead forge new relationships, less 
profound, but still intimate, in the sense that they cultivate an impression of presence; 
that of companionship429. 
 
As the architect of new intimacies, robots and computers may lower down this 
concept of intimacy to reduce it to the notion of closeness, but do not annihilate it: 
“Our networked life allows us to hide from each other, even as we are tethered to each 
other. We’d rather text than talk”430. In this respect, connection is still a form of 
relation, though superficial, argues Turkle. Combatting this superficiality implies the 
revalorization of intimacy as presence, instead of as closeness. To achieve this, we 
must take our distance from technologies.  For this reason, Turkle thinks it necessary 
to put machines back in their place. It is in putting technologies in this adequate place, 
that individuals will be able to reinvest theirs. For Turkle, there is still a place left for 
us: “Apps can give you’re a number; only people can provide a narrative. Technology 
can expose mechanism; people have to find meaning”431 .  
 
Once again, the aim of these last paragraphs was not to oppose Stiegler’s and 
Turkle’s views, but to show how they complement each other, while offering some 
points of contrast that, I believe, can only enrich their respective approaches. The fact 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
429 Sherry Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect More From Technology And Less From Each Other 
(New York: Basic Books, 2011) p.1 
430 Sherry Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect More From Technology And Less From Each Other 
(New York: Basic Books, 2011p.1 
431 Sherry Turkle, Reclaiming Conversation: The Power of Talk in a Digital Age, (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2015, p.81 
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that Turkle refers to specific case studies432 in which she took part herself enables us 
to have a more concrete approach of the technological environment. Stiegler, for his 
part, remains often vague and rarely offer examples to rely on. They rather constitute 
a starting point to his thought, such as the case of Richard Durn who gave him the 
opportunity to reflect on the loss of the feeling of existing433. But these examples, 
except for the myth of Epimetheus and Prometheus, do not constitute the core of his 
thought and rarely serve as compelling illustrations of difficult concepts.   
 
Finally, what strikes me in Turkle’s and Stiegler’s works is that they both 
apprehend technologies as modulators capable of intensifying or diminishing human 
skills, values, and the quality of existence in general. And though they take different 
routes, the object of their final concern is the same: how can we preserve our 
humanity?  
  
4.4 CYBERSPACE: UTOPIA AND HETEROTOPIA 
 
Having explained how Turkle came to conceive technologies as mirrors of the 
mind, this following section intends to show the further implications of such 
metaphorization, insofar as her work links technologies to personality and subjectivity. 
While using the metaphor of the mirror, Sherry Turkle puts the stress on the notion of 
duplication, so that what ties us to the machine is mimetism.  A mimetism that 
interrogates our own perfectibility and which is the reason of the seductive power of 
technologies over us: 
 
The experience of a game that makes an instantaneous and exact response to your touch, or of 
a computer that is itself always consistent in its response, can take over. It becomes gripping, 
independent of anything that you are trying to “do” with it in an instrumental sense434. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
432 One of Turkle’s research interest concerns the companionship of robots. She thus reflected on the 
impact of computational creatures such as the Tamagotchi or the Furby on children. She realised that 
children were capable to care for these robots and create a bond.  
433 See introduction and the relevant footnote on Richard Durn. 
434 Sherry Turkle, The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit (Cambridge Massachusetts, 
London England: The MIT Press, 2005) p.87 
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Our relations with computers, machines and robots in general change the very way of 
our being human, so that we have a responsibility to reflect on this issue. According 
to Turkle, we rely too much on technologies, up to the point that we do not feel like 
facing ourselves. Like the myth of Narcissus, we are blinded by our own reflection, 
smitten by the image. More than a mirror in which one can see what he or she desires 
to see, the virtual world offered by internet/cyberspace is a space of illusions, an ideal 
gateway, and an alternative to real social spaces.  
While reporting people’s experience with video games, Turkle emphasizes for 
example the positive contribution of the virtual/cyberspace in the construction of one’s 
persona. She thus discusses how videogames helped individuals to either gain 
confidence, release frustration or canalize outbursts of violence. Hence, as far as her 
account suggests, virtuality appears to be therapeutically beneficial as it enables the 
individual to live a parallel life, a more livable life perhaps, and compensate for one’s 
flaws and weaknesses. In virtuality, the imaginary takes over the real, insofar as one 
can be whoever one wants. As Turkle states: 
The obese can be slender, the beautiful plain. The fact that self-presentation is written in text 
means that there is time to reflect upon and edit one's “composition”, which makes it easier for 
the shy to be outgoing, the “nerdy” sophisticated.  
 
Such role-playing enables one to absent oneself from one’s real situation, to escape 
one’s social condition, one’s race, sex or gender, in order to become someone else. 
Life on screen creates a sense of inner self and outer self, online and offline identity, 
socially inhibited or disinhibited personality. As such, cyberspace offers a space of 
infinite freedom and infinite power, infinite self-discovery and self-reinvention. In 
some sense, it fulfils one’s desire for totality. And for all these reasons, cyberspace 
represents an ideal world, that is, a utopia.    
Turkle’s portrayal of cyberspace is utopian, I argue, because it presents 
cyberspace as the perfect mirror of the human, but not only. The concept of utopia 
often serves to theorize a perfect social order. It is, literally speaking a no-place, a 
placeless place. As a literary genre, utopian visions are not much different from science 
fiction, as they intend to portray, from Plato to Thomas More, an improved vision of 
our world. Yet, utopias do not simply draw perfect future places one can dream about 
or strive to achieve. Instead, such narrative technique proposes to reflect on the 
	   163	  
political, social or economic struggle of its time. In that sense, a utopia is a mirror 
because it offers an alternative to the real. However, a utopia remains ideal, that is, 
non-real. This means that it does not exist.   
 
Insofar as Turkle’s account of cyberspace/internet always imply a tension 
between the real and the virtual, the subject and the object, the online and offline world, 
it strikes me as utopian.  As suggests her counting of the myth of Narcissus, the virtual 
proposes a spectacle of images; it is imaginary, illusory and phantasmagoric. The 
virtual does not propose a space of its own and remains dependent to the subjective 
experience to which it is the representation. Wendy Hui Kyong Chun criticizes Turkle 
for reducing online interactions to a mere conglomerate of personal desires and states 
that “cyberspace does more than reflect back; it is more than a virtual location we 
traverse in order to reconstitute ourselves435”. Hence, it is misleading to describe 
cyberspace as utopian as it does not allow cyberspace to be anything else than the true 
and transparent incarnation of subjective life.   
 
Manuel Castells argues for his part that we are faced with a virtual world which 
cannot be defined as completely virtual, that is, as an abstraction or negation of the 
real, for there is something very tangible about it. According to Castells, cyberspace 
offers more than a representative image of oneself, the illusion of compensation or a 
therapeutical catharsis. Discussing the emergence of the digitized society, the media 
theorist claims that virtuality is in fact our reality436. 
It is a system in which reality itself (that is, people's material/symbolic existence) is entirely 
captured, fully immersed in a virtual image setting, in the world of make believe, in which 
appearances are not just on the screen through which experience is communicated, but they 
become the experience437. 
 
His vision may correspond to what Foucault has theorized as “heterotopia”. Whereas 
a utopia is a placeless place where everything is good and perfect, a heterotopia is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
435 Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, Control and Freedom: Power and Paranoia in the Age of Fiber Optics 
(Cambridge Massachusetts, London, England: The MIT Press, 2006) p.55 
436 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, second edition with a new preface (Sussex: Wiley-
Blackwell publications, 2010) p.403 
437 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, second edition with a new preface (Sussex: Wiley-
Blackwell publications, 2010) p.404 
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place where things are either different from the established social order, or inverted. 
Unlike utopias, heterotopias are real places:  
[Heterotopia offer] a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other 
real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and 
inverted. Places of this kind are outside of all places, even though it may be possible to 
indicate their location in reality438.  
 
Heterotopias are other spaces that may be modelled like utopias or dystopias and 
plunge us into a different reality, challenge the continuity of time and space, stand in-
between the real and the imaginary. Examples of heterotopias may include for 
Foucault cemeteries, which are sacred spaces for the dead, modelled as counter-sites 
of the living world; colonies which are disrupting conventional spaces in invading 
foreign territories; museums that challenge the continuity of time by the very fact they 
exhibit old pieces of art in a modern space; but also boats. The latter is perhaps 
probably the best example of heterotopias because it is a floating piece of space that 
“exists by itself, that is closed in on itself and at the same time is given over to the 
infinity of the sea439”. And finally, the mirror.  
For Foucault, the mirror has the particularity to be both utopic and heterotopic; 
a particularity that may well correspond to the nature of cyberspace that is neither real 
or ideal. The mirror is a placeless place because it is both present and absent, both 
physically there and imaginary, there and not there, virtual and real. In this case, the 
virtual is not a mere prolongation of space, or the slippage of the real to the non-real, 
but the juxtaposition of the real onto the imaginary and vice-versa; it is the combined, 
though contradictory, experience of presence and absence. As placeless places, mirrors 
distort the traditional notions of sites and places. Foucault thus explains: 
 
The site is defined by relations of proximity between points or elements; formally, we can 
describe these relations as series, trees, or grids. Moreover, the importance of the site as a 
problem in contemporary technical work is well known: the storage of data or of the 
intermediate results of a calculation in the memory of a machine, the circulation of discrete 
elements with a random output (automobile traffic is a simple case, or indeed the sounds on a 
telephone line); the identification of marked or coded elements inside a set that may be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
438 Michel Foucault, ‘Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias’, Architecture /Mouvement/ 
Continuité, trans. by Jay Miskowiec (October 1984) p.4 
439 Michel Foucault, ‘Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias’, Architecture /Mouvement/ 
Continuité, trans. by Jay Miskowiec (October 1984) p.9 
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randomly distributed, or may be arranged according to single or to multiple classifications440.  
 
Systemic and organisational, a site does not need to be anchored in the real. In that 
sense, sites are described as utopias, ancestors of the virtual, because “they are sites 
that have a general relation of direct or inverted analogy with the real space of 
society441”.  Conversely though, a place must be geographically attested, that is, rooted 
in the physical world.  
The virtual corresponds to a placeless place, though it is not a groundless place. 
First, it is a place because it is real; because it is “a locale whose form, function, and 
meaning are self-contained within the boundaries of physical contiguity442”. And 
though Castells is a bit reluctant towards this formulation, it is somehow placeless 
because delocalized, insofar as the place has been absorbed in the network, in the space 
of flows “constituted by its nodes and hubs443”. A such, the reality of virtuality must 
be acknowledged, instead of being apprehended as a mere illusion.  
On that last point, it is interesting to note that, while discussing role-playing 
games, Turkle mostly viewed virtuality as a digitized extension of the real, while 
Castells rather thinks virtuality in terms of an interpenetration with the real. This 
interpenetration with the physical world prevents virtuality to be strictly thought as 
utopic and therefore, as purely placeless. While discussing the impact of social spaces 
of virtual reality, Castells takes the example of role-playing game Second Life and 
explains:  
 
For many observers, the most interesting trend among Second Life communities is their 
inability to create Utopia, even in the absence of institutional or spatial limitations. Residents 
of Second Life have reproduced some of the features of our society, including many of its 
pitfalls, such as aggression and rape. Furthermore, Second Life is privately owned by Linden 
Corporation, and virtual real estate soon became a profitable business, to the point that the 
United States Internal Revenue Service started to develop schemes to tax the Linden dollars 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
440 Michel Foucault, ‘Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias’, Architecture /Mouvement/ 
Continuité, trans. by Jay Miskowiec (October 1984) p.2 
441 Michel Foucault, ‘Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias’, Architecture /Mouvement/ 
Continuité, trans. by Jay Miskowiec (October 1984) p.3 
442 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, second edition with a new preface (Sussex: Wiley-
Blackwell publications, 2010) p.453 
443 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, second edition with a new preface (Sussex: Wiley-
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that are convertible to US dollars. Yet, this virtual space has such a communicative capacity 
that some universities have established campuses in Second Life; there are also experiments to 
use it as an educational platform; virtual banks open and go bankrupt following the ups and 
downs of the US markets; political demonstrations and even violent confrontations between 
leftists and rightists take place in virtual cities; and news stories within Second Life reach the 
real world through an increasingly attentive corps of media correspondents444.  
 
As such, virtuality is more a different reality than a non-reality. Castells makes an 
interesting move in describing the virtual as what is intertwined in the real, and as what 
has a profundity of its own.  
 
In sum, what Foucault manages to put in place through the joint concept of 
utopia and heterotopia is the formulation of the mirror as the metaphor of virtuality; a 
virtuality which is not a no-where, but an else-where. This would mean that cyberspace 
cannot simply be a non-place. Instead, it is a place that is displaced, or out of place.  
This is what Castells seems to defend in his study of new media and what Turkle’s 
early investigations did not adequately grasp. The reevaluation of the virtual into the 
domain of reality is what will constitute my next focus.  
 
4.5 SOCIAL MEDIA: WHAT IS SO REAL ABOUT THE VIRTUAL? 
 
In The Second Self, Sherry Turkle argues that “online life can be used as a 
psychosocial moratorium, that is, as an opportunity to ‘play out’ new kinds of 
relationships in a relatively consequence-free context445”. The message seems clear; 
the virtual is trivial. Indeed, when Turkle discusses the issue, she immediately takes 
for object of study role-playing games such as Second Life or The Sim’s, as if virtuality 
was best expressed through recreational activities. Pointing at the virtual’s lack of 
seriousness is not unique to Turkle’s work. Hubert Dreyfus goes down the same path 
when drawing a continuity between Kierkegaard’s account of the Press as encouraging 
a discursivity of the meaningless, and the emergence of the Web, which inhibits the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
444 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, second edition with a new preface (Sussex: Wiley-
Blackwell publications, 2010) p. xxix-xxx 
445 Sherry Turkle, The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit (Cambridge Massachusetts, 
London England: The MIT Press, 2005) p.331 
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possibility of true commitment. According to him, the virtual is vain and empty. Read 
from this angle, the Web is risk-free: 
Kierkegaard thought that in the final analysis people were attracted to the Press, and we can 
now add the Web, because the anonymous spectator takes no risks. The person in the aesthetic- 
sphere keeps open all possibilities and has no fixed identity that could be threatened by 
disappointment, humiliation or loss. Surfing the Web is ideally suited to such a life. On the 
Internet commitments are at best virtual commitments and losses only virtual losses446.  
The virtual space opens up a reassuring world where choices and actions that constitute 
our identities are reversible, effaceable, and/or redoable. Because there is no 
possibility for the either/or to be enacted, the user being able to jump from an 
alternative to another, the confrontation of loss which is irreducible to the choice, 
vanishes.  
 
Kierkegaard would surely argue that, while the Internet allows unconditional commitments, it 
does not support them. Like a simulator, it manages to capture everything but the risk. Our 
imaginations can be drawn in, as they are in playing games and watching movies. And no doubt 
game simulations sharpen our responses for non-game situations. But so far as games work by 
capturing our imaginations, they will fail to give us serious commitments (…) Far from 
encouraging unconditional commitments, the Net tends to turn all of life into a risk-free game. 
So, in the end, although Information Technology does not prohibit unconditional 
commitments, it does inhibit them447.  
Dreyfus makes the same mistake as Turkle in illustrating virtuality as a game. His 
example is misleading and reductive because it narrows down the definition of 
cyberspace to a child’s playground. Besides, this lack of risk he describes is a lure, as 
well as for anonymity. Users can be trackable and identifiable. Thus, despite this 
impression of invisibility one may experience online, information is hardly erasable, 
which is one of the reasons the Deep Web emerged, for it offers the possibility of 
escaping the risk of surveillance.  As Manuel Castells argues, virtuality is not a space 
that grows apart from virtuality. Hence, claiming that virtuality is meaningless or 
ineffective represents already in itself a risk. Nonetheless, this impression of 
anonymity and of recreational space remains a common assumption, and it is this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
446 Hubert Dreyfus, ‘Anonymity versus Commitment: The Dangers of Education on the Internet’, in 
Philosophy of Technology: The Technological Condition, ed. Robert C. Scharff and Val Dusek (Sussex: 
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assumption that should be dismantled448.  
 
As it has been explained above, the virtual is often underestimated for it is 
associated in the collective unconscious with leisure. It is this impression that French 






The image above served as an illustration for an article dealing with the issue of online 
dating and the resulting harassment of women. Cyber-harassment, which has been for 
years a recurring problem on Twitter, is rarely severely punished449, perhaps because 
it is ill-conceived, misunderstood or not clearly acknowledged as an offense by the 
legal system, which is too slow and static to apprehend the internet which stands as its 
complete opposite. The image here bluntly represents a handshake between virtuality 
and reality, but the colliding of these two worlds is pictured as violent and intrusive. 
This feeling of intrusion precisely emerges as a reaction to the widely-shared 
assumption that whatever one is doing online, these acts will remain only virtual, as 
Dreyfus claims, and so, reasonably safe. The choice of colors is also quite evocative; 
indeed, the virtual hand appears in red, hence menacing, while its real counterpart is 
immaculate. The first seems to abruptly jump off the screen to grab and pull the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
448 Galloway will draw on the political implications of this issue. He argues, in this respect, that such 
recreational illusion provided by the digital has become an important part of what he calls ‘ludic 
capitalism’. He thus warns us that it is no longer the disciplinary that constitutes the core of systems of 
control, but the very experience of enjoyment. 
449 Matias, J., Johnson, A., Boesel, W. E., Keegan, B., Friedman, J., & DeTar, C., ‘Reporting, reviewing, 
and responding to harassment on Twitter’, (2015) Available at SSRN 2602018. 
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second, hereby highlighting the violence of the encounter, as if saying that virtuality 
should not get in touch with reality, though it unfortunately does. In this respect, the 
image exemplifies well the ludic and yet, dangerous character of virtuality; most users, 
the image suggests, treat digital technologies as toys, because they believe that the 
virtual space they offer is completely foreign to reality. It suggests, in other words, 
that believing in a safe cyberspace is exactly where the virtual’s real danger lies. 
The novelty brought with the digital era is not that of virtuality, as Sherry 
Turkle suggests, but that of real virtuality. Cyberspace is real because it does not just 
mirror the physical world, but blends with it. On this issue, Turkle’s metaphor of the 
mirror appears obsolete, because the discursivity deployed by such metaphor gets 
stuck in an old dialectics whereby the human and the technological, the real and the 
virtual, can never be fully conciliated and in which the merging of the two is barely 
conceivable. Castells concludes for his part that “space is not the reflection of society, 
it is its expression450”. Hence, Castells comes to term with a concept of virtuality 
presented as non-reality. And in doing so, he moves away from the recursive logic of 
the original and the copy. 
 
But to continue the dichotomy between the real and the virtual is to prolong the 
dichotomy between the tangible and the non-tangible, the proper and the improper. It 
is to assume that one is more legitimate, true or reliable than the other. In this respect, 
Turkle’s early work on virtuality has underestimated the political impact of virtuality 
on reality, for she primary approaches virtuality from the angle of triviality.  
 
At this stage, it could be addressed to me that my reading of Turkle is unfair 
and that claiming that her account of virtuality is obsolete is to already propose an 
obsolete reading of her work. Turkle’s research does not stop with The Second Self, 
which is the main object of my study for this section. If I focus on this text, rather than 
her more recent research, it is not for the pleasure of pointing out possible flaws in her 
understanding of new media. The Second Self was originally published in 1984 and 
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the time of its release must be taken into consideration, for if it is outdated, it is because 
the computational machines and the so-called cyberspaces she is studying are 
themselves outdated. However, what I find compelling in this book is that it still 
resonates with certain assumptions regarding the virtual sphere. As I have mentionned 
at length, these assumptions are that of conceiving the world of internet as risk-free, 
ludic and trivial. In that sense, Turkle’s work on The Second Self remains pertinent 
and still deserves our full attention. 
 
 
4.6 KEY POINTS 
 
 
In this chapter, I examined Turkle’s insight on machines as mirrors of the mind. In 
focusing on the psychological effects of computers on individual’s personal 
development, I expressed some reservations towards her account of the machine as the 
reflection of subjective life because it confines the machine to its role of imitator. 
Lydia Liu writes on that issue:  
 
Fundamentally, why should a machine be made to resemble or duplicate a human being? Is 
narcissism a necessary (psychic) condition for the development of technological prosthesis, as 
Marshall McLuhan once suggested? Furthermore, does the logic of reciprocity compel human 
beings to imitate their machines just as much as the machines are built to resemble them, 
keeping an infinite feedback loop of simulacra or doppelgänger in place? If so, is there a 
psychic force that drives the feedback loop of human- machine interchange even before the 
reverse engineering of the human brain becomes possible? Finally, does this feedback loop 
obey a set of laws once speculated by Freud as the compulsion to repeat, the unconscious, the 
death drive, and so on?451  
 
I aimed to show that technologies were more than just a process of repetition. It is in 
that sense that I believe Stiegler’s views on originary technicity come as useful to 
apprehend technologies other than as the subordinate of human life, but as what 
enables human life. I was then comparing Turkle’s view on virtuality which she 
presents as the copy of the real with Castells’ own approach. I have shown that Castells 
prefers to put the emphasis on the expressive character of virtuality. He thus breaks 
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down the division between the virtual and the real and tends to present the virtual as 
real as the real.  
Though Castells’ approach could be reconciled with Stiegler’s in the way he 
presents technologies as the source of social development, and not its consequence or 
effect, I do not wish to reduce technologies to their expressive character either, that is, 
in their capacity to communicate something; to deliver a message. I agree that 
technologies are the expression of the human, I disagree with the idea that they are 
only that. I argue instead that technologies are more than a communication system, 
more than an apparatus meant to disclose meaning, more than a conglomerate of signs 
and symbols.  However, the question of meaning is central to Stiegler’s philosophy. 
Indeed, his account of epiphylogenesis presents the tool as bearer of sense insofar as 
it sediments past experiences. Put otherwise, the tool is the vector of memory, the 
medium through which knowledge can be transmitted to future generations. It thus 
means that technical evolution as a whole is closely tied to the production and the 
diffusion of signification.  
 
In my opinion, Stiegler’s work tends to enact a divide between the meaningful 
and the meaningless. This is rendered evident with the figure of the amateur which he 
contrasts with that of the consumer. The amateur is an artist because he produces 
cultural symbols. Conversely, the consumer kills off cultural symbols. The consumer 
is the one that cannot produce or create. But obviously, it is not enough to be a producer 
for Stiegler. Our current economy over produces and yet does not allow for meaningful 
encounter. The saturation of goods and commodities coupled with the liquidation of 
symbols and values are precisely constitutive of the symbolic misery.  
As such, the amateur is more than a producer, he is the producer of the aesthetic 
experience. This aesthetic experience is that of singularity, diversification and 
differentiation452. It is the exact opposite of the experience proposed by mass-culture 
industries which instead, are standardizing subjective life. Stiegler writes in this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
452 Martin Crowley, ‘The Artist and the Amateur, from Misery to Invention’, in Stiegler and Technics, 
eds. Gerald Moore and Christina Howells (Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 2013) p.119-134. 
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respect: 
An immense part of the population is today deprived of any aesthetic experience, entirely 
subjected as it is to the aesthetic conditioning in which marketing consists, which has become 
hegemonic for the vast majority of the world’s population – while the other part of the 
population, which still has such experiences [qui expérimente encore], has resigned itself to 
losing those who have sunk into this conditioning453.  
It has thus become necessary to articulate the transition from the age of the consumer 
to the age of the amateurs “who love because, in their own way, by forms of practice 
which cannot be reduced to habit, they too open out and, in so doing, are opened454”. 
Indeed, it is only in developing the figure of the amateur, argues Stiegler, that one can 
grow a sense of intellectual existence.  
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
453 Stiegler, as quoted and translated by Martin Crowley, ‘The Artist and the Amateur, from Misery to 
Invention’, in Stiegler and Technics, eds. Gerald Moore and Christina Howells (Edinburgh; Edinburgh 
University Press, 2013) p.120 
The quote can be found in a slightly different translation in Bernard Stiegler, Symbolic Misery: The 
Hyperindustrial Epoch, trans. Barnaby Norman (Cambridge: Polity, 2014) p.3 
454 Stiegler, as quoted and translated by Martin Crowley, ‘The Artist and the Amateur, from Misery to 
Invention’, in Stiegler and Technics, eds. Gerald Moore and Christina Howells (Edinburgh; Edinburgh 
University Press, 2013) p.132 
The quote can be found in a slightly different translation in Bernard Stiegler, Symbolic Misery: The 
Katastrophé of the Sensible, trans. Barnaby Norman (Cambridge: Polity, 2015) p.13 
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V-   ALEXANDER GALLOWAY: EXCOMMUNICATION, 




“The founding principle of the Net is control, not freedom. Control has existed from the beginning. 
Perhaps it is a different type of control than we are used to seeing. It is a type of control based on 




The purpose of this chapter will be to challenge Stiegler’s account of 
technology as the vector of meaning to argue instead that technology does also resist 
and/or escape meaning.    
Stiegler defines technics as “pursuit of life by means other than life”456 and 
thus stresses technics as the diffusion or order and stability. Indeed, technics is 
negentropic for it enables human beings to survive in their environment. Tools and 
artefacts, Stiegler says, provide humans with the means to resist or compensate for 
biological decay. However, technics does not simply organize matter, it organizes 
thought in general. To express his point, Stiegler proposes to go back to Plato.   
 
Stiegler argues that philosophy begins by repressing its own question457, for it 
has disavowed technics from the outset. As he explains, the origin of knowledge 
constitutes the philosophical question par excellence: how is it possible for us to 
know? Plato, who for Stiegler stands at the origin of philosophy itself, famously 
locates the possibility of knowledge in anamesis, that is, in the recollection process. In 
Meno, Plato illustrates his theory in engaging a dialogue between Socrates and a slave. 
Socrates asks the slave to perform a geometrical reasoning, despite the slave’s 
ignorance of geometry. After going through a series of deductions, the slave solves the 
problem without Socrates teaching him. For Plato, this example serves to demonstrate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
455 Protocol: How Control Exists After Decentralization, Alexander R. Galloway (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, London, England; The MIT Press, 2004) p.141-2 
456  Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. Richard Beardsworth and 
George Collins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) p.17 
457 Bernard Stiegler, Philosophising by Accident: Interviews with Élie During, eds and trans. by Benoît 
Dillet (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017) p.31 
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that knowledge is never acquired but recovered. It thus stands as an already-there. But 
Stiegler points out that in order to conduct their reasoning, Socrates and the slave had 
to trace figures on the sand, hence having, by this very gesture, recourse to technics. 
Knowledge, Stiegler claims, stems from the internalisation process of the exterior. In 
this respect, the origin of knowledge does not lie in the inside of anamesis, but in the 
outside of hypomnesis. It means also that knowledge is formed, rather than simply 
remembered. Hence, Stiegler emphasizes technics as a rational process and declares:  
 
To think his object, right away he needs to externalise this object by organising the sand, by 
organising the inorgacity of the sand, which then becomes the space and the medium of 
projection of the geometrical concept — the sand is here a plastic surface that can receive and, 
more importantly, retain an inscription. No matter how short-lived it is, the drawing on the 
sand can preserve a character of an element of the figure longer than the spirit of the slave, 
since the spirit of the slave is by essence changing (…) This drawing constitutes what I have 
called elsewhere a crutch of the understanding, and a space of intuition that is entirely produces 
by the gestures of the slave who traces in the sand, throughout his reasoning, the sand 
preserving them as the results that the slave, together with his intuition and his understanding, 
has ‘under sight’ and upon which he can extend and construct geometrical reasoning458.  
 
In this respect, Stiegler’s conception of technics is techno-logical, because logos is 
intrinsic to the technical gesture. This leads Stiegler to describe technics as the 
condition for all possibility of thought. Indeed, the second volume of Technics and 
Time argues that in virtue of its capacities to order the real, the technical object 
temporalizes, spatializes, configures and concretizes459. Put more broadly, technics is 
what enables and orients thought. For these reasons, Stiegler is to me less a thinker of 
technics (qua poiesis460) than a thinker of the techno-logical. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
458 Bernard Stiegler, Philosophising by Accident: Interviews with Élie During, eds and trans. by Benoît 
Dillet (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017) p.52 
459 By “concretization”, Stiegler understands the “tendential path toward perfection”. Bernard Stiegler, 
Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. Richard Beardsworth and George Collins 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) p.54 
460Stiegler’s account of technics privileges the linearity of tekhne over the swirling, though disorienting 
movement of poiesis. Yet, he acknowledges to some extent the poietic dimension of technics. Insofar 
as technics transforms matter, it is right to characterizes tekhne as poetic, Stiegler says, for it does 
produce something; it produces the different.  However, when recounting the story of Prometheus and 
Epimetheus through the mouth of Protagoras, it is interesting to note that Stiegler reverses the 
ascendency of poiesis (skill in the arts) on tekhne (fire); “for without fire there was no means 
[amekhanon] for anyone to possess or use this skill”. It is not that Stiegler simply negates poiesis, but 
it is evident that his account of the poietic is outshined by the aesthetic necessity of order, proper to 
tekhne.   
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I would like, for this chapter, to challenge this techno-logical account by 
offering a contrast with the work of Alexander Galloway. Galloway is critical 
regarding the theorization of (new) media as transparent tools of communication, and 
more broadly, of the conflation between the medium and the message. Such 
understanding, he claims, reduces media to its faculty to increase or impoverish 
meaning. I will thus state that Galloway’s understanding of excommunication is 
opening a third road to Stiegler’s binary conception of the aesthetical order. Indeed, 
Galloway’s work on excommunication shows that media can defy the coherent circuits 
of the communicable to propose instead an aesthetics of the unworkable, that is, the 
inoperable and the unproductive.  
Galloway argues overall that media shall not simply be thought from the angle 
of meaning. For him, it is not a matter of what they are, but about what they do, do not 
do and fail to do. In this regard, media should rather be defined by their ‘effects’. I will 
thus contrast Galloway’s understanding of the effect with Stiegler’s theory of the 
affect. The conclusion I would like to draw from this investigation is that by being so 
keen to tackle media through the angle of communication and signification, Stiegler 
does not allow technology to be absurd, futile and/ or distracting. He thus 
underestimates the positive aesthetic value of the meaningless for human existence. 
Yet, I suggest that Galloway’s emphasis on the effect, instead of freeing technology 
from meaning, does unfortunately throw it into the hands of control. I will then 
emphasize the influence of Foucault in Galloway’s understanding of the network and 
the protocol. His reading of Foucault, I suggest, leads him to give too much power to 
control in current networks. In this respect, Galloway may participate despite himself 
to the spread of the paranoia of control pinpointed by Chun, which is the belief that 
current networks act as a giant panopticon. I will tackle this last issue in further details 
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5.1 MODES OF (EX)COMMUNICATION: HERMES AND IRIS 
 
 
In the introduction of Excommunication; Three Inquiries in Media and 
Mediation461, Alexander Galloway, Eugene Thacker and McKenzie Wark ask 
themselves: what is new about new media? The aim of their collective work is to 
deconstruct popular assumptions in the field of media theory. This starts, to them, with 
the questioning of their so-called novelty. For the trio, not much is very new about 
new media for they already incorporate in their system and design, past forms of 
mediation. This means that new media stand in the continuity of old media. But then, 
what is a media? Independently from their supposed novelty, Galloway, Thacker and 
Wark suggest that “media are transformative” insofar as they affect “conditions of 
possibility in general462”. It means that media enable circuits of communication, but 
are not reducible to communication devices. Elaborating further on that issue, 
Galloway, Thacker and Wark argue:  
 
The field of media studies today generally understands media along two interconnected axes: 
devices and determinacy. On the one hand, media are understood as synonymous with media 
devices, technological apparatuses of mediation such as the phone, the file, or the printing 
press. And yet such technological devices are imbued with the irresistible force of their own 
determinacy. Media either determine a given social, cultural, or political dimension, or media 
are themselves determined by the social, cultural, or political. Media makers affect media 
consumers and thus establish hierarchical relationships with them, or media-savvy individuals 
express their own desires by way of the tools and machines that extend their will. For media 
studies generally, media are, in short, determinative devices, and they are thus evaluated 
normatively as either good influencers or bad influencers463.  
 
Media, they suggest, shall somehow be thought in terms of modern signifier-gods 
because, as the mythological figure of Hermes, the deity of the road, travelling and 
goods-exchange, they enable the circulation of messages. However, in conflating the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
461 Eugene Thacker, Alexander R. Galloway and McKenzie Wark, Excommunication: Three Inquiries 
in Media and Mediation (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2014)  
 
462 Eugene Thacker, Alexander R. Galloway and McKenzie Wark, Excommunication: Three Inquiries 
in Media and Mediation (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2014) p.1 
 
463 Eugene Thacker, Alexander R. Galloway and McKenzie Wark, Excommunication: Three Inquiries 
in Media and Mediation (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2014) p.7  
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messenger with the message, we take the risk of restricting our understanding of media 
to their contents.  
 
How do we then avoid the reductive evaluation of media between good and 
bad influencers? More generally, how can we escape the understanding of technology 
beyond its curative or poisonous effects?  
 
 The main problem for Thacker, Galloway and Wark seems to be the 
overemphasis put on communication, that is, on media as mere techniques of 
mediation. It is not that they reject the current understanding of media as 
communication and as mediation, but rather that they consider it insufficient to fully 
apprehend the complexity of media. For example, to think media as mediation is 
misleading insofar as it implies a bi-directional model of communication; a model of 
communication which connects a sender to a receiver. It implies also that all messages 
are communicable, the same way it subordinates the communicable to “the presented 
and the represented”, “the mediated and the remediated”, and as such, the 
“communicated and the translated464”. In other words, it is to understand language as 
presence and reciprocity. Read from this angle, language and communication are 
reduced to their message/meaning; it is what it says. Yet, communication is more than 
what it says, the trio argues. As such, a message does not solely articulate itself around 
the said, but also to the unsaid. This is what Thacker, Galloway and Wark wish to posit 
as excommunication. 
 
Excommunication shall not be read as the negation of communication, but as 
its extension; its surplus. As such, the concept of excommunication aims to englobe 
the said and the unsaid together; it is communication taken to its paradox, that is, its 
impossibility to communicate.   
 
We know that the fact that one can communicate doesn’t necessarily mean that there is 
something to say, but at the same time one cannot help notice in our media cultures the 
seduction of empty messages, flitting here and there like so many angelic constellations in the 
aether. Do we not always assume that communication is possible and even desirable—or better, 
do not our attitudes toward communication always presume the possibility of communication, 
that “there will have always been communication,” even before a single word has been uttered? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
464 Eugene Thacker, Alexander R. Galloway and McKenzie Wark, Excommunication: Three Inquiries 
in Media and Mediation (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2014) p.10  
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A common language, a common ground, an agreed-upon topic and rules of engagement . . . so 
much has al- ready taken place prior to the first words being uttered or the first message being 
sent. There are mediative situations in which heresy, exile, or banishment carry the day, not 
repetition, communion, or integration. There are certain kinds of messages that state there will 
be no more messages. Why? The reasons may vary, from the paradoxical lyricism of the 
ineffable (“it can’t be put into words”), to the refusal to engage (“I prefer not to”), to the 
contentiousness of apathy (“some things aren’t worth saying”), to the enigma of silence (and 
its impossibility)465.  
 
Communication, suggest Thacker, Galloway and Wark, does have an elusive side, an 
absurd character which is that of excommunication. Their example of the message 
stating “there will be no more message” illustrates perfectly the absurdity I am trying 
to pinpoint. It is not absurd because it is stupid, it is absurd, because it defies sense in 
contradicting and not contradicting itself at the same time. In my view, 
excommunication is the absurd of communication, insofar as it plays around with the 
normative circuits of signification and stands at the border between the meaningless 
and the meaningful, without having to be one or the other. Excommunication, as such, 
challenges common binary systems of communication. Overall, Thacker’s, 
Galloway’s and Wark’s book on Excommunication explores the limits of 
communication. They aim to take a critical distance with the old-fashioned, and yet 
still dominant, view of the modern communicational apparatus as the intertwinement 
between sender and receiver, message and channel.   
 
To better express my point, I am going to focus now on Galloway’s chapter 
“Love of the Middle” and compare his reading of the figure of Hermes with Stiegler’s. 
As I said, Stiegler mostly understands technology through its role of signifier, hence 
problematizing technology as either a good or bad influencer; a point which the book 
on Excommunication is openly critical about, though it is not mentioning Stiegler 
directly. To challenge Stiegler’s views will give me the opportunity to pledge for an 
account of technology beyond communication and beyond signification, that is, 
beyond its discursive and rational function. My point is to claim and defend a certain 
opacity and unpredictability of technology. On the contrary, asserting technology as a 
mere influencer, which in Stiegler’s language could be translated as the pharmakon, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
465 Eugene Thacker, Alexander R. Galloway and McKenzie Wark, Excommunication: Three Inquiries 
in Media and Mediation (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2014) p.10  
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equally capable of curating or poisoning, is to conflate the technological with the 
instrumental. For Latour, such association inevitably confronts us to an unfruitful 
debate in which we are so prompt to give intentions to technology or to humans: 
 
Behind the tired repetition of the theme of the neutrality of ‘technologies-that-are-neither-
good-nor-bad-but-will-be- what-man-makes-of-them’, or the theme, identical in its foundation, 
of ‘technology-that-becomes-crazy-because-it-has-become-autonomous-and-no-longer-has-
any-other-end-except-it-goalless-development’, hides the fear of discovering this reality so 
new to modern man who has acquired the habit to dominate: there are no masters anymore – 
not even crazed technologies466.  
 
In claiming that there are no more masters anymore, the same way there are no crazed 
technologies, Latour emphasizes in its own way the absurd character of technologies 
by freeing them from the discursivity of mastery, rationality and directionality. What 
if, after all, technology was taking us nowhere? For Latour, technology escapes the 
field of rationality; “If you want to keep your intentions straight, your plans inflexible, 
your programmes of action rigid, then do not pass through any form of technological 
life467”. This means that technology never simply translates, supports or achieves our 
intentions, it constantly betrays them. As such, technology belongs less to “the clarity 
of right reason468”, than the opacity of the detour.  
In Galloway’s own words, Hermes embodies communication because he 
“governs the sending of messages and the journeying into foreign lands”469. As such, 
the main role of Hermes is to guide and inform the traveller. On that above 
characterization, Galloway and Stiegler seem to agree. The first point of divergence 
occurs when Stiegler emphasizes Hermes as the god of translation and textual 
interpretation, that is, of knowledge circulation. Indeed, Hermes is a signifier-god 
because he is the inventor of writing. Stiegler tells us that in the Protagorean version 
of the myth of Prometheus, the figure of Hermes descends from Prometheus himself. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
466 Bruno Latour, ‘Morality and Technology: The End of the Means’, Theory, Culture & Society, trans. 
by Couze Venn, vol. 19, 5/6 (2002) 247–260 p.255 
467 Bruno Latour, ‘Morality and Technology: The End of the Means’, Theory, Culture & Society, trans. 
by Couze Venn, vol. 19, 5/6 (2002) 247–260 p.252 
468 Bruno Latour, ‘Morality and Technology: The End of the Means’, Theory, Culture & Society, trans. 
by Couze Venn, vol. 19, 5/6 (2002) 247–260 p.251 
469 Eugene Thacker, Alexander R. Galloway and McKenzie Wark, Excommunication: Three Inquiries 
in Media and Mediation (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2014) p.29  
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In other words, Hermes descends from prostheticity, and therefore technicity. In 
bringing to light the technical background of the figure of Hermes, Stiegler aims to 
intertwine technicity and signification together, as he is eager to defend a rational 
model of technics. Although Stiegler’s reading of the figure of Hermes as the symbol 
of clear communication is not rejected by Galloway who also notes strong 
acquaintances between Hermes and technics, it is however not fully embraced. The 
reason for this is that Hermes “does not have the last word on communication tout 
court”470.  
Galloway thus turns to the lesser known figure of Iris. Unlike Hermes, the 
figure of Iris brings “the communicants into an ecstasy of immediacy, producing a 
short circuit of hypercommunication”471. Iris challenges the traditional circuits of 
communication that simply include a single message for a single sender and a single 
receiver. To be more precise, Iris embodies a form of communication, which is in fact 
an excommunication, that aims at the deceptive, the immediate and the multiple. 
Although communication can be obscure and iridescent, Hermes himself comes as 
quite deceptive as the messenger-god of gods. And this is what Stiegler’s reading, in 
my view, does not take into consideration enough. For Galloway, one must bear in 
mind that Hermes is known for his repeated trickeries. The duplicity of Hermes should 
not come as a surprise as he is after all the god of borderlands; he lies, robs, 
manipulates and betrays. 
Hermes is not just a thief, he is the Prince of Thieves. Duplicity in speech gives Hermes yet 
another epithet, this one explicitly linguistic and semiotic in nature: Hermes logios, or as one 
might say using current parlance the “discursive” Hermes. He governs over eloquence, 
persuasion, and the act of speaking. Flows of words are not unlike flows of goods and services 
across the borderlands, and so, as with merchants and economic commerce, Hermes too has a 
special connection to the dialogical and discursive economies of language that flow from the 
tongue of the rhetorician. And like Eros and Aphrodite, he is one of the “whisperer” or seducer 
gods, for he can intoxicate and seduce others either with promise of profit, or seduce simply 
through the sweet sounds of the lyre or the reed flute. The Hermes logios sculptural type depicts 
the god in the act of oration, for the herald is the one who, after arriving in far-off lands, must 
stand tall and speak clearly and convincingly. Thus travel and rhetoric—if not its more 
degraded form, sophistry— are connected in Hermes472.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
470 Eugene Thacker, Alexander R. Galloway and McKenzie Wark, Excommunication: Three Inquiries 
in Media and Mediation (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2014) p.30  
471 Eugene Thacker, Alexander R. Galloway and McKenzie Wark, Excommunication: Three Inquiries 
in Media and Mediation (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2014) p.30 
 
472 Eugene Thacker, Alexander R. Galloway and McKenzie Wark, Excommunication: Three Inquiries 
in Media and Mediation (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2014) p.35  
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The reason I wanted to briefly focus on Stiegler’s and Galloway’s respective reading 
of the Hermes figure in connection to technicity was to show a simple thing, which I 
think is significant of their approach of media technology; for Stiegler technology 
belongs to the light of reason473 whereas for Galloway, technology is opaque and 
devious. But it is not enough for Galloway to simply branch out media between a 
hermeneutic or iridescent circuit of communication. He thus jumps to a third type of 




5.2 FROM FURIOUS MEDIA TO THE INTERFACE EFFECT 
 
 
In this section, I intend to show how, according to Galloway, ‘furious media’ 
turn meaning into an effect. The Furies, Galloway suggests, characterize the mode of 
mediation of current digital networks. In this respect, Galloway writes:  
Dispersed. Split. Deconstructed. Fragmented. Disseminated. Scattered. Emulsified. Blunted. 
Unfolded. Folded up. Incomplete. Becalmed. Calmly. Carefully. Continuously. Obstinately.” 
The Furies signal noncompliance with both immanence and hermeneutics, an abdication of 
both presence and difference. They signal the triumph of multiplicity, heterogeneity, 
parallelity, rhizomatics, horizontal topology, complexity, and nonlinear systems. The Furies 
are essentially indeterminate in number; in the literary record their numbers change depending 
on the source. If Hermes is the god of the signifier, and Iris is the goddess of immanence, the 
Furies are the gods of the incontinence of form474.  
 
Furious media are a succession of causalities and micro functions475.  Meaning is 
discretized, shattered into a multiplicity of autonomous points, nodes and ties. This 
last statement summarizes well, I believe, his theory of the effect which I propose now 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
473 In the second volume of Technics and Time, Stiegler does indeed examines the orthothetic 
substructure of technical life insofar as technics is an orientation marker. It is orthothetic because it 
indicates, designates, rectifies and corrects.  
474 Eugene Thacker, Alexander R. Galloway and McKenzie Wark, Excommunication: Three Inquiries 
in Media and Mediation (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2014) p.57  
 
475 Eugene Thacker, Alexander R. Galloway and McKenzie Wark, Excommunication: Three Inquiries 
in Media and Mediation (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2014) p.62 
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to investigate. This will be done by analyzing what he problematizes as the ‘interface 
effect’ and by assessing what the term ‘effect’ conveys.  
 
Galloway reminds us that “an interface is not something that appears before 
you but rather is a gateway that opens up and allows passage to some place beyond476”. 
In this respect, technologies not only posit themselves as designing processes, but shall 
also be apprehended as surfaces, or zones of activities. This is precisely what the 
notion of interface wishes to bring forth. Having said that, the interface should not be 
thought as the medium itself, but as the principle of mediation. Galloway thus argues 
that the interface is not a static object, but a plastic phenomenon that configures and 
reconfigures our semiotic and aesthetic experience with technologies: 
 
Interfaces are not things, but rather processes that effect a result of whatever kind. For this 
reason I will be speaking not so much about particular interface objects (screens, keyboards), 
but interface effects. And in speaking about them I will not be satisfied just to say an interface 
is defined in such and such a way, but to show how it exists that way for specific social and 
historical reasons. Interfaces themselves are effects, in that they bring about transformations in 
material states. But at the same time interfaces are themselves the effects of other things, and 
thus tell the story of the larger forces that engender them477.  
 
The interface is more than a platform, a substrate, or a hypomnemata. It stands as a 
practice of mediation. In choosing to describe the interface as an effect and not as a 
thing478, Galloway is in fact suggesting that the interface is inscribed in a network. 
This means that the interface is mediatic. The very notion of interface is set in the 
constant dynamic of relations. It means that it takes part to the whole circuit of causes 
and effects, that is, the relation of objects to objects.  
Galloway’s research mainly concentrate on rhizomes, nodes, structures and 
principles of mediation. The Interface Effect is not a book on media properly speaking, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
476 Alexander R. Galloway, The interface effect (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012) p.30 
477 Alexander R. Galloway, The interface effect (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012) p.vii 
478 In a Heideggerian sense, the thing is an ontological category: “Less a tool or object of knowledge, 
the thing is for Heidegger that intersection or congealment of materials, production processes, and 
ideologies” Eugene Thacker, Alexander R. Galloway and McKenzie Wark, Excommunication: Three 
Inquiries in Media and Mediation (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2014) p.114 
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but on what stands in-between, that is to say, the activity of (non)-transmission. To 
clarify the distinction between media and interface, one needs to keep in mind that the 
media is a container, whereas the interface is understood as an agitation, for it is 
generative of “frictions between different formats.479”  Galloway criticizes Kittler for 
adopting a media-centric discourse, insofar as the latter apprehends media primarily 
in terms of material support capable of storing, processing and transmitting. Galloway 
claims that endorsing such a view only contributes to repeating and reinforcing the 
prejudice done to the field of technology since Plato;  
By conservative I mean the claim that techne is substrate and only substrate. For Kittler and 
McLuhan alike, media mean hypomnesis. They define media via the externalization of man 
into objects. Hence a fundamentally conservative dichotomy is inaugurated – which to be clear 
was in Plato before it was in Aristotle – between the good and balanced human specimen and 
the dead junk of the hypomnemata. Contrast this with an alternate philosophical tradition that 
views techne as technique, art, habitus, ethos, or lived practice. Such an alternate tradition is 
what was alluded to previously, through the contrast between media (as objects or substrates) 
and practices of mediation (as middles or interfaces). Indeed it is ironic that Kittler hews so 
closely to Heidegger, as Heidegger was one of the philosophers who best understood both 
aspects of techne.480  
The problem lies in the definition itself, for in choosing to define technology as mere 
hypomnemata, one is doing nothing else than continuing the discursive dichotomy 
between the human and technology in which the latter is condemned to live in the 
shadow of the former. Technology is not a mere support for subjective life, that is, of 
human activity, Galloway argues. In this respect, he suggests that media should not be 
defined by their essence as hypomnemata, but shall rather be understood in terms of 
their effects. Hence, one should not ask “what is it?” but instead “what does it do?”.  
Put otherwise, one should apprehend media in terms of its capacities, potentialities and 
possibilities.   
 
In sum, media are modes of mediation481 that can only be apprehended in virtue 
of their effects. It will be the task of the following paragraph to explain in what the 
effect consists.   
First of all, the effect is not subjective, but objective. To illustrate his point, 
Galloway argues for example we do not cry at websites like we cry at the movies. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
479 Alexander R. Galloway, The interface effect (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012) p.31 
480 Alexander R. Galloway, The interface effect (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012) p.16 
481 Alexander R. Galloway, The interface effect (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012) p.18 
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emotional/ aesthetic experience they offer is not comparable. This stance articulates 
the whole problematic between the effect and the affect; cinema affects me, Galloway 
says, whereas the interface has an effect on me. As a spectator, I can concentrate on a 
movie, and be emotionally invested, because I maintain a necessary distance that 
enables me to reflect on the object. In the case of digital technologies, their immediacy 
absorbs my attention, rendering it impossible for me to concentrate, or to reflect on 
them. There is no entertainment, only unproductive distraction. The whole problem of 
furious media lies precisely in the absence of affect, for they do not enable emotional 
appropriation. Instead, new media encourage emotional reaction.  
Galloway’s criticisms resonate in many ways with Stiegler’s. As mentionned 
in chapter 3, Stiegler’s own work on attention formation warns us about the power of 
visual technologies. In the third tome of Technics and Time, he describes their 
seductive character on consciousness as below:  
 
  
The cinematic will attract our attention to the passing images, no matter what they are, and we 
will prefer to see them unfold before our eyes. We become immersed in the time of their 
flowing forth; we forget all about ourselves watching, perhaps “losing ourselves” (losing track 
of time), but however we define it, we will be sufficiently captured, not to say captivated, to 
stay with it to the very end. During the passing ninety minutes or so (fifty-two in the case of 
tele-visual “hour”) of this pastime, the time of our consciousness will be totally passive within 
the thrall of those “moving” images that are linked together by noises, sounds, words, voices. 
Ninety or fifty-two minutes of our life will have passed by outside our “real” life, but within a 
life or the lives of people and events, real or fictive, to which we will have conjoined our time, 
adopting their events as though they were happening to us as they happened to them482. 
 
 
As mentionned earlier, Stiegler draws on Husserl and states that attention is formed 
and sedimented through one’s capacity to focus on an object. Put briefly, the 
sedimentation of attention contributes to the formation of intelligence. Attention 
constitutes therefore the core of intellectual existence while culture, according to 
Stiegler, is the sum of the intergenerational transmission of attentional forms. These 
attentional forms, Stiegler argues, are individually produced before becoming 
collectively appropriated. Cultural life is, in this respect, the result of an 
intergenerational psycho-collective process of memorization which however always 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
482  Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time 3: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise, trans. Stephen 
Barker, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011) p.10 
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depends on the exteriorization of attention in technical objects483.  
While technology allows for the crystallization of attentional forms, it also 
redesigns them. Hence, Stiegler draws a line between noo-technologies and 
psychotechnologies. As technologies of spirit, the former generates deep attention, 
whereas the latter, as technologies of feelings and emotions, generates hyper-attention. 
Deep attention belongs to the rational, hyper-attention, to the pathological; that is to 
say, to the affect. Drawing on the work of Katharine Hayles, Stiegler describes hyper-
attention as the symptom of a generational malaise which is encouraged by certain 
types of digital technologies or interfaces. Social networks such as Facebook are an 
example of that because these platforms, according to Stiegler, are designed to 
privilege multitasking, that is, a series of short actions with immediate repercussions. 
It produces “a form of attention without consciousness, a characteristic of wild 
animals”484.  Following Freud on this, Stiegler defines the affect in terms of drives. 
Profoundly unpoetic and unaesthetic; drives are the manifestation of a morbid 
relationship towards the object 485. Drives are opposed to desires, for Stiegler. They are 
lived and cannot be appropriated or reflected upon. On this, Stiegler is close to Freud, 
as he warns us that despite being enjoyable — which constitutes their danger — drives 
do not represent an alternative for desire, but are symptomatic of the failure to desire.  
 
In my opinion, Galloway’s work rather opposes effect and affect, the objective 
and the subjective. Having said that, the main point of divergence seems to be the 
following: Stiegler claims that technologies do affect us, while Galloway pretends that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
483 Bernard Stiegler, ‘Relational Ecology and the Digital Pharmakon’, trans. Patrick Crogan. Culture 
Machine, 2012. Issue 13: 1–19.  p.4 
484 Bernard Stiegler, Taking Care of Youth and the Generations, trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2010),p.78 
485 Freud writes:  
“If the love for the object—a love which cannot be given up though the object itself is given up—takes 
refuge in narcissistic identification, then the hate comes into operation on this substitutive object, 
abusing it, debasing it, making it suffer and deriving sadistic satisfaction from its suffering. The self-
tormenting in melancholia, which is without doubt enjoyable, signifies, just like the corresponding 
phenomenon in obsessional neurosis, a satisfaction of trends of sadism and hate which relate to an 
object, and which have been turned round upon the subject’s own self” see: Sigmund Freud, ‘Mourning 
and Melancholia’, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 
Volume XIV (1914-1916): On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement, Papers on Metapsychology 
and Other Works (1917) p.250 
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they do not, precisely because he understands the affect as already poietic, the pathos, 
as being already the sign of spirit. In this respect, the apparent reign of the affect in the 
digital sphere is only an illusion: 
 
The net is nothing if not the grand parade of personality profiles, wants and needs, projected 
egos, “second” selves and “second” lives. This is all true. So the triumph of affect is also its 
undoing. The waning of an older affective mode comes at the moment of its absolute 
rationalization into software. At the moment when something is perfected, it is dead. This is 
the condition of affect today online, and it is why the object of the computer is not a man: 
because its data is one. 486 
According to Galloway, the affect suffers from the process of rationalization. It is 
because of its algorithmatization, mathematization, and discretization, that the affect 
is condemned to be transformed into an effect, that is, into a quantified phenomenon. 
The effect belongs to the objective. It is a succession, or an intertwinement, of 
causalities, while the affect’s mode of functioning is more obscure, and cannot solely 
be explained through the accumulation of empirical data and the analytic logic of 
causation. Its spiritual, poietic, dimension is precisely what cannot be calculated or 
grasped. The affect, argues Galloway, has no place in the digital world, because it is 
human. The digital sphere, as he has explained, only supports relations of objects to 
objects. This means that what characterizes the interface is the absence of the subject. 
Instead, there are users, profiles or persona. In other words, more numbers, more 
statistics.  
 
 Whether hypnotic or distracting, screens do not leave us indifferent. For 
Stiegler, new media liquidate the possibility of the aesthetical experience. Galloway, 
on the other hand, states that the interface effect constitutes the very aesthetical 
dimension of the digital. To better understand Stiegler’s binary position on aesthetics, 





5.3 STIEGLER AND BENJAMIN WALK INTO A CINEMA 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
486 Alexander R. Galloway, The interface effect (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012) p.12 
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Let’s imagine for a moment that Bernard Stiegler and Walter Benjamin live on 
the same timeframe and that they decide to go to the cinema together. Though 
Benjamin does not need much convincing, valuing cinema for rendering culture 
available to the masses and freeing the artwork from the grip of bourgeoisie, Stiegler 
is hopeful that the movie will transcend their existence. He tells Benjamin: 
 
If by some lucky chance the film is a good one, we who are watching it in complete lethargy, 
the core validation of the animated sound-image by which we can leave everything behind and 
still be completely uninvolved— not even (as with a book) following written sentences and 
turning pages, careful not to lose the gist of the story; indeed, if the film is good, we come out 
of it less lazy, even re-invigorated, full of emotion and the desire to do something, or else 
infused with a new outlook on things: the cinematographic machine, taking charge of our 
boredom, will have transformed it into new energy, transubstantiated it, made something out 
of nothing — the nothing of that terrible, nearly fatal feeling of a Sunday afternoon of 
nothingness. The cinema will have brought back the expectation of something, something that 
must come, that will come, and that will come to us from our own life; from this seemingly 
non-fictional life that we re-discover when, leaving the darkening room, we hide ourselves in 




Let’s now imagine that they watch Iron Man. Indeed, Stiegler thought it was a good 
idea as it will perhaps enable him to introduce Benjamin to his theory regarding the 
co-evolution of the human and the technical. Two hours later, they both leave the 
screening and agree that the movie was distracting. Yet, they do not feel the same way 
about it. Benjamin, for his part, is quite satisfied, arguing that: 
 
If one considers the dangerous tensions which technology and its consequences have 
engendered in the masses at large-tendencies which at critical stages take on a psychotic 
character-one also has to recognize that this same technologization [Technisierung] has created 
the possibility of psychic immunization against such mass psychoses. It does so by means of 
certain films in which the forced development of sadistic fantasies or masochistic delusions 
can prevent their natural and dangerous maturation in the masses. Collective laughter is one 
such preemptive and healing outbreak of mass psychosis. The countless grotesque events 
consumed in films are a graphic indication of the dangers threatening mankind from the 
repressions implicit in civilization. American slapstick comedies and Disney films trigger a 
therapeutic release of unconscious energies488.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
487 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time 3: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise, trans. Stephen 
Barker, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011) p.10 
488 Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility and Other Writings 
on Media, eds. Michael W. Jennings, Brigid Doherty, and Thomas Y. Levin, trans. Edmund Jephcott, 
Rodney Livingstone, Howard Eiland, and Others (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: The 
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But Stiegler remains puzzled, pointing out that the movie, like most of Hollywood 
blockbusters, is finally a bit dumb. And also dangerous. Unlike Benjamin, Stiegler 
does not see how the movie can immunize the masses from their worst impulses. It 
does in fact the opposite! He thus replies to Benjamin:  
 
 
The goal is the stimulation of immature drives, making them prescriptive for adults as well 
by inverting intergenerational relations, the result of which is organized mass regression, 




It occurs overall that Stiegler and Benjamin disagree on the value of entertainment, 
which Benjamin chooses to take as a positive distraction. As such, Benjamin values 
the movie for its cathartic virtues, when Stiegler attacks the movie for encouraging 
psychic regression. In the case of Iron Man, Stiegler would for example argue, in 
conformity to his philosophy that it is spreading American values, glorifying 
capitalism, and short-circuiting attention by presenting too many action scenes. It is 
indeed entertaining, but it is entertaining insofar as the movie captures its audience 
“through the most archaic drives, then compelling it to construct a consciousness 
reduced to simple, reflex cerebral functions, which is always disenchanted and always 
available490”. Stiegler thus opposes entertainment and fantasy491. He claims that 
entertainment destroys our ability to fantasize, as it captures our imagination and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
489 Bernard Stiegler, Taking Care of Youth and the Generations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2010) p.12 
490 Bernard Stiegler, Taking Care of Youth and the Generations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2010) p.15 
491 For Stiegler fantasy is essential to the aesthetic experience: 
 “Fantasy, created through phantasia (i.e., through the imagination's formation of symbolic mediations), 
is humanity's most precious gift: it en- genders the very spirit of human culture, including science, since 
as Bachelard shows, science results from imaginative play in the specific form of attention we call 
contemplation (theoria), which then results in a mode of observation in which pleasure and reality seem 
to coincide: the reality principle does not oppose the pleasure principle here, but rather is its product”.  
Entertainment, on the other hand, is fantasy constrained, insofar as it has been captured by “uncontrolled 
cultural industrialization” which “activates the psychopower of attentional control”.  
Bernard Stiegler, Taking Care of Youth and the Generations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010) 
p.15 
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standardizes our dreams.  Besides, in being too keen to contrast distraction with 
concentration through the model of deep and hyper-attention I have discussed in the 
section above, Stiegler does not seem to be willing to make a difference between 
positive and negative distraction, as if distraction was always debilitating. Having 
listened to Stiegler’s ranting, Benjamin would like to bring some nuance to the 
approach:  
The masses are criticized for seeking distraction [Zerstreuung] in the work of art, whereas 
the art lover supposedly approaches it with concentration. In the case of the masses, the 
artwork is seen as a means of entertainment; in the case of the art lover, it is considered an 
object of devotion492.  
 
My point is not to merely say that Benjamin would defend the Hollywood blockbuster, 
as his investigations on the aesthetics of experience does in fact polarize the reception 
of an artwork between positive and negative distraction493.  Yet, the problem is not 
located in the distracting character of the object, but its subjective reception. As it is 
not the place to elaborate on subject-object division in theories of the aesthetic 
judgement, I will limit my understanding of Benjamin as follows: movies mobilize the 
masses and allow for a reception in distraction in virtue of their shock effect. Yet, this 
distraction is not necessarily bad and if it is destructive, it may perhaps be for the best. 
Unlike Stiegler, Benjamin does not fear the dissolution of traditions. Benjamin is 
actually positive regarding the massive reproduction of art, even though it contributes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
492 Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility and Other Writings 
on Media, eds. Michael W. Jennings, Brigid Doherty, and Thomas Y. Levin, trans. Edmund Jephcott, 
Rodney Livingstone, Howard Eiland, and Others (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008) “The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological 
Reproducibility” second version. p.39 
493 This concerns more architecture than cinema, but is still worth of interest. In his essay “some motifs 
on Baudelaire” Benjamin argues for example that the urban crowd “has been sealed off” from 
experience, constantly distracted by external stimuli. So far, this would sound Stieglerian. Yet, his later 
essay on “The Work of Art in its Mechanical Reproduction/Technological Reproducibility”, which I 
have here chosen for focus, depicts the urban life in a more positive way. Benjamin suggests indeed 
that it is possible for the masses to be confronted with the experience of everydayness. Urban 
architecture, to him, illustrates well this aesthetic of everydayness in which masses “casually notice” 
the presence of buildings and absorb these buildings “into themselves”. By contrast, the individual who 
sees an artwork is absorbed by it, insofar as the work of art, when directed to the individual and not the 
masses, demands attentive concentration. The experience of the building (excluding touristy 
monuments) would be by use and perception, sight and touch. It stands there for collective consumption 
and yet, this is not incompatible with a certain level of aesthetic appropriation. What Benjamin is getting 
at is that aesthetic experience does not have to be solely contemplative; the contemplative gaze is just 
one way to experience the world.  Another way, suggests Benjamin, would be by habit.  
See: Alan Latham. "The Power of Distraction: Distraction, Tactility, and Habit in the Work of Walter 
Benjamin." in Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 17, no. 4 (1999): 451-73. 
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to the decline of the artwork’s aura, as there is sometimes a gain to be found from a 
loss.   
 
In this story, Walter Benjamin is happy with Iron Man not only because the 
movie is cathartic, but also because in being intended for the masses it promotes the 
dissemination of culture. In this respect, the movie is an example of a successful 
politicization of art. Stiegler may think the movie has good ideas regarding technology, 
but remains an instrument of psychopower insofar as it has been designed to support 
American imperialism. While Benjamin understands Iron Man as an artwork, Stiegler 
views it as a weapon, and therefore, as a falsely cultural object contributing to the 
aesthecization of politics, and in this case of war. Though a lot could be said about 
politics of entertainment, this does not unfortunately constitute the core of my topic. 
I would like therefore to conclude this part with the following observation: 
Benjamin’s insight on positive distraction defends the futile as aesthetically and 
existentially worthy. In its meaninglessness and triviality, distraction can be 
intellectually productive.  Stiegler, on the other hand, opposes distraction with 
concentration. Distraction is for him destructive because of its immediate character. 
Concentration is conversely productive because it “holds the object in a firm 
contemplative gaze”494 and a distancing look, that are, according to him, essential to 
the true, deep, aesthetic experience. In this regard, Stiegler devalues the meaningless 
and the trivial as a positive mode of aesthetic experience, as if both were condemned 





5.4 THE HIGHWAY ANALOGY 
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Galloway, on the other hand, seems to assign an aesthetic value to the 
meaninglessness of the effect. As such, I would like for this paragraph to discuss his 
famous analogy of freedom with the highway, which shows how the aesthetic 
experience of freedom has itself been turned into a network effect. By the means of 
this analogy, Galloway also wants to stress how the aesthetic experience has become 
dependent to the notion of the ludic, insofar as it is enjoyment that is constitutive of 
the meaningful experience of freedom here. He thus writes: 
 
To help understand the concept of computer protocols, consider the analogy of the highway 
system. Many different combinations of roads are available to a person driving from point A 
to point B. However, en route one is compelled to stop at red lights, stay between the white 
lines, follow a reasonably direct path, and so on. These conventional rules that govern the set 
of possible behavior patterns within a heterogeneous system are what computer scientists call 




By the means of this metaphor, Galloway shows three things:  
1)   Freedom is the effect of a network.  
2)   The network is governed by protocol 
3)   Freedom is the product of protocol, that is, of control 
 
This means, overall, that one is free when entrapped. Galloway then states that 
the key to freedom is its architecture. This means that freedom is enacted through 
limitations, interferences and obstructions insofar as the purpose of freedom is to 
ensure safety. Galloway constructs in this respect a model of positive liberty in which 
one’s actions are determined by the presence of rules, that is, a certain architecture 
which is mapping out one’s behavior. In this context freedom is neither infinite nor 
absolute for one’s decisions are already coerced by the external environment.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
495 Alexander R. Galloway, Protocol: How Control Exists After Decentralization (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, London, England: The MIT Press, 2004) p.7 
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On one hand, the implementation of highways contributes to the enlargement 
and the democratization of freedom as it covers long distance and gives the possibility 
for individuals from all sorts of social background to travel more easily. On the other 
hand, the highway analogy teaches us that the experience of freedom necessitates 
rigidity for it can only be enacted and experienced through the setting of patterns such 
as the introduction of speed limitation or left-hand/right-hand traffic. 
 
This dispositif of control may be an example of soft power in the sense that one 
can still feel free while conforming to the rules. Indeed, one follows rather than 
obeying, one is influenced rather than being forced or coerced. Though the highway 
stands as an apparatus of control in which freedom is enacted, it nonetheless needs to 
remain enjoyable to be powerful, according to Galloway. In this regard, the highway 
challenges our vision of control in the sense that there are no oppressor, no oppressed: 
one is not the victim of control, but its beneficiary.  Control is therefore flexible, 
opened and inclusive. Most importantly, procedures of control must, in order to be 
viable, hide behind attractive interfaces. In fact, enjoyment is the alibi of control; it is 
what enables the individual to feel that she is driving when actually, she is being 
driven. Freedom is in fact the main object of what Galloway calls ludic capitalism; it 
is not so much that freedom needs to be experienced or explored, but consumed like 
any other commodity496.  Control, on the other hand, does not depend anymore on a 
bureaucratic process of decision-making but stems from a purely technical 
organization, which is protocol.  
 
In sum, the system of freedom governance that Galloway has metaphorized 
under the highway is a “delicate dance between freedom and control497” in which the 
latter has the upper-hand. Galloway’s emphasis on control, as the directing principle 
of the network, will constitute the object of the next section.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
496Alexander R. Galloway and Eugene Thacker, The Exploit, A Theory of Networks (University of 
Minnesota Press, 2007) p.143 
497 Alexander R. Galloway, Protocol: How Control Exists After Decentralization (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, London, England: The MIT Press, 2004) p.75 
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In Control and Freedom: Power and Paranoia in the Age of Fiber Optics498, 
Chun argues that thinkers such as Foucault and Deleuze left their imprint in the current 
understanding of new media in overemphasizing the actual powerfulness of networks 
of power. For this last section, I would like to rearticulate Galloway’s appropriation of 
Foucault’s legacy insofar as I believe that Galloway still falls into the pitfall pinpointed 
by Chun.  
 
 
Galloway is inspired by Foucault’s genealogical enterprise. As mentionned in 
chapter 2, Foucault’s genealogy proposes a model of inquiry purged of all 
considerations for the individual, that is, the social subject of history. Instead, he aims 
to exhume the anonymous subject. Galloway, for his part, draws a cartography of 
behavior and practices through the prism of power and control.  This means that his 
approach allows for the conceptualization of responsibility, autonomy and freedom. 
But they are insofar as these issues stand as the strategical outcome of protocol, and 
not the reverse. Hence, I am suggesting that his understanding of the protocological 
still confine media into an enclosed logic of control. Galloway writes: 
 
 
Biopolitics and biopower are Foucault’s terms for protocol as it relates to life forms. They are 
Foucault’s terms for the statistical coding, the making-statistical, of large living masses, such 
that any singular life-form within that mass may be compared in its organic nature to the 
totality. This is exactly how protocol functions, as a management style for distributed masses 
of autonomous agents499.  
 
 
For Foucault, dynamics of power and governance cannot be overcome or overthrown. 
In this respect, he was not interested in developing practices of liberation and has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
498 Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, Control and Freedom: Power and Paranoia in the Age of Fiber Optics 
(Cambridge Massachusetts, London, England: The MIT Press, 2006) 
499 Alexander R. Galloway, Protocol: How Control Exists After Decentralization (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, London, England: The MIT Press, 2004) p.87 
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denied the existence of a counter power. On the contrary, power and governance 
emerge as intrinsic to human life and are co-extensive with the social. Galloway’s 
account of protocol, that is, of decentralized control, is in complete agreement with 
Foucault’s conception of power-relations.   
According to Galloway a network is a technology of governance, that is, of 
power and control. As modes of control, networks are multiple: they can be 
hierarchical, chaotic, disruptive, regulative, linear or non-linear500. While social 
networks are commonly associated with popular digital interfaces such as Instagram, 
Facebook or Snapchat, Galloway argues that they are the contemporary re-enactment 
of old power relations. It is these power relations that Galloway choses to focus on, 
insofar as these relations are enabled through the connectivity of protocol. As we may 
feel more connected than ever, one of Galloway’s originalities is to argue that protocol 
produces the core structure of our societies. “As a system of management that only 
exists in a space populated by a multitude of independent, vital agents501”, the protocol 
forms and informs the socio-political sphere and traverses every form of life, to the 
point that life itself is the intertwinement of protocological techniques. In this regard, 
Galloway does not wish to develop alternatives to protocol. Instead, he believes it 
essential to work through the protocol and find strategies of resistance within its 
structure.  
 
Drawing on Deleuze, Galloway argues that to every society corresponds a type 
of machine that constitutes both its foundation and its accomplishment. Sovereign 
societies are grounded in the mechanical, while disciplinary societies operate with 
thermodynamic machines. Control societies emerge with computers. Digital societies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
500 Networks have been present since Ancient Times, either as a chain of triumph or the web or ruins.  
“In the tragedy Agamemnon Aeschylus describes two types of networks. The first, an actual 
communication network, is described in detail but remains off stage. The second, a meshwork of traps, 
while visible and present is but a symbol of larger machinations. The communications network is a 
chain of fire beacons, spanning a few hundred miles, that carried the message of the of Troy back to 
Argos, thus warning of the victor Agamemnon’s imminent homecoming (…) But later, upon the return 
of Agamemnon to his hearth, a second net is deployed, this one a “vast voluminous net used by 
Clytemnestra to ensnare her husband and bring about his ruin. This voluminous net, later decried by the 
chorus as a foul spider web” 
See: Alexander Galloway, ‘Networks’, in Critical terms for Media Studies, eds. W. J. T. Mitchell and 
Mark B. N. Hansen (University of Chicago Press, 2010) p.280  
501 Alexander R. Galloway, Protocol: How Control Exists After Decentralization (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, London, England: The MIT Press, 2004) p.82 
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are equipped with the internet. They function with algorithms and codes. It is thus not 
the network that constitutes the nucleus of the internet, but protocol. As Galloway 
states, protocol is in fact the mapping out of the network: 
 
The concept of protocol refers to all technoscientific rules and standards that govern 
relationships within networks. Protocols abound in technoculture. They are rooted in the laws 
of nature, yet they sculpt the spheres of the social and the cultural. They are principles of 
networked interrelationality, yet they are also principles of political organization502.  
 
Taken this way, protocol encodes the network, regulates relationships; it is the very 
condition of their formalization. It is an anonymous, a non-human apparatus of control. 
However, in the same way that Foucault understands power as what enables rather 
than what represses, Galloway thinks protocol as what allows rather than disallows. 
As a system of control, the protocol switches on relational circuits, perpetuates a 
system of organization and produces a conglomerate of agents. In describing the 
internet as a decentralized mass of data which is essentially distributive, Galloway 
rationalizes the structural components of cyberspace and dissolves the subject into this 
opaque system of interconnectivity.  
 
Protocol is penetrating and articulating every move of the digital space. It is 
the architectural principle of the internet. As such, it stands as the reactualisation of 
the panopticon, insofar as it is geared towards efficiency and productivity. Like 
Foucault’s panopticon, Galloway’s protocol deploys a system of normalization and 
exploitation. The subject, on the other hand, disappears, and the individual becomes 
dividual — that is, divisible into data. It is an object of exchange and transfer. This 
resonates with the concerns of Christian Fauré who claims that the algorithmatization 
of human existence is articulating a new model of discursivity; a hermeneutic of the 
subject without a subject in which one just needs to be plugged in, connected and 
interfaced to produce data503. Despite Galloway’s reluctance to define networks as the 
world’s most self-evident architecture, he however insists on deciphering its mesh. 
 
 
What matters more and more is the very distribution and dispersal of action throughout the 
network, a dispersal that would ask us to define networks less in terms of the nodes and more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
502 Alexander R. Galloway and Eugene Thacker, The Exploit, A Theory of Networks (University of 
Minnesota Press, 2007) p.28 
503 Christian Fauré, ‘Les interfaces digitales’, in Digital Studies : organologies des savoirs et 
technologies de la connaissance, ed. Bernard Stiegler (Paris: Fyp éditions, 2014) 
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in terms of the edges—or even in terms other than the entire, overly spatialized dichotomy of 
nodes and edges altogether504.  
 
Protocol epitomizes the social as a network of relations, rules and conventions and 
could be said to act as a mediatic form of Foucault’s historical a priori. However, 
Galloway is aware of the limits that the term ‘relation’ brings about505.  He 
acknowledges that life cannot be solely reduced to a system of lineage. However, the 
network is not subsidiary to human action either. This leads Galloway to conclude, 
quite ambiguously, that “no one controls networks, but networks are controlled506”.  
 
5.6 KEY POINTS 
 
Stiegler stresses that technics is a grammatization process and closely ties the 
question of technics with that of meaning. While comparing his work with Benjamin’s 
theory of distraction, I have explained that his thoughts on technology give the 
privilege to attentive concentration and contemplative experience. I have also 
explained that for Stiegler, technologies are always affecting the individual, either 
curing or poisoning their audience, individuating or dis-individuating the individual. 
My purpose was to suggest that Stiegler’s approach to the question of technology and 
aesthetics remained logocentric. Galloway, for his part, proposes a third paradigm, a 
paradigm of the middle. Indeed, his thoughts on excommunication, furious media, and 
the protocol, challenges the very idea of a technology filled with meaning. Instead, 
current networks give rise to the aesthetic of the effect; the experience of the 
meaningless (provided that it is enjoyable).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
504 Alexander R. Galloway and Eugene Thacker, The Exploit, A Theory of Networks (University of 
Minnesota Press, 2007) p.157 
505 Galloway writes: “Should we define an essential property — “relation” or “interrelation”—and 
construct a concept of the network from that? This could provide a starting point, but defining essences 
is always a tricky business. Relation always presupposes at least two “things” that are related. Relation 
is not, then, a “thing” but the relation between things. Is it a gap, an interval, a synapse? We are led into 
even more treacherous waters: relation is “the nothing” between two things. Following such a line of 
argument, our notion of “network” would be founded on the most insubstantial of substances.” 
Alexander R. Galloway and Eugene Thacker, The Exploit, A Theory of Networks (University of 
Minnesota Press, 2007) p.37 
506 Alexander R. Galloway and Eugene Thacker, The Exploit, A Theory of Networks (University of 
Minnesota Press, 2007) p.39 
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Is there an alternative to Furious media? The highway? The network? Or the 
dominance of the logos in general? Unlike Stiegler, Galloway is not a thinker of the 
alternative. However, he argues that furious media are not inevitable, nor is the 
reduction of freedom to the highway. In this regard, Galloway finds in the figure of 
Aphrodite another mode of mediation, which he considers worth of attention:  
Aphrodite, whose name means “rising up out of the foam,” is a mixture of desire, lust, and sex. 
Aphrodite spans two different poles, two different aspects, often typified by Aphrodite ourania 
and Aphrodite pandēmos, the one sprung from her father Ouranos and the other disseminated 
into the pandemonium of the common people(…)From Hermes she gains the mediatory 
promiscuity of mixing, inseminating and cross fertilizing; from Iris she gains a somatic 
immediacy, appearing as surging waves and surging bodies; from the Furies she gains a generic 
commonality, resulting in non-reproductive sexual desires, a non or pure desire507.  
In Galloway’s own words, Aphrodite is the lover of the middle. She is the perfect 
oscillation between determination and indetermination. She cultivates the “elusive 
promiscuities of Hermes508” and possesses also the “translucent immanence of iris509”. 
By the means of these compelling allegories, it seems evident that Galloway refuses 
to consider technology only through their capacity to produce or destroy signification. 
Instead, he proposes to think technology as an opaque mediation.  
However, it occurs that Galloway’s belief in the control paradigm is still 
preponderant. Indeed, just as the disciplinary served, for Foucault, as the framework 
for the enactment of liberty, protocological control serves, for Galloway, as the grid 
for the experience of freedom. Hence, the question that will occupy the next chapter is 
the following; can we think freedom independently from the architectures of control? 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
507 Eugene Thacker, Alexander R. Galloway and McKenzie Wark, Excommunication: Three Inquiries 
in Media and Mediation (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2014) p.64 
508 Eugene Thacker, Alexander R. Galloway and McKenzie Wark, Excommunication: Three Inquiries 
in Media and Mediation (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2014) p.68 
509 Eugene Thacker, Alexander R. Galloway and McKenzie Wark, Excommunication: Three Inquiries 
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“When freedom is conflated with security, freedom loses its meaning — freedom is no longer free”. 






According to Stiegler, the marketization of human existence511 precipitates us 
into a culture with no culture, that is, into a nihilist state with no hope, desire, or 
possibility for change512. It is because we are at a critical stage, Stiegler argues, that 
we must take a decision and reinvent ourselves. In other words, we must develop 
strategies of freedom in order to escape the reality of control.  
 
Wendy Hui Kyong Chun argues that these conclusions are the result of a 
paranoiac legacy. A legacy we owe more specifically to Foucault and Deleuze. 
Concerning Foucault, she explains that his reading of Bentham’s panopticon left a 
mark in our understanding of control and had encouraged “paranoid narratives of 
surveillance513”. This paranoid narrative surrounding the panopticon stems indeed 
from the conflation of visibility with surveillance and the belief that if one may be 
seen, one is therefore seen. Yet, for Chun, the internet shows almost the reverse insofar 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
510 Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, Control and Freedom: Power and Paranoia in the Age of Fiber Optics 
(Cambridge Massachusetts, London, England: The MIT Press, 2006) p.vii 
511 It being understood as the systematic tracking of online activities eventually sold to companies in 
order to predict the needs of consumer.   
512 See Bernard Stiegler, ‘La grande bifurcation vers le néguantropos, exceptions et sélections dans la 
noodiversité’, in Pourquoi nous sommes tous Nietzschéen ? eds. Dorian Astor and Alain Jugnon (Les 
impressions nouvelles, 2016). 
513 Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, Control and Freedom: Power and Paranoia in the Age of Fiber Optics 
(Cambridge Massachusetts, London, England: The MIT Press, 2006) p.6 
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as it is not because one’s online activities can be the object of surveillance that it is 
actually the case. The error, she says, is to treat possibility as a fact514. Indeed, though 
the risk of prosecution exists, it remains very low, which is the reason why the internet 
favours ‘deviant’ behavior such as child pornography. If the internet was a giant 
panopticon, that is, a system geared toward regulation and normalization, then criminal 
activities would be not the significant problem it however is at the moment. In fact, 
Chun says, the internet provokes a crisis of discipline. Though networks seem to 
legitimate theories of control and surveillance, online interactions are rarely the object 
of the often-fantasized panoptic gaze. Besides, the conflation of control with network 
protocol has led to superficial law enforcement procedures in which the suppression 
of contents appears to be enough to solve a social issue.  For Chun, the McLuhan-
esque belief that the message is the medium has convinced us that the solution to a 
problem, such as online child pornography or racism, is to suppress the medium in 
order to supress the message515.  It is therefore crucial, she argues, to revise our views 
on the internet instead of falsely metaphorizing the digital as a tentacling monster 
tracking and spying our every move516.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
514 Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, Control and Freedom: Power and Paranoia in the Age of Fiber Optics 
(Cambridge Massachusetts, London, England: The MIT Press, 2006) p.84 
515 Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, Control and Freedom: Power and Paranoia in the Age of Fiber Optics 
(Cambridge Massachusetts, London, England: The MIT Press, 2006) p.93 
516 In a more recent work, Chun uses once again her background in Humanities and Systems Design 
Engineering to reflect on digital surveillance. In Updating to Remain the Same, she asks: “Has the 
Internet destroyed the world or made it a better place? Does it foster democracy or total surveillance? 
Community or isolation? Information or pornography? Well-adjusted citizens or homicidal 
psychopaths?” (p. IX). She describes, quite ironically, new media as “wonderfully creepy”. Yet, “we 
need to disabuse ourselves of several assumptions, most importantly that there exists a “natural” 
relationship between technology and (the lack of) freedom” (p. IX). The gap between our perception of 
the digital and its actual operations is what she aims to tackle. But while she fears in Control and 
Freedom that our diligence to secure freedom may cost us our very freedom — as we shall see 
throughout this chapter —  she defends in Updating to Remain the Same the right for users to be 
vulnerable online without being attacked or preyed upon. To her viewpoint, the privatization of the 
internet is a false solution, as it does not guarantee freedom but surveillance (this issue will be discussed 
further in the conclusion). Yet, the internet (and the network in general) is a discursive construction that 
seduces our imaginary and offers a compelling experience of freedom. Moreover, it is essential to the 
dynamics of contemporary neoliberalism, that is, the economic and cultural functioning of our society. 
The digital is generative of paradoxes, Chun tells us, and this is these very paradoxes that she 
investigates. While Chun proposes a critical reflection on the possibility of developing, strengthening 
public rights in the context of media culture, Soshana Zuboff invites us, on the other hand, to resist by 
the means of a collective action the instrumentarian power of surveillance capitalism. She argues indeed 
that current digital powers threaten human nature, that is, the individual’s self-determination and moral 
autonomy. Zuboff’s The Age of Surveillance Capitalism makes a clear correlation between 
instrumentarian power of information economy and totalitarianism: “surveillance capitalism unitarily 
claim human experience as free raw material for translation into behavioral data. Although some of 
these data are applied to product or service improvement, the rest are declared as a proprietary 
behavioral surplus, fed into advanced manufacturing processes known as ‘machine intelligence’, and 
fabricated into prediction products that anticipate what you will do now, soon, and later” (p.14).Whereas 
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Chun argues overall that we have been giving too much power to control. This 
last chapter will be the opportunity for me to expose her views. I will end this chapter 
by suggesting through the work of Chun regarding the issue of control and freedom, 
that a way to free ourselves from what Stiegler has coined as technologies of 
psychopower, would be to first free ourselves from our paranoid knowledge about 
technologies. This means; stop taking control for an established fact, but rather as a 
possibility. Hence, the purpose of this chapter will be to show how the reduction of 







6.1 FREEDOM, AUTONOMY AND SELF-CONTROL 
 
 
In her introduction to Control and Freedom, Chun reminds us the etymology of 
freedom. She thus indicates: 
 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the Old English frei (derived from Sanskrit) 
meant dear and described all those close or related to the head of the family (hence friends). 
Conversely in Latin, libertas denoted the legal state of being free versus enslaved and was later 
extended to children (liberi), meaning literally the free members of the household. Those who 
are one’s friends are free; those who are not are slaves. But, like love, freedom exceeds the 
subject. Liberty is linked to human subjectivity; freedom is not. The Declaration of 
Independence, for example, describes men as having liberty and the nation as being free. Free 
will — “the quality of being free from the control of fate or necessity”— may first have been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Chun defends the right to be vulnerable, it is interesting to note that Zuboff seems rather on the side of 
safety, as she seeks a “right to sanctuary” from this tentacling and unprecedented form of power that 
regulates both the real and virtual world.  
See: Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, Updating to Remain the Same: Habitual New Media (Cambridge 
Massachusetts, London, England: The MIT Press, 2016) 
Soshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New 
Frontier of Power (London: Profile Books, 2018) 
517 Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, Control and Freedom: Power and Paranoia in the Age of Fiber Optics 
(Cambridge Massachusetts, London, England: The MIT Press, 2006) viii 
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attributed to human will, but Newtonian physics attributes freedom— degrees of freedom, free 
bodies— to objects518. 
 
 
She thus insists that freedom was, in its very etymology, not bound to institutions, nor 
did it used to designate a self-determining and autonomous subject. Moreover, 
freedom was not yet coined as a value. Instead, freedom originally resonated with 
priceless marks of affection. The aim of her book is to stress how with time, the 
concept of freedom came to be separated with concepts of equality and fraternity to be 
rather understood in terms of liberty of movement (exemplified in the freeway or the 
figure of the explorer in the cyberspace of 1990’s, which was sold as a mass-medium 
for freedom), before suffering from the rules of commerce. According to Chun, this 
pairing of freedom with economy cheapened the very notion of freedom to a mere 
commodity exchangeable for a fee (this is particularly true with war slogans such as 
“freedom comes with a price”). More recently, Chun argues that freedom has conflated 




Before moving on Chun’s criticisms on the paranoia of control, few things need 
to be said about freedom and its historical conflation with control. The fact that 
freedom has been repeatedly casted as navigability, self-control is not peculiar to the 
contemporary world.  
 
Let us for example go back to the Greeks for whom the concept of autonomy 
is understood as a synonym for independence and self-governance. In Plato’s 
Alcibiades, we learn for example that one is recognized as an autonomous being when 
one is granted the right to participate in the life of the city, so that autonomy is the key 
attribute of the adult. However, adulthood is not a sufficient criterion in this case, for 
one needs not only to be of a certain age, but of a certain social class. In Plato’s work, 
only the citizen is considered autonomous, which thus excludes women and slaves.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
518 Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, Control and Freedom: Power and Paranoia in the Age of Fiber Optics 
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Autonomy is linked to mastery. This is particularly true in Plato’s tripartite 
conception of the soul and the metaphor of the chariot: 
 
We will liken the soul to the composite nature of a pair of winged horses and a charioteer. [… 
] the charioteer of the human soul drives a pair, one of the horses is noble and of noble breed, 
but the other quite the opposite in breed and character. Therefore, in our case the driving is 
necessarily difficult and troublesome520.  
 
For Plato, autonomy is not the exclusive object of reason. Instead, it is described as 
the capacity to navigate wisely between the lower and the higher parts of the human 
soul. It is about finding the right balance between reason and passion, so that autonomy 
does not necessarily equate to pure rationality. However, the balance between the two 
is always on the verge of being compromised, which is why the exercise is 
characterized as ‘troublesome’. In this respect, practices of self-realization are 
elaborated through forms of coercion that maintain this fragile state of equilibrium.  
 
Autonomy is represented by the figure of the charioteer. It stands above reason 
and passion, and governs the activity of self-design. In this respect, to be autonomous 
does not make sense, for example, because it is not about being, but about acting, the 
same way it does not belong to the innate, but the acquired. For the Ancients, as we 
have seen in the first section of the thesis when comparing Stiegler and Foucault’s 
interpretation of care, the ideal of autonomy serves as a motivation for the elaboration 
of an ethics of self. Indeed, to problematize autonomy necessitates the problematizing 
of a certain notion of subjectivity, itself indispensable to think responsibility. 
However, autonomy was at that time understood primarily in terms of lack of 
dependence. One was therefore autonomous when alone, self-sufficient, and 
emotionally indifferent towards external causes. This attitude of indifference was 
especially prevalent with the Stoics, for example521. Aristotle suggests for his part in 
Nichomachean Ethics that independence (autarkeia) constitutes the key element for 
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aestheticize a careless relationship to the world, for example. Pierre Hadot writes: “For the Stoics, too, 
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happiness. This means that the ideal of autonomy can only be attained through the 
undertaking of a discipline over oneself and a distancing with others.  
 
While practices of care acknowledge the presence of the other, they remain 
mostly designed for the individual, insofar as Ancient practices of care encourage the 
individual to take responsibility for herself first. Once again, it is the principle of (self)-
mastery that regulates the tekhne tou biou. On this point, Foucault insists:  
 
The apprehension is concentrated above all on the crossover point of the agitations and 
troubles, taking account of the fact that one had best correct the soul if one does not want the 
body to get the better of it, and rectify the body if one wants it to remain completely in control 
of itself522. 
 
However, it is not always enough to control oneself, one may also need to exert a 
certain power over the other. This is the case in Plato’s Alcibiades, as Alcibiades is 
told by Socrates that in order to be a good politician, he needs to take care, that is, to 
develop a tekhne, which will enable him to govern the entire city.  
Overall, the ‘techniques of the self’ formulated by the Ancients put less the 
emphasis on the self than on power, insofar as the free individual is the one who 
exercises power. As Deleuze states, we are confronted with the Greeks by practices of 
subjectivation without subjects523.  
 
  The concern for the I arose with modern philosophy and Descartes, so that 
subjectivation disappears to the profit of the knowing subject and with it, the whole 
conception of ethics is turned upside down. If in Ancient philosophy the understanding 
of autonomy is mostly turned towards actions (praxis), we owe to modern philosophers 
like Kant its association with a morality of intentions. The Dictionary of 
Untranslatables summarizes the historical and definitional complexity of the notion 
of praxis as follows: 
 
The term praxis [πϱᾶξις]—always seen in modern languages as imported from Greek, even 
though German and to a certain extent Italian have naturalized it (die Praxis [with a German 
plural, die Praxen], la prassi)—is central in contemporary philosophy, where it designates, 
depending on the case, an alternative to the points of view and values of being of logos [λόγος] 
or language, of theory or speculation, of form or structure, and so on. It refers, then, either to 
an Aristotelian version (Nichomachean Ethics) that opposes it to poiêsis [ποίησις] and relates 
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it to an ethics and a politics of “prudence” (phronêsis [φϱόνησις]), or to a Marxist version 
(Theses on Feuerbach) that identifies it with the effort to transform the existing world rooted 
in labor and class struggle (umwälzende or revolutionäre Praxis). Between these two poles 
there is a Kantian version of the practical element of action (das Praktische) and the “primacy 
of practical reason,” which, by assigning to philosophy an infinite task of moralizing human 
nature (a task called “pragmatic” [pragmatisch]), consummates the break with naturalism and 
prefigures the dilemmas of collective historical action524. 
 
 
Here, autonomy is described as the inner capacity to determine whether or not one’s 
conduct is morally good and therefore, universally applicable. We thus witness a 
reversal in the conception of autonomy. Indeed, the activity of self-governance is not 
oriented towards actions and their consequences. Instead, it is one’s personal faith that 
serves as a guiding principle. It means also that being autonomous is not a matter of 
being efficient but authentic. As such, autonomy is not something that must be 
appropriated or exercised, but acknowledged by the subject.  
 
Autonomy therefore appears as an innate quality of the human that 
differentiates her from the animal. Kant explains in this regard that autonomy is rooted 
in the noumenal self, while feelings and inclinations belong to the phenomenal self. 
Here, the opposition between autonomy and heteronomy is not any different from the 
opposition we find in the Ancients between reason and passion. But while the Greeks 
thought autonomy in terms of mastery, Kant puts the stress on rationality, judgment 
and intentions. In this respect, one moves from a discursivity of action — which is 
constitutive of ethics — to that of agency — which is the object of morality. This said, 
it occurs nonetheless that both Ancient and Modern philosophy tends to stress 
autonomy as a lack of dependence, whether it is a lack of dependence from others or 
from one’s personal inclinations525. Overall, Kant’s moral philosophy suggests that 
autonomy necessitates freedom, which is its condition of possibility: 
 
 
The concept of freedom is the central normative and metaphysical concept in Kant’s 
philosophy. Freedom of choice and action from constraint by external forces but also even 
from one’s own mere inclinations, something that can be achieved not by the elimination of 
inclinations, which is not possible for human beings, but by the subjection of inclination to the 
rule of reason and its demand for universalizability, which Kant ultimately calls “autonomy”, 
“the property of the will by which it is a law to itself” (G 4:440), is the ultimate value for Kant, 
the only value that can be an end in itself and has a dignity beyond all price (4:435–6). Freedom 
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of the will, the ability to initiate an action spontaneously, independently of determination by 
mere laws of nature, so that every human agent has the capacity to act in accordance with the 
moral law no matter what might seem to be predicted by her entire prior history, is for Kant 
only a logical possibility in theoretical philosophy but an inescapable postulate of pure 
practical reason, “the necessary condition of … the complete fulfillment of the moral law”. For 
Kant, the relation between these two concepts, autonomy as our ultimate value and freedom of 
the will as our ultimate metaphysical property, although one assertible only on practical 
grounds, is intimate, to say the least – the unconditional moral law that enjoins us above all 
else to preserve and promote freedom of action “is merely the self-consciousness of a pure 
practical reason, this being identical with the positive concept of freedom” (5:29)although his 




Kant’s transcendental idealism conceives freedom as an innate self-active reason, 
while autonomy acts out as its norm. Autonomy is therefore the spontaneous 
subjection to a self-imposed law. In other words, one could say that autonomy is the 
application of freedom and that one cannot be autonomous if not radically free.  
 
Kant teaches us that freedom constitutes the specificity of the human. It is 
because we are free that we are, unlike animals, embedded with dignity. Hence, 
following the law of reason is a way for human beings to elevate themselves to the 
type of being they already are and ought to be. Here, two things must be noted; on one 
hand, freedom can only be exercised if forced upon the individual (though, in this case, 
the coercion is internal to the subject and not external, as it is the case for the Greeks). 
On the other hand, and this may be more significant: Kant’s account of freedom 
provides us with a perception of freedom which is not entirely free or boundless, 
insofar as it depends on the existence of the subject. Indeed, in order to be recognized, 
actualized, or experienced, freedom cannot be detached from a certain 
acknowledgement of identity as its prior condition. This impossibility to detach 
freedom from the subject is a difficulty that Sartre will encounter too and will leave 
him no other choice than embracing freedom as an existential burden constitutive of 
the human.  In both cases, freedom is coerced and coercive, alienated and alienating. 
The fact that they both interpret the gift of freedom as a duty to be, insofar as to be 
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 Stiegler argues for his part that autonomy springs from heteronomy. Aiming to 
desacralize the concept of autonomy, Stiegler is equally reluctant to develop a theory 
that asserts the primacy of a self-constitutive subject. According to Stiegler, to argue 
for the pre-existence of an autonomous subject— as if an ego prior to experience could 
exist— would be untenable because of its metaphysical undertone. Instead, one must 
depart from heteronomy of technics: 
Now, my point of view is that pure autonomy does not exist. My own position – and it is very 
close to Derrida’s – is that there is never an autonomy with- out a link to a heteronomy, i.e., 
with a link to technics. Because for example, in Greek society people were creating their 
autonomy through a therapeutic use of the pharmakon of writing, i.e., of the technique of 
writing. So, autonomy is always a limited autonomy, never a pure autonomy. Now, all my 
questions are extremely classical in fact. But, with a very small change, in that it is impossible 
to oppose autonomy and heteronomy527.  
This means not only that autonomy depends on external constraints, but that it is 
acquired throughout one’s internalization of automatisms. I have already stressed this 
issue in chapter 3. 
 
The problem lies not so much in Stiegler’s attempt to make of autonomy a 
matter of discipline, for these themes appear already in the Ancient’s ethics of care. 
Yet, Stiegler gives the issue a new turn when throwing autonomy into the hands of 
technics. Indeed, his philosophical move suggests that freedom is no longer the 
attribute of the human but that of technology. It means in this respect that freedom is 
not the outcome of a decision but the effect of a technical framework.  More broadly, 
it means that freedom is programmable. This assumption is dangerous, for it leads 
Stiegler to mostly perceive freedom as a technological problem that needs to be solved 
by the means of technologies.  
 
 Indeed, I have explained earlier that our very experience of freedom is, 
according to Stiegler, presently conditioned by media of psychopower which promote 
cynical entertainment. In this respect, freedom has become devaluated, turned into 
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merchandise. In other words, freedom is used as a form of propaganda for cultural 
capitalism, insofar as freedom equates entertainment. On this point, Stiegler comes 
close to Galloway and his criticism of ludic capitalism “that has taken over the old 
concepts of discipline528”. Stiegler thus proposes to restore freedom and autonomy 
through the reactivation techniques of care, which, as stated above, are closely tied to 
ideologies of control and mastery.  
 
Chun’s work proposes to investigate the effects of the ideological pairing of 
freedom and control. Such pairing leads us to believe that freedom is controllable. 
However, she precisely argues that this runs the risk of turning the political problem 
of freedom into a mere technological issue that is simply solvable through the 
implementations of procedures without taking into account that these procedures may 
fail to operate or grasp clearly the nature of the problem.  
 
Yet technologies cannot adequately respond to social problems. Chun uses 
child online pornography as an example: 
 
Cyberporn became a pressing public danger in 1995. The CDA passed the U.S. Senate with an 
overwhelming majority after senators perused tightly bound printouts of ‘‘perverse’’ images 
that Senator James Exon’s ‘‘friend’’ had downloaded. Subsequently passed by Congress, the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 both deregulated the telecommunications industry—
allegedly opening access for all citizens to the Internet—and regulated Internet content for the 
first time. Time and Newsweek published special features on cyberporn with the respective 
titles, ‘‘On a Screen Near You, Cyberporn: A New Study Shows How Pervasive and Wild It 
Really Is’’ and ‘‘No Place for Kids? A Parent’s Guide to Sex on the Internet.’’ Philip Elmer-
Dewitt’s ‘‘On a Screen Near You, Cyberporn’’ launched a particularly heated online and off-
line debate over pornography’s pervasiveness on the so-called information superhighway, and 
was accused of launching the ‘‘Great Internet Sex Panic of 1995”.529 
 
And then concludes:  
 
Anxieties over cyberporn exceed the simple worry over the present conditions. In order to 
understand cyberporn’s ramifications, we are told to imagine a catastrophic future of 
unbearable and uncontrollable contact. This call assumes that catastrophe could be avoided if 
pornography were simply purged from this medium.530 
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Overall, she argues that the panic inspired by the possibility to be exposed to 
pornographic images raised the issue of increasing state regulations in order to protect 
internet users, and more specifically children, from inappropriate contents. This fear 
of perversion, Chun argues, boldly assumes a correspondence between the medium 
and the message. But it also assumes a correspondence between the user’s true identity 
and the content he or she is seeing, as if watching child pornography meant necessarily 
being pedophile. This technology-determinist account of social issues equally reduces 
pornography and pedophilia into a mere question of contents availability that only 
needs to be suppressed to be considered solved.  As such, Chun states that freedom 
cannot be defined as a pattern of decisions and solutions. She will argue instead, using 
the work of Jean-Luc Nancy531, that freedom is what engenders decisions. To confine 




6.3 THE EYE OF POWER 
 
 
The key word to Chun’s argument is paranoia, as she argues that our current 
ideologies of freedom stem from the fear of control and surveillance, which ironically, 
only reinforces the reality of control. Fiber-optic networks, she argues, contributes to 
spread a visual culture in which one is under the constant impression of being seen and 
thus increases the fear of being caught doing something reprehensible or socially 
unaccepted:  
 
Online, one is not simply a spectator-citizen-commodity owner. Even when ‘‘just viewing’’ or 
‘‘lurking,’’ one actively sends and receives data (all spectators are still visible—the degree of 
their visibility, or more properly their traceability, is the issue). Dreams of vision from afar 
coexist with the media’s relentless drive toward circulation. As I asserted in the introduction, 
fiber-optic networks threaten to break the glass so that nothing screens the subject from the 
circulation of images. Instead of only celebrities being caught in the glare of publicity, average 
citizens find themselves blinded and harassed532.  
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This architecture of visibility offered by fiber-optic networks is often mistaken for 
actual surveillance in which the internet is polarized between spectators and 
spectacles, lurkers and images, predators and preys. Though it is tempting to portray 
the internet as a cinematic panopticon filled with voyeurs, Chun believes that it only 
perpetuates the paranoid confusion between visibility and surveillance, possibility and 
actuality.  
 
I will uncover this issue by looking at Foucault’s reading of Bentham’s model 
of the panopticon533, but before that, I would like to go back to Sartre. Indeed, I believe 
that the anxiety of being seen could be traced back to his work and his account of the 
gaze, which was already acknowledged as paranoiac at the time.534 The purpose of this 
first paragraph is to show how the paranoia of surveillance pinpointed by Chun denotes 
a Sartrean conception of the gaze and a Foucauldian understanding of panopticism.   
 
Presented through and through as an external negation in Sartre’s philosophy, 
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Yet, for Bentham, the panopticon was first imagined as plural as there is not just one model of 
panoticism. Besides, while Foucault presents the panopticon as a pervasive means of social control, 
Bentham’s own theory minimized the actual power of the panopticon, insofar as social control cannot 
be performed through its sole means.  
 
See Beyond Foucault: New Perspectives on Bentham’s Panopticon, ed. Anne Brunon-Ernst (Farnham, 
England; Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate, 2012) 
 
534 Leo Fretz, ‘Individuality in Sartre’s Philosophy’, in The Cambridge Companion to Sartre, ed. 
Christina Howells (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1992) 
	   210	  
the other appears to the Cogito as not being me535. The subject exists as body in a 
situation and experiences the world as phenomena that is both irremediably close and 
far from her. In this respect, the other “belongs to my distance536”. The reverse is also 
true; I am made object through the eyes of the other. Hence, what constitutes my 
primary relationship towards the other is that of object-ness. What fundamentally 
crystallizes my encounter with the other is the experience of the look, for seeing means 
being seen. Sartre indeed defines the gaze as the essential condition for one to feel 
ashamed or vulnerable. It is because I am being looked at, because I am visible, that I 
experience such feelings. In this respect, the gaze is traumatic; 
The look which the eyes manifest, no matter what kind of eyes they are, is a pure reference to 
myself. What I apprehend immediately when I hear the branches crackling behind me is not 
that there is someone there; it is that I am vulnerable, that I have a body which can be hurt, that 
I occupy a place and that I cannot in any case escape from the space in which I am without 
defense — in short, that I am seen537. 
 
The same way Plato suggests in the Republic538 that one, once turned invisible, would 
easily commit a crime because of the impossibility to be seen and therefore to be 
punished, Sartre teaches us that the gaze restrains the individual, insofar as the gaze is 
the vector of a moral judgement. In Sartre’s work, the other is always a limit to my 
freedom, but also a threat.  
Sartre’s account of the gaze already gives us a foretaste of the paranoia of 
surveillance insofar the other is a “judge539” and a source of anxiety that pushes the 
individual to behave540. As objectifying power, the gaze enables me to constitute 
myself, that is, to subjectivize myself through the way I am seen as body-for-others. 
Sartre writes: 
I grasp the Other’s look at the very center of my act as the solidification and alienation of my 
possibilities. In fear or in anxious or prudent anticipation, I perceive that these possibilities 
which I am and which are the condition of my transcendence are given also to another, given 
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as about to be transcendence in turn by his own possibilities. The Other as a look is only that 
— my transcendence transcended. Of course I still am my possibilities in the mode of non-
thetic consciousness of these possibilities. But at the same time the look alienates them from 
me541. 
 
In this respect, the power of observation is, in Sartre’s work, reduced to one’s capacity 
to cast judgment on his peers542. As I have suggested in the first chapter of this thesis, 
Sartre fails to fully incorporate the other in the activity of self-making, which is still 
caught in “the tragic loneliness of the cogito543”. Yet, what could be added at this stage 
is that Sartre’s philosophy already theorizes the theme of visibility (through the 
experience of the look) as something oppressive.  Having said so, Sartre always make 
sure to dissociate power from freedom. However, this dissociation collapses with 
Foucault.  
I have explained earlier when contrasting Sartre with Foucault on the process 
of subjectivation, that for Foucault, the other produces more than he represses. While 
the Sartrean philosophy suggests that I constitute myself against the other, the 
Foucauldian perspective puts the emphasis on how I constitute myself with and 
through the other. The former ruminates at length on how the other turns me into an 
object, whereas the latter claims that despite the normalizing power of the gaze, the 
individual produces herself as subject.544 Whereas Sartre theorizes the gaze of the other 
as essentially objectifying, Foucault thinks the dynamic of observation as 
subjectifying. He thus ties power and freedom together. Here is where Bentham’s 
panopticon comes in as useful to understand how surveillance plays out.  
Drawing on Bentham’s model of the perfect prison, Foucault introduces the 
panopticon as an eloquent illustration of the productive virtues of the look. Bentham’s 
panopticon (pan meaning “all”, and opticon meaning “sight”) is a perimeter building 
in the form of a ring with a tower at its center. As a device of behavior control, the 
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building is divided into cells, each equipped with a window facing the central tower. 
In this context, prisoners are the objects of constant surveillance, despite their jailors 
not being visible. Thus, they are seen without being able to see. In this architectural 
model of surveillance, Foucault acknowledges indeed that the individual is considered 
as object of information and not subject in communication. The effect of the 
panopticon is to instigate in the prisoner the feeling of being seen, of being vulnerable 
to a faceless gaze. It is cruel because it is asymmetrical. Foucault writes in this respect 
that “one is totally seen, without ever seeing; in the central tower, one sees everything 
without ever being seen545”.  Becoming conscious of his or her visibility, the prisoner 
polices herself. In other words, the inmate disciplines her body and her attitude, 
through the sensation of the external gaze which is destined to become a generalized 
function of the social body. This is because, for Foucault, the panoptic schema is that 
of a seeing machine that “gives power of mind over mind546”. But its aim is directed 
towards productivity and efficiency.  
 
It does so not for power itself, nor for the immediate salvation of a threatened society; its aim 
is to strengthen the social forces— to increase production, to develop the economy, spread 
education, raise the level of public morality; to increase and multiply547.  
The gaze is normative.  It is an external force, exerted upon the individual, a force 
which the latter responds to in becoming aware of his body as the central point of the 
circulation of power. But it does not mean that the individual strictly complies or 
submits herself to the gaze. Self is not a mere docile body passively modelled through 
the fluctuations of random social forces. Rather, it is the product of an active, though 
disciplinary, self-fashioning, insofar as power designates what turns individuals into 
subjects.  As Foucault reminds us: “There are two meanings of the word subject: 
subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a 
conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which 
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subjugates and makes subject to548”. In the case of the panopticon, the prisoner enters 
in the game of observation, of the visible and the invisible. Despite being disembodied 
or faceless, the gaze makes itself visible for it is somehow personified and materialized 




But in fact, it is just a sign, not an irrefutable proof. As stresses Chun, the 
inmate cannot verify if there is a prison guard in the tower549. However, this is enough 
for the inmate to modify her behavior and be cautious. This uncertainty, Chun argues, 
is what enables power to effectively work on the individual, not actual observance. In 
other words, power feeds on paranoia and the panopticon epitomizes this reality. 
According to Foucault, the individual learns to constitute herself through the 
dichotomy between the seen and the unseen, the controllable and the uncontrollable. 
The prisoner may discipline herself but only does so in relation with the eye of power, 
that is, in appropriating, interiorizing the gaze which may or may not be enacted upon 
her. However, Foucault prefers to insist on the actuality of the gaze: 
 
In reality power is only exercised at a cost. Obviously, there is an economic cost, and Bentham 
talks about this. How many overseers will the Panopticon need? How much will the machine 
then cost to run? But there is also a specifically political cost. If you are too violent, you risk 
provoking revolts (…) In contrast to that you have the system of surveillance, which on the 
contrary involves very little expense. There is no need for arms, physical violence, material 
constraints. Just a gaze. An inspecting gaze, a gaze which each individual under its weight will 
end by interiorizing to the point that he is his own overseer, each individual thus exercising 
this surveillance over, and against, himself. A superb formula: power exercised continuously 
and for what turns out to be a minimal cost550.  
As such, it is through movements of visibility/invisibility that the individual 
subjectivizes herself as docile body. This leads Foucault to brand the panopticon as an 
apparatus of actual surveillance.  Once again, if one considers, as Chun does, that the 
presence of a surveilling prison guard cannot be proven, but only supposed, then it 
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goes the same for the status of the inmate as being surveilled. In conclusion, Bentham’s 
panopticon is to her more an allegory of the paranoia of control, than of actual control. 
According to Chun, this stance is equally true for the internet. In theory, the internet 
appears as a giant tool for surveillance, yet, real-time spying is very rare and 
cyberspace too vast for the user to feel the inspector’s presence. As such, the internet-
user cannot internalize the panoptic gaze for the chances to get caught doing something 
reprehensible remain quite small. 
Chun claims on the one hand that the internet illustrates the paranoia of control 
conveyed by Foucauldian studies on the panopticon. On the other hand, she does not 
think the internet fits the criteria of the panopticon. The reason for this is that 
Bentham’s panopticon was geared towards discipline. The internet, on the other hand, 
rather favors deviant behavior because of the impression of invisibility551 and 
anonymity, which are constitutive of the medium. Unlike the inmate, the internet user 
does not wonder if the prison guard is looking at her. Instead, she wonders if someone 
could look. Being observed is only a possibility, not a fact. Chun writes in this respect: 
“whether or not someone will or can access your files (…) is fundamentally 





6.4 CONTROL OVER FREEDOM 
 
 
While Galloway argues that “there is no freedom from control”553, Chun invites 
us to think freedom beyond the scope of control and thus warns us: 
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This twinning of control and freedom subverts the promise of freedom, turning it from a force 
that simultaneously breaks bonds and makes relation possible to the dream of a gated 
community writ large. This subversion of freedom, however, does not forever render freedom 
innocuous, for if anything cannot be controlled it is freedom. The emergence of the Internet as 
a mass medium, this book argues, epitomizes this new structure of power and the possibilities 
for a freedom without control554. 
 
 
In this case, Chun does not deny, or reject, the link between power and freedom. 
However, she argues that attributing a causality between the two phenomena is 
symptomatic of the ideology of control which itself is the consequence of the influence 
of Foucault and Deleuze in the field of new media. Their account of power relations 
suffers from a suffocating determinism insofar as they underestimate the possibility of 
disruption and are oblivious to the unpredictable and the irrational. Put otherwise, 
Foucault and Deleuze are paranoid because, according to Chun, they give too much 
power to power555. 
 
Deleuze’s mistake, she argues, is to not take into account the vulnerabilities of 
technologies and to conflate “possibility with probability556”, which is the conflation 
of what may or may not happen with what is likely to happen. Hence, technologies 
may be utilized as instruments of control, but that does not necessarily mean that they 
will. From her standpoint though, those who have read Foucault and Deleuze take their 
considerations too literally and contribute to the reinforcement of the ideology of 
control.  According to Chun, this propensity to make of freedom the result of control 
is both etymological and historical, for it has been long understood as belonging to the 
realm of objects, rather than as an innate quality of the subject.  
 
As a result, one wants to exercise control over freedom. Cyberculture exemplifies well 
the dream of control over freedom according to Chun: 
 
The myth of superagent users, who dismantle and engage the code, who are explorers rather 
than explored, screens the lurker’s vulnerable position. This myth tries to convince the user-
cum-lurker that it is a flâneur, who leaves no traces as it observes, or when not “lurking”,  it is 
the detective, the active searcher of information. This myth both emphasizes user control and 
fosters paranoia, for if the user can go anywhere it wants, cannot someone else with more 
knowledge and skill track the user? In order to circumvent this paranoid doubt, or any 
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admission of vulnerability, Internet promoters produce spectacular spectacles, or at the very 
least sites that emphasize the agency of the user and not the server…557 
 
 
But what constitutes Chun’s object of concern is that not only are we keen on 
problematizing freedom as a quality that needs to be earned and owned, it also 
demands, as a commodity, to be secured. In fact, freedom is too hastily associated with 
safety, so that one is free if one is not exposed to danger. Throughout her work, Chun 
deciphers what appears to be the paradox of freedom. On one hand, as we explained 
above, freedom is produced throughout systems of control. On the other hand, the 
existence of these systems of control has for one sole justification freedom itself. 
Hence, the ideology of control shows clearly its limits for it is incapable of 
conceptually understanding itself other than through freedom as its motivation.  
 
Chun asserts for her part that freedom constitutes the condition of possibility 
for the deployment of procedures of control instead of the reverse. Overall, Chun’s 
book can be described as an attempt to emancipate freedom from discourses of control. 







6.5 THE COST OF FREEDOM 
 
 
Chun believes that there is a paradox in the way we conceive freedom. Indeed, 
if one affirms freedom as necessarily coupled with control and agrees that being free 
comes at a certain cost, one actually jeopardizes freedom by the very act of 
guaranteeing it. Hence, the paradox of freedom is the belief that the cost of freedom is 
freedom itself: 
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During the Afghanistan War, the second Gulf War and the subsequent occupation, t-shirts, 
bumper stickers, and politicians reminded us, “Freedom is not Free.”  This phrase, engraved 
on the Korean War Memorial in Washington, DC, would seem simply to say that freedom 
comes at the cost of soldiers’ lives and civilian sacrifices.  Freedom is not without cost; 
someone has to pay a price.  This phrase, however, is open to another reading: when freedom 
is conflated with security, freedom loses its meaning—freedom is no longer free.  If freedom 
is reduced to a gated community writ large, or becomes the ideological watchword of a national 
security state, then it can turn into nothing more than the partner of, or the alibi for, control.  The 
very phrase “freedom is not free” can make freedom unfree when it calls on people to accept 
unfreedom as the cost of freedom558. 
 
 
The other consequence of the conflation of freedom and control is that of safety. While 
the Ancients think freedom as a coercive practice geared towards independence from 
social constraints, we are now confronted with a vision of freedom geared towards 
dependence. This understanding of freedom may have been marked by the Hobbesian 
model of the social contract.  Indeed, Hobbes’ portrayal of the social contract is an 
example on how freedom is easily abandoned for the promise of safety. Wherever the 
state of nature is depicted as a state of war of everyone against everyone, the 
establishing of a political power comes as a salvation. By presenting us a state of mere 
survival, Hobbes suggests first of all that the acquaintance with absolute freedom may 
not be desirable. Plus, it is implied that the experience of freedom is incompatible with 
the possibility of attaining the realm of a more complete existence. To exist, one must 
make some concessions. This is what happens in his model of the social contract in 
which individuals choose to become subjected to a sovereign. In Hobbes’ description 
of the state of nature, individuals choose to secure themselves at the cost of freedom. 
They chose obedience to flee their responsibilities, the same way they chose the 
restrictions of their movements to minimize the risks of life-threatening encounters.   
In that sense, freedom is bargained for comfort because the experience of freedom is 
unbearable.  
 
According to Chun, such a pessimistic account of freedom still prevails today 
and contributes to the overall devaluation of liberty for that of safety.  “Freedom is not 
free” is the motto our contemporary society complies to, she argues. In this respect, 
procedures are put in place to minimize risk, so that we are confronted with a society 
that has developed a low tolerance towards failure and vulnerability559. This is 
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rendered even more evident with the rise of the internet as a mass medium, argues 
Chun. The information age deploys a discursivity of freedom through empowerment. 
One is safe while surfing the web because one is not exposed to “fissures, scars and 
other markings560”. In this respect, procedural freedom functions through measures of 
suppression. One is free online because the principal vectors of inequalities and 
discriminations, namely, gender, race, ages and infirmities, are suppressed, effaced, or 
edited. In escaping and remodeling one’s body, one does indeed participate in the 
remodeling of her social and physical condition, Chun suggests. But this model of 
empowerment, she says, is negative in the sense that it conceals difference, turns the 
visible into the invisible, and in doing so, contributes to justify inequalities in the 
physical world.  
 
 
To illustrate her point, Chun refers to MCI’s anthem commercial that aired in 
1997. MCI was a former American telecommunication company. It launched a 
campaign promoting its services by emphasizing the internet as “the medium of the 
minds”561. This commercial features “variously raced, gendered, aged and physically 
challenged persons chanting in succession and in concert”562. The point of the 
commercial is to show that these differences do not matter online because age, race 
and genders are erased. But instead of promoting tolerance, it validates the attitude of 
discriminators in encouraging those discriminated against to keep a low profile. Said 
otherwise, the internet eradicates the risk of discrimination, but does not eradicate the 
problem of discrimination.  
 
Significantly, this rewriting of the internet as emancipatory, as “freeing” oneself from one’s 
body, also naturalizes racism. The logic framing MCI’s commercial reduce to what they can’t 
see, can’t hurt you. Since race, gender, age, and infirmities are only skin-deep (or so this logic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
But also Badiou who writes: 
Philosophy requires that we throw the dice against the obsession for security, that we interrupt the 
calculus of life determined by this obsession. But what chance has it to win, except in the name of a 
value which ordains this risk and gives to it a minimum of consistency and weight? And there again I 
believe it is vain to imagine that, in the absence of a principle of truth, one can oppose to the calculus 
of life an existential gamble, which will give rise to something that can be called a liberty. 
See: Alain Badiou ‘The desire for Philosophy and the Contemporary World’, Lacan.com (2006) 
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goes), moving to a text-based medium makes them— and thus the discrimination that stems 
from them— disappear. Although “no race” rather than “no racism” leaves open the possibility 
of racism without physical marker of “race”, this formulation effectively conceals individual 
and institutional responsibility for discrimination, positing discrimination as a problem that the 
discriminated must solve563. 
 
 
What is truly empowered are the network itself, the internet, and virtuality, but not 
individuals. Here, Chun demonstrates how technologies are the enabler of a social 
justice, without however endorsing the role of the judge, for even judging would be 
taking the risk to commit a mistake. And systems of control do not tolerate mistakes. 
There is no decision to be made, for in eliminating the risk, there is no possibility for 
the injustice to be enacted.  On Chun’s view, technology does not solve sociological 
problems, it distances itself from these problems, ignores or minimizes them. The 
apparent fluidity of virtuality is only symptomatic of the physical world’s own 
inflexibility. Hence, the internet contributes to prolonging and reinforcing the paradox 
of freedom, instead of bypassing or abolishing it.  
 
In this respect, the rise of control is the response to the failures of “both liberty 
and discipline”, Chun claims. The passage of freedom from an institutional model to 
a protocological model corresponds to the individual’s progressive disengagement 
from herself as a responsible being, capable of making decisions and fail. In other 
words, technologies relieve us from the task we do not want to endorse anymore for 
the simple reason that we think ourselves not capable of doing so564 .  
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564 Alain Badiou summarizes the contention as follows:  
 
The first problem is that of identity; the second, that of agency. The mind-body problem derives 
for the most part from the former, and the free will versus determinism debate from the latter. 
Poststructuralists have concentrated almost exclusively on a critique of the first problem, 
arguing that there is no solution to the problem of the identity of the subject because the subject 
has no substantial identity: the illusion of an underlying identity is produced by the very 
representational mechanism employed by the subject in its effort to grasp its own identity. The 
same line of argument is also applied to the identity of any entity thus including the subject 
within the domain of a general ontology (…) As for agency - philosophy's second fundamental 
problem in the thought of the subject - the consequence of poststructuralists’ almost exclusive 
concentration on the first problem has been that the critics of poststructuralism have had an 
easy pitch: all they have had to do is to accuse the poststructuralists of robbing the subject of 
agency: if there is no self-identical subject, then what is the ground for autonomous rational 
action? This is what lies behind the infamous jibe that poststructuralism leads down a slippery 
slope to apoliticism. 
 
Alain Badiou, Infinite Thought, trans. Oliver Feltham (London: Continuum, 2003) p.4-5 
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According to Chun, the coupling of freedom and control is philosophically 
devastating because it generates disinvested individuals on an ethical and moral level; 
it generates a system in which models of empowerment produce powerless individuals 
and in which freedom is reduced to the avoidance of danger through the multiplication 
of regulations.  
 
 
6.5 INITIATING FREEDOM 
 
 
Whereas conceptions of control-as-freedom claim that freedom is enabled by 
power-structures, Chun suggests by the means of Nancy’s work, that the very 
possibility of the existence of power-structures is traversed through and through by 
freedom.  
 
Freedom does not produce anything, but only comes to produce itself there (it is not poiesis, 
but praxis), in the sense that an actor, in order to be the actor he is, produces himself on the 
stage…Power has an origin, freedom is a beginning. Freedom does not cause coming-to-being, 
it is an initiality of being. Freedom is what is initially, or (singularly) self-initiating being. 
Freedom is the existence of the existent as such which means that it is the initiality of its 
“setting into position”.565 
 
 
If freedom never ceases to produce itself, it thus means that it never ceases to be 
applied, though its application can take different forms and follow unexpected 
trajectories. One of these trajectories is that of control. However, control is not the 
natural expression of freedom. It is not its consequence either. Throughout her reading 
of Nancy, Chun makes it clear that control is not caused by freedom.  
 
Societies of control-freedom such as ours are grounded on technologies more 
than on a consistent politics. In these regimes, individuals are resigned to their fate and 
it is this resignation that leads them to accept unfreedom as the price to pay in order to 
be safe. The current paranoid mind-set convinces us that control procedures are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
565 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Experience of Freedom, translated by Bridget McDonald (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1993) p.74 *as quoted by Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, Control and Freedom: Power and 
Paranoia in the Age of Fiber Optics (Cambridge Massachusetts, London, England: The MIT Press, 
2006) p.293 
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inevitable if we wish to exercise our freedom. Yet, Chun argues that the existence, or 
the reality, of freedom does not strictly depends on its application, or on physical 
markers, as it is often the case with Foucault’s description of power. Instead, freedom 
is nothing. Drawing on Jean-Luc Nancy, Chun agrees to the definition of freedom as 
transcendental spacing: 
 
Freedom is that which spaces and singularizes— or which singularizes itself— because it is 
freedom of being in its withdrawal. Freedom “precedes” in the sense that being cedes before 
every birth to existence: it withdraws. Freedom is the withdrawal of being, but the withdrawal 
of being is the nothingness of this being, which is the being of freedom. This is why freedom 
is not, but it frees being and frees from being, all of which can be rewritten here as: freedom 
withdraws being and gives relation566. 
 
 
Said otherwise, and this is what Chun retains from her reading of Nancy, freedom is 
apodictic and is grounded in the thrownness of existence; it is not the action but the 
possibility of the action itself, the same way it is not being, but the possibility of being.  
 
 
In rejecting the principle of causality between freedom and control, Chun 
claims that control is free because it has been put in place freely. In other words, it has 
been initiated. The difference between causality and initiality is the same that separates 
the notion of origin and birth. Arendt argues in The Human Condition: 
 
Without the articulation of natality, we would be doomed to swing forever in the ever-recurring 
cycle of becoming, then without the faculty to undo what we have done and to control at least 
partially the processes we have let loose, we would be the victims of an automatic necessity 
bearing all the marks of the inexorable laws which, according to the natural sciences before 
our time, were supposed to constitute the outstanding characteristic of natural processes. We 
have seen before that to mortal beings this natural fatality, though it swings in itself and may 
be eternal, can only spell doom. If it were true that fatality is the inalienable mark of historical 
processes, then it would indeed be equally true that everything done in history is doomed567. 
 
In this respect, Arendt’s account of natality escapes any sort of determinism and rather 
describes it in terms of unpredictability. Natality is presented in The Human Condition 
as an initiative that interrupts; it is the experience of an opening and of a cutting568. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
566 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Experience of Freedom, translated by Bridget McDonald (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1993) p.20 *as quoted by Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, Control and Freedom: Power and 
Paranoia in the Age of Fiber Optics (Cambridge Massachusetts, London, England: The MIT Press, 
2006) p.292 
567 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 
1998) p.246 
568 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 
1998) p.247 
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This is why freedom is before all nothing rather than something. It is nothing because 
freedom does not establish any principles of truth. Freedom is not metaphysical 
precisely because it has no foundation; it is beyond the foundation. Hence, with Chun, 
we are not confronted with a Kantian model of freedom, precisely because her 
understanding of freedom is amoral. It means that her conception of freedom does not 
bear any pre-conception of good and evil. It is for this reason that freedom is 
dangerous, risky, obscure and unpredictable569.  Put otherwise, freedom is the 
experience of abandonment. This is the reason why it cannot be secured.  
 
In sum, Chun argues that technologies entail narratives of freedom, rather than 
actual practices of freedom. To argue that freedom is the outcome of control only 
worsens the paranoia of the internet as “dark machine of control570”. To her mind, 
freedom always slips from control.  However, it is not that we should purely dissociate 
freedom from control or minimize the reality of one to stress the implacability of the 
other571. Instead, we must acknowledge, for a start, that freedom is the possibility of 
action and decision, not their result.  
 
6.6 KEY POINTS 
 
 
The pessimism of today stems from a paranoiac attitude, Chun claims, for we 
confuse what may or may not happen with what will happen. The possibilities offered 
by new technologies are indeed possibilities, yet we tend to treat these possibilities as 
facts in overthinking the power of technologies. However, unpredictability plays a key 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
569 Chun writes: “Freedom as initiality, as power, makes freedom both good and evil; the first 
manifestation of freedom — the withdrawal of being and the furious unleashing— is wickedness. Evil 
absolutely ruins good— it destroys good before it can occur; it is freedom unleashed against itself. 
Freedom necessitates a decision: a decision for good is a decision for finitude, a decision to hold back 
its possibility for devastation; a decision for evil is the letting go of this furious devastation.” 
Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, Control and Freedom: Power and Paranoia in the Age of Fiber Optics 
(Cambridge Massachusetts, London, England: The MIT Press, 2006) p.295 
 
570 Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, Control and Freedom: Power and Paranoia in the Age of Fiber Optics 
(Cambridge Massachusetts, London, England: The MIT Press, 2006) p.2 
571 Chun claims that “rather than simply agreeing with Nancy”, she also aims to outline that “his 
philosophical notion of freedom works by making oppression metaphoric” and is therefore not fully 
adequate.  
Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, Control and Freedom: Power and Paranoia in the Age of Fiber Optics 
(Cambridge Massachusetts, London, England: The MIT Press, 2006) p.30 
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part in technological evolution. It is thus time to come to terms to what she calls a 
“cybernetic dream based on a technology that perpetuates master-and-slave relations, 
that reduces freedom to control, language to programs and commands572”.  
 
In short, the key to liberty shall be found in freedom, not control. One must 
therefore come to terms with the ideal of safety to embrace the unpredictability of risk 
instead, understood that risk is the openness to contingency and mistakes.  Overall, 
Chun’s work invites us to reflect on our relationship with freedom and more 
specifically with our blind faith in control. It occurs to me that her claims regarding 
the paranoia traversing contemporary social circuits possess a Sartrean undertone. Like 
Sartre’s bad faith, she notes that it is our misconception of freedom and our refusal to 
own up to ourselves as responsible beings (even though this refusal does not make us 
less responsible) that is at cause, not the situation that we are embedded with. What 
her work implies and what makes it relevant for this research, is that technology is not 
the fault, but an alibi.  Finally, it is reductive, according to Chun, to view freedom as 
a mere complement of control, insofar as freedom always exceeds control. Freedom is 
beyond control because it is beyond representational circuits. It thus cannot be reduced 













	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
572 Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, Control and Freedom: Power and Paranoia in the Age of Fiber Optics 
(Cambridge Massachusetts, London, England: The MIT Press, 2006) p.297 
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CONCLUSION 




The Aesthecization of Self and the Necessity to be Free 
 
In this thesis, I took Sartre as a point of departure for two reasons. On one hand, 
he is famous for articulating selfhood as a project of existence. This approach entails 
an aesthetic of subjectivation in which one constitutes herself through her actions and 
subsequently redefines selfhood as the pattern of one’s choices and doings. Behind the 
claim ‘existence precedes essence’ lies the idea that we are the architects of our 
existence, of our own self. The second reason is that Sartre locates freedom in the 
spontaneity of consciousness, which, as a reflective unifying activity, enables one to 
posit oneself as subject. For Sartre, freedom is both a fact and a goal to be attained; it 
needs to be recognized, embraced, cultivated and preserved.  
 
In positing the transcendence of the ego, Sartre suggest that there is no inner 
self, only outer selves. Hence, selfhood is a narrative opened to multiple interpretations 
from myself and others. In arguing this, Sartre throws selfhood into the domain of the 
public, for self has no consistency of its own; it is only constructed outwardly. Self is 
also a social tool that situates me among others.  
 
Sartre also tears apart the idea that self-understanding necessitates an activity 
of contemplative introspection. Instead, self-understanding requires, as his conception 
of existential psychoanalysis suggests, a technical exteriorization. The aim is not to 
discover what constitutes the hidden crux of one’s identity, but to clarify the nature of 
the fundamental project of existence that one has already in some sense understood 
and undertaken through the course of one’s actions. In order to achieve this, one must 
have recourse to hermeneutical techniques. I have therefore stressed how writing 
enabled Sartre to fully realise his existential project of becoming an author.  
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As the key figure of existentialism, Sartre argues that what constitutes a 
human’s essence is their lack of essence. This lack deprives human beings of a fixed 
nature and is, in this respect, constitutive of their ontological freedom. Yet this 
freedom is also a burden, for humans are condemned to ek-sist, that is, to live outside 
themselves. This stance constitutes another reason for me choosing Sartre as a starting 
point of reference. Indeed, the ontological lack triggers the need to exteriorize what is 
precisely missing, namely, the ego.  The lack is the quasi-cause of self, the same way 
the lack is the quasi-cause of technics in Stiegler’s work. This is why, according to 
Sartre, the notion of selfhood sounds so seductive for individuals as it crystalizes one’s 
desire for self-coincidence. Self articulates a narrative in which I can fully posit myself 




I have argued that Sartre elaborates, in his half-philosophical half-
autobiographical piece, Words, a hermeneutics of the self that can be, in retrospect, 
read as Foucauldian in many key respects. I have also argued that the late Foucault 
presents continuities with its predecessor when abandoning the structuralist semantics 
to put subjectivity at the center of his concern, without relinquishing his earlier 
assumptions on the true nature of power. Foucault’s input is to claim that power is 
always bio-power in the sense that it is exerted upon living beings. Though embodied 
in institutions, titles or objects, power cannot be simply abstracted; it demands to be 
applied. Bio-power has emerged conjointly with capitalism and the need to produce 
useful bodies. What Foucault demonstrates could be summarized as follows: where 
there is power there is freedom. But also and most importantly; where there is power 
there are subjects, precisely because power can only be enacted upon free individuals. 
On one hand, we are the products of power relations, on the other hand, we produce 
these power relations, which means that we are accountable for the circuits of power 
we are embedded in. For Chun, such an assumption only precipitates the ideological 
conflation of control and freedom that characterizes our age, insofar as it remains 
evident that for Foucault, the very possibility of freedom is enabled by power relations 
and not the reverse. Whereas Sartre’s later philosophy perpetuates a (perhaps 
simplistic) Marxist account of power and freedom, of which Foucault was himself very 
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critical, Sartre’s reluctance to merge power and freedom together as co-expansive 
elements of the social sphere deserves appraisal. Sartre’s defence of freedom as an 
existential necessity, though perceived as naive and overly optimistic, reveals itself to 
be useful to combat the current paranoia of control pinpointed by Chun and into which, 
I contend, Stiegler falls.  
 
Sartre conceives the self primarily, though not exclusively, as an imaginary 
object of consciousness, whereas Foucault stresses that the self is a socio-political 
construct and gives a bigger emphasis on practices of self-formation such as his 
reading of care suggests. Stiegler goes further in his conception of selfhood. Not only 
is self an imaginary object or the product of social forces, it is always preceded by 
technics.  
 
Indeed, whereas Sartre starts with consciousness and Foucault with power 
relations, Stiegler reshuffles the cards and argues that the individuation process is 
always already technical. Stiegler never mentions Sartre as a possible influence, 
despite the work of both being inscribed in the same philosophical lineage. As Sartre 
before, Stiegler draws on Heidegger and Husserl. From Heidegger, both theorists take 
up the idea of incompleteness of Being, which translates as ontological lack; a lack 
around which the issue of responsibility is articulated in terms of zu-sein (to-be). From 
the early Husserl, both argue for the intentionality of consciousness and present the 
latter as transcendental. Yet, they take their distance with the word transcendental, 
hence expressing a desire to move away from the Kantian legacy. Sartre prefers to coin 
consciousness as spontaneous, whereas Stiegler affirms that consciousness emerges 
from the empirical ground-(lessness) of technics, hereby rejecting the possibility of 
pure transcendentality.  
 
 
Foucault argues that it is because power relations are inevitable, that one must 
take care of oneself in one way or another. Drawing on Foucault, Stiegler proposes to 
reactivate techniques of care as an alternative to current forms of power, which are not 
exerted on the living (bios), but on consciousness (psyche). In that sense, biopower has 
evolved into psychopower, claims Stiegler. The same way Foucault declares that we 
are consenting to power relations, Stiegler’s views on technics suggests that we are 
	   228	  
not the mere toys of technologies. Instead, we are complicit in the future these 
technologies are designing for us. On the other hand, we are not the master of this 
process either. This refusal to apprehend technologies through the prism of mastery is 
crucial here, because Stiegler’s work is not turned towards a discursivity of freedom 
and liberation, but autonomy and relation. Like Sartre, Stiegler locates freedom in 
consciousness, yet, one cannot merely conflate Stiegler’s understanding of freedom 
with Sartre’s. For Sartre, the whole point of developing one’s fundamental project of 
existence is to be capable to transcend one’s initial situation; in other words, freedom 
is a matter of breaking bonds.  Conversely, the exercise of freedom implies for 
Foucault and Stiegler the developing of relations; an input that, according to Chun, has 




The first part of the thesis claimed overall that reading Stiegler through Sartre’s and 
Foucault’s lens enables us to gain a better understanding of the true issues at stake 
within the politics of consciousness that Stiegler intends to develop in response to the 
loss of the feeling of existing.  
 
 
1)   Selfhood, as I have said, is a tool that enables Sartre to problematize the 
combined issues of freedom and responsibility. It is because we are free to 
construct ourselves that we are responsible for who we are becoming. We 
exist as free agents, therefore we are accountable for our actions. This 
stance resonates once again with Stiegler for whom the dissolution of 
selfhood is symptomatic of the dissolution of responsibility and hence, of 
our freedom. To reinvigorate responsibility, that is, political freedom, 
necessarily implies the reinvigoration of a sense of self.  
 
 
2)   While Stiegler draws his reading of care from Foucault, he broadens the 
issue of stationery bio-power, geared towards the normalisation of bodies, 
and introduces a new problematic, which is that of psychopower, 
characteristic of the digital age, and geared towards the standardization of 
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flows of consciousness. Foucault made of the body the main site of power 
and therefore, the main interface of care. Conversely, Stiegler suggests that 
it is now consciousness that constitutes the object of political and 
commercial targeting. In this respect, it is primarily (but not exclusively) 




Narratives of Freedom in the Age of New Media:  
 
 
I have suggested that Stiegler’s politics of care is dangerous insofar as it runs 
the risk of destroying what it aims to protect, namely, freedom. Now is the time to 
clarify my statement under the light of the themes covered with Turkle, Galloway and 
Chun. Indeed, I have claimed that Stiegler’s questionable account of care lies in his 
blind faith in the reality of control as the grounding principle of new media. As such, 




To summarise briefly, I compared Stiegler’s approach to Sherry Turkle’s. I put 
the stress on the effect of technology in the ontological and psychological development 
of the human and explained that while Turkle and Stiegler follow different paths, they 
come to broadly the same conclusion: redefining of the technological framework needs 
to be at the center of our political concern. Stiegler’s willingness to develop a new 
political economy in which care would be at the center is not groundless and his use 
of N. Katharine Hayles’ work gives us evidence of the (potentially) disastrous effects 
of new technologies on the formation of attention. But when I moved on to consider 
Galloway’s insights on new media, I intended to show that technology is not just a 
homogenising force aimed at the concretization and the sustaining of negentropy, and 
that there is in technology a furious dimension, the same way that there is an opaque 
dimension that resists transparent communication. Technologies resist meaning, they 
resist the all too rational process of grammatization. I believe that one way to 
deconstruct the paranoid narrative deployed by Stiegler who comes to apprehend 
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technology in terms of either good or bad influencers in the psychic and collective 
development of individuals would be to take into account the elusive character of 
technology in relation to signification. In this sense, technology does not only belong 
to the discursive, that is, to the politics of self-writing, but to something else, 
something more, which Galloway terms ‘ex-communication’ when referring to media 
standing at the limit of traditional hermeneutics. It is certainly a path that should be 
further investigated if one does not wish to see control everywhere. This fear of total 
control and total surveillance is what the last chapter on Chun intended to challenge.  
 
 
Stiegler’s account of psychopower is paranoid, for it assumes from the outset 
the political reality of unfreedom and portrays the current socio-digital environment 
as panoptical. Though Stiegler nuances his thoughts on multiple occasions, especially 
during interviews, his tone grows more and more alarmist throughout the years. 
Psychopower signals not only the decline of culture, but of democracy. To reintroduce 
care constitutes a political emergency. This leads Stiegler to pledge for a return to old 
institutions as careful agents of individuation. Yet, as I have underlined in the third 
chapter, this approach stands in contradiction with Foucault insofar as the latter 
precisely criticized institutions for their lack of care.  Hence, one must not confuse 
disciplinary subjection with careful subjectivation.  Overall, Stiegler considers 
psychopower to be mainly (but not only) a technological problem to which he proposes 
several technological solutions. As I have underlined, Stiegler believes national 
education to be a desirable system of metacare. Indeed, the key element of Stiegler’s 
politics of care is that of the necessity to be educated. How does this translate to the 
age of new media when Stiegler mainly refers to the institutions of the Third French 
republic? One of his suggestions is to teach students computer programming in order 
to liberate them from their status of mere consumers and transform them into 
responsible users capable of understanding the functioning of networks and protocols. 
For Chun, this is a mistake insofar as one cannot reduce the political problem of 
freedom to a mere technological issue. She has explained for example how erasing 
racist contents online does not erase the actual problem of racism, hence showing that 
a technological solution (blocking a website for example) does not solve a political 
issue (insofar as the content will likely to reappear elsewhere in another form). But on 
a larger scale, Stiegler’s account of psychopower blames technologies less than the 
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economic interests they articulate. In the case of new media, Stiegler argues that the 
progressive commercialisation of the internet that started in mid 1990’s contributed 
largely to the expansion of psychopower, earlier initiated by radio and television. As 
such, it is crucial, according to him, to favour open source technologies that foster 
meaningful processes of individuation. Put otherwise, one must develop an economy 
of contribution geared towards the circulation of knowledge. An example of this 
endeavour would be Wikipedia573 to which Stiegler shows sympathy. Put more 
broadly, it is the marketization and privatization of the internet that worries Stiegler574, 
for it facilitates control and surveillance, and more broadly, the exploitation of online 
activities for commercial purposes. Where does Stiegler’s trust in open-source 
originate and does it really ensure freedom?  
 
 
According to Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, this trust in public structures stems from 
the assumption that what is public is open and therefore free. But the correlation 
between the three is not self-evident and is itself the product of historical 
misconceptions regarding new media. Chun thus explains that it is most notably the 
branding of cyberspace as a space for freedom that has affected the development of 
the Internet as a network of control. Our conception of new media has moved from a 
utopian narrative of freedom revolving around the notion of space, to a dystopian 
narrative of control to which network is the key. In other words, we seem to have 
passed from one extreme to another, from one excess to its exact excessive reverse. 
Yet, the two are not antithetical or antinomic. In fact, both ideologies feed one another 
and are equally dangerous for the implementation of democratic freedom, Chun tells 
us. While I have stressed the dangers of ideologies575 of control, I would like in this 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
573 Bernard Stiegler, L’emploi est mort, vive le travail ! Entretien avec Ariel Kyrou (Paris : Mille et une 
nuits, 2015) p.77 
574 Bernard Stiegler, L’emploi est mort, vive le travail ! Entretien avec Ariel Kyrou (Paris : Mille et une 
nuits, 2015) p.40-41 
575 For the sake of this conclusion, I will limit my understanding of ideology as being a false 
representation.  
	   232	  
a)   Freedom as volitional mobility  
 
 
The mystification of the cyberspace as a space of freedom started in the late 
1980’s and early 1990’s and was epitomized by the work of Turkle on The Second Self 
among numerous others. I have said that her work could appear outdated and is yet 
symptomatic of our relationship with computing devices as the mirror of ourselves and 
spaces for infinite self-recreation and boundless exploration. In this respect, the virtual 
becomes a space in which one make the experience of unlimited freedom. The fact 
that, at the time, cyberspace was public and owned by the government, left users with 
greater liberties. The latter was an explorer, a flâneur, wandering in a virtual world 
where anything was possible. This world appeared as an alternative to mainstream 
media such as radio and television, accused of being perverted by economic interests. 
Cyberspace offered a brand-new space, free because apparently neutral and boundless. 
Freed from her body, her social background, her race and her gender, the user could 
indeed pretend to be anyone. This is at least what  Sherry Turkle used to argue, while 
defending cyberspace for its potential therapeutical virtues. Online gaming, she said, 
enabled users to either tame their bad temper or release their frustration. For all these 
reasons, it functions as a utopia, for it is a perfect space of freedom in which the user 
can herself, reinvent herself and play with her image.  
 
According to Chun, Turkle’s optimism obfuscated the reality of cyberspace, 
insofar as it is less driven by actual freedom than by its ideology.  Cyberspace, Chun 
argues, offers a narrative of freedom revolving around notions of mobility and 
accessibility. She thus raises to our attention the fact that many of cyberspace’s 
semantics echo nautical navigation and hence perpetuate, in their own way, the dream 
of the explorer — or the pirate — on his boat ready to discover new lands. Cyberspace, 
she adds, proffers also a narrative of supreme agency through the figures of the 
explorer and/or the user, for its interfaces (and this is still the case today) induce the 
feeling that everything is searchable, findable and orderable on demand and that the 
computing machine only respond to these demands. Unfortunately, this hardly 
corresponds to the reality of cyberspace. First of all, cyberspace cannot offer a space 
for navigation, for the good reason that there is no such thing as virtual space, strictly 
speaking. To believe that one can experience online a parallel world in which one can 
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live a parallel life is a false conception. Lev Manovich argues for example that there 
is no continuous and coherent space in cyberspace, only a collection of discrete 
objects, superimposed and yet unrelated to each other:  
In view of this, commonly expressed arguments that 3D computer graphics send us back to 
Renaissance perspectivalism, and, therefore, from the viewpoint of twentieth-century 
abstraction, should be considered regressive, turn out to be groundless. If we are to apply the 
evolutionary paradigm of Panofsky to the history of virtual computer space, it has not even 
achieved its Renaissance yet. It is still on the level of Ancient Greece, which could not conceive 
of space as a totality576. 
The notion of cyberspace was certainly seductive for the user who was offered the 
possibility to wander endlessly in a world in which he is the master. That too, is 
erroneous. The figure of the empowered and invulnerable user is a myth. It perpetuates 
the fantasy of an unfailing global system subordinated to the will of a knowing and 
responsible subject that is fully in control of her actions. Computers constantly wander 
and produces information without the user’s consent, Chun argues; they crash and 
erase contents by mistake. But this vulnerability was hardly taken into account in the 
narrative of cyberspace which instead was branded as the mass medium of individual 
freedom and empowerment.  
 
 
b)   Between transparency and opacity 
 
 
The mystification of cyberspace as a space of unlimited freedom is directly 
related to its portrayal as a space where anything is possible, hence perpetuating the 
belief that the user fully controls the machine and that the machine only does what the 
user wants. But to assume this is to posit a unilateral correspondence/equivalence 
between the user and the computer. In other words, it is to suggest that computing 
machines are the mirror of the human and that their main function is to reflect back on 
the user’s actions, which are themselves the reflection of the user’s desires. This leads 
us back to Turkle and her portraying of computers in terms of the second self. I have 
stressed that Turkle, like Stiegler, ties technologies to the subjective experience, either 
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as its passive medium of expression or its necessary condition and horizon. In this 
respect, I explained that both understand computing machines/technologies through 
their mirroring functions, even though they metaphorized the mirror in different terms. 
 
 Stiegler draws on Lacan and Leroi-Gourhan’s instrumental maieutics and 
states that technics constitutes subjective life. Turkle’s account of the mirror proposes, 
on the other hand, to revisit the figure of Narcissus and utopian spaces. She presents 
the relation between humans and machines essentially as mimetic. The point of 
Turkle’s investigations is to show how computers affect the psychological 
development of individuals, whereas Stiegler is more concerned about the impact of 
technologies on an ontological level. Yet their approach, I believe, does not allow 
technologies — and in this case, cyberspace or internet — to be anything more than 
their contents. In any case, it does not allow the user of these technologies to be 
anything else than the contents she browses. In short, I contend that the perversity of 
their approach is to limit both the human to technologies and technologies to the 
human. Turkle portrays the user as a knowing, rational, self-aware and responsible 
subject whose actions in front of a screen are the reflection of the user’s identity and 
which hence assumes a correspondence between the two.  
 
Stiegler, for his part, often reduces the user to a vulnerable recipient of 
technological activity. This is especially the case in his examining of one of Canal J’s 
advertising campaigns to which he concludes, quite vigorously, that such advertising 
diverts primary identification and captures the attention of young minds577. Put more 
bluntly, the exposure to debilitating contents debilitates individuals. In this respect, 
Stiegler contends that there is an equivalence between acting and desiring, insofar as 
he perceives regressive identification to be the fetishization of brands and 
commodities. This would mean, in other words, that me wearing a Disney T-shirt 
necessarily translates as me identifying with the corporation. But this is to be oblivious 
to the possible gratuity, meaninglessness and absurdity of one’s gesture.  
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Chun tackles the issue with the example of cyber pornography to criticize this 
confusion between content, medium and the nature of human mind. According to her, 
we forget that “there is an important gap between download and identity, between 
looking and acting578”. As such, “the thrill of downloading so-called deviant 
pornography stems from both the content and the very act of searching and 
downloading ‘blasphemous knowledge’”579. It may not mean anything more than that. 
Put otherwise, the issue is not to interrogate if what I do corresponds to or makes me 
who I am or if what I see, click on, download, wear, or possess should be conflated 
with my personality. Instead, it is to wonder if everything I do corresponds to or makes 
me who I am and if everything I see, click on, download, wear, or possess should be 
conflated with my personality. Understanding technology either as the psychological 
representation or the ontological extension of the human condemns technology to be 
in a relation of correspondence or equivalence with the human. It is to restrict one’s 
understanding of technology as mere materialization of one’s desires, that are either 
good or bad, productive or destructive, healthy or poisonous, wise or stupid, acceptable 
or unacceptable, normal or deviant. The mistake is to identify the message with the 
medium and to tie technology with the necessity of meaning; it is also to assume that 
their effect is dependent on their contents, that is, on the logos they deploy, articulate 
or promote. The chapter on Galloway and his work on Excommunication intended to 
deconstruct, or at least interrogate, Stiegler’s McLuhan-esque conflation of the 
medium with the message in order to stress that technologies not only distort the 
message, but also challenge the very ideal of “communication that proceeds in an 
orderly fashion, with little or no misunderstanding, with no harassment or 
irrationality”580. In short, technologies are deceptive, they fail and fail us on a regular 
basis. Besides, they are not mere communication tools destined to reveal or produce 
fundamental truths about ourselves. Instead, they play with these truths. According to 
Chun, one should accept this opacity and indeterminacy in order to better accept the 
vulnerability of freedom, which always entail risks, errors and misunderstanding.  
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c) Open-source and Privatization 
 
 
The commercialization of what became the Internet at the end of 1990’s by 
telecommunication corporations impacted seriously upon the aura of the Internet as a 
utopian space of freedom by 1) implementing security procedures that led to the 
assumption that greater freedom implies greater safety as its necessary condition, and 
2) by privatizing the virtual field.   According to Chun, the idealization of cyberspace 
as a boundless space of freedom, in contrast with the progressive depreciation of the 
internet 581 — a network technology which is controlled by economic interests —has 
led to the paranoid assumption that one is less free in the current media due to the 
intrusive presence of corporations and online advertising. She however tells us that, 
while cyberspace may have been more free in the sense that it was not controlled, 
hence less secured, its use was limited to a small number of people, themselves often 
marginalized as nerds. In that sense, cyberspace was a space of unlimited freedom for 
a limited number of people. Conversely, we forget that the privatization of the internet 
has engendered its democratization, though it is also true that it has potentially 
engendered more control. The question is: should we defend this model of freedom 
which hardly is democratic?  For Chun, the issue deserves our full attention as the 
idealization of cyberspace as a space of freedom still subsists nowadays and lies on 
false representations.  
 
 
In sum, the cyberspace of the 1990’s was perhaps public, but reserved to 
experts, while contemporary networks are private, but accessible to everyone. This 
contention between public and private as the illustration of the more profound 
antagonism between freedom and control is, according to Chun, not the right way to 
approach the political significance of new media; public does not equal freedom and 
private ownership does not necessarily involve actual control. Hence, to critique the 
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internet as a whole for being under the grip of capitalism, as Stiegler does, only 
reinforces the paranoiac account of the internet as a gigantic network of control, while 
the promoting of open-source technologies, though interesting, is not the ultimate 
guarantee for democratic freedom and may in fact, reinforce the reality of control. In 
this respect, it is worth examining Lessig’s criticisms in Code: And Other Laws of 
Cyberspace. Lessig argues that the transformation of the internet into a giant shopping 
mall and the private ownership of codes are engendering an environment of perfect 
control. The argument is simple: the privatization of codes threatens democracy for if 
they are owned they are controlled. Hence, the only way to ensure democracy is to free 
internet from ownership and favour open-source. According to Chun, this open-source 
dynamic entails at its core a dangerous politics of shared transparency insofar as a code 
that is not owned means that it belongs to a public license. And if it is public, tells us 
Chun, it also means that “others are free to use this code” and “they too must make 
their source code available582”. This reciprocal availability of information is at the core 
of the open-source model. Chun argues in this respect that the open-source ideology 
does not erase control, but displaces it, for freedom only flourishes through a system 
of visibility in which everyone is seen by everyone, hence reproducing a panoptical 
structure of control one tried initially to avoid. She thus states: 
 
With Jeremy Bentham-esque optimism, Lessig assumes that readability ensures democracy 
(those who can read the code will read it and a good consensus will emerge) and that open 
means public, open means common. Also like Bentham, Lessig makes self-conscious control 
— the internalization of control — the goal (although unlike Bentham, self-conscious control 
leads to greater freedom)583. 
 
 
The same criticism, I believe, could be applied to Stiegler’s computational politics 
which, as I have mentionned, also favour open-source structures of knowledge, public 
contributions and share of information.  
 
In short, the historical idealization of freedom fostered the current paranoia of 
control in which one is trapped into a panoptical account of the social, that is, subjected 
to an electronic/digital gaze that sees and records everything. It is not enough to seek 
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freedom, one must deconstruct control in order to break the poisonous dynamic 
between the two. In this respect, Galloway proposed an interesting perspective in 
arguing that freedom and control are not opposites but two sides of the same coin. He 
thus argues that it is control that produces freedom so that the very possibility of 
technological innovation, cherished by Stiegler for example, depends and is allowed 
by norms and procedures. Galloway does not present innovation as an alternative to 
control; it is its outcome. This the reason why one should not work against protocol 
but work through it. In this respect, Galloway repeats the Foucauldian gesture in 
reactivating a discourse of resistance, whereas Stiegler believes in reinvention. But 
arguing for the co-dependence and co-expansivity of control and freedom is not 
enough to deconstruct the paranoia of control, even though it desacralizes the ideal of 
pure or unlimited freedom. If it is not enough, I contend, it is because it still confines 
us in a paranoid mind-set in which control is everywhere. To reduce freedom into a 
mere effect of procedures of control is to portray a cynical reality where freedom is an 
illusion, whereas control is a reality. As I have argued in the last chapter, control is far 
from being a certainty; it is simply a possibility. The rumours of the internet being a 
giant system of control and surveillance are not groundless, though. It would be wrong 
to affirm that cookies are not tracking online activities for example. Yet, one forgets 
that this automated form of control is not volitional. The presence of systems of control 
does not necessarily imply the actuality of a culture of control. As Chun explains, the 
internet is often viewed as big archival monster, but it stores as much information as 
it destroys data. It is also too vast to enable everyone to be seen at the same time. 
Though its structure belongs to the visible, one is only seen if someone is looking. 
Chun argues that the possibility of someone getting access to someone else’s files is 
constitutive of this medium, but it is not a fact. This conflation between the two is 
symptomatic of the paranoia of control she intends to describe and it is this paranoia 
that is dangerous for it takes the risk of accomplishing the reverse it aimed to do; 
entrapping us in a system of control instead of freeing us.  
 
Those aware of and concerned with tracking treat possibility as fact, and assume that all their 
electronic data transfers are recorded and analyzed—an assumption that flies in the face of 
their everyday experience with crashing computers, undelivered e-mail messages, and 
inaccessible Web sites. They therefore encrypt their messages, guaranteeing that their 
messages will be recorded584. 
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This tells us two things. First of all, it tells us that it is the paranoia of control and not 
the actuality of control that produces more control. Second, it shows us that treating 
control as a technological problem instead as a pathological issue regarding one’s own 
relation to power, is insufficient and deserves a serious and profound engagement with 
one’s political conception of freedom. I believe that Stiegler’s project is questionable 
for these precise reasons.  His eagerness to defend the old institutions of the Third 
Republic and his conflating of the Ancient ethics of care with its disciplinary 
counterpart appears to me philosophically suspicious as I hardly see how a disciplinary 
model of control can succeed in freeing us from control. One should not assume the 
certainty of control, but its uncertainty, Chun argues. And it is on that ground that 
Galloway’s understanding of the network as a delicate dance of control and freedom 
is not satisfying. It is crucial, she says, to understand new media from the perspective 
of their vulnerabilities, their failures and repeated mistakes. On this last issue, 
Galloway and Chun seem to agree. Indeed, the latter salutes Galloway for turning “to 
tactical media as an effective means of exploiting the flaws in protological and 
proprietary command and control”585. In this respect, new media should not merely be 
understood as a rational and infallible system copying or fulfilling a certain ideal of 
the human mind. Instead, they should be understood in virtue of their indeterminacy 
and opacity.  
 
Key points:  
 
The aim of this work was to critically examine the relevance of Stiegler’s 
politics of care, as formulated, in particular, in his controversial piece Taking of Care 
and the Generations. The first part of the thesis intended to unpack Stiegler’s argument 
through its implicit resonance with the Sartrean discourse and its explicit relation with 
Foucault. The second part challenged Stiegler’s narrative of psychopower, the effects 
of which I consider to be overestimated by their author. It is interesting to note in this 
respect that “despite his critique of Plato’s attitude toward technics, he frequently 
repeats the Phaedrus’s line about writing as the ‘production of forgetfulness’ (274a), 
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reworking it into a critique of the anaesthetising gadgetry of the twenty-first century. 
Stiegler does indeed share his concerns over the dangers of displacing live thought into 
the dead matter of technics (writing)”586, fearing through the popularization of 
smartphones the eroding of human knowledge. My intention was to counterbalance 
his pessimism regarding digital culture, without discarding the virtues of his approach 
in which this critique of new media is only one side of the story. Stiegler is still 
promoting creativity and invention. It would be wrong to simply accuse him of wishing 
to revive old institutions.  Stiegler is concerned about creating healthier forms of 
individuation; a project which can only be achieved through technics.  
 
Following Stiegler on this, my thesis defends the political necessity of 
developing an ethics of care in the digital age. Like him, I argue that the individual’s 
participation in cultural becoming — through the active use of technics — should be 
encouraged if one aims to combat the loss of the feeling of existing. However, I claim 
that Stiegler’s argument is flawed with paranoia and a reactionary attitude towards 
new technologies that runs the risk of perpetuating misconceptions regarding power 
and freedom in general.  
 
In my point of view, Sartre’s contributions enable us to understand the political 
significance of consciousness insofar as it is viewed as the main site of freedom and is 
essential to the process of individuation.  As suggested in the introduction, selfhood is 
a feeling rather than a state of being; it thus depends on consciousness and the 
cultivating of self-awareness. Foucault, on the other hand, clarifies freedom as a key 
narrative to the expansion of power. But, as I have explained, this may have 
precipitated us to the paranoia of control I note in Stiegler’s account of technologies 
of psychopower. It is on these grounds that I consider it crucial to return to Sartre’s 
existentialist model of freedom in which humans are spontaneously free and therefore 
always capable of reinventing themselves. Moreover, it is essential to view freedom 
as the sole condition of its foundation587, rather than as the cynical outcome of power 
relations, for it is the only way, I believe, one can hope to instill in the individual a 
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sense of responsibility instead of hopelessness. This quest for responsibility is 
precisely what Stiegler’s politics of care, as discussed in Taking of Youth and the 
Generations, is getting at. Yet, in my viewpoint, his argument would gain in depth and 
intelligibility by directly engaging with Sartre and not simply with Foucault. This is 
this gap that my thesis intended to initially cover.  
 
 
While I do not take issue with Stiegler’s account of the existential crisis we are 
embedded within, I express clear reserves regarding his approach of new media which 
he essentially views through the lens of psychopower. For Stiegler, the ontological 
groundlessness of the human qua technical being is a mixed blessing, for it is both the 
condition of our freedom and the very reason of our vulnerability towards the 
technological environment. It is this very default of being, according to Stiegler, that 
enables us to act out in order to reinvent our future. Yet, if such ontological 
groundlessness resonates with the indeterminacy of our becoming, one may be 
perplexed why systems of control fail to truly capture us and why our relationship with 
technologies is anything but transparent or self-evident. Stiegler, unfortunately, does 
not explore this possibility.  
 
Stiegler’s account, though theoretically enlightening, I argue, suffers from a 
lack of empirical engagement with the field he intends to criticize. It is true that in 
Stiegler’s work, technics is a rather broad and abstract concept that equally refers to 
artefacts, craftsmanship, modern technology electronics and contemporary computing 
devices. One could argue that it is not Stiegler’s intention to be caught in empirical 
considerations for he does not wish to reduce technics to a set of specific objects and 
instruments. After all, Stiegler is a philosopher of technology, not a media 
archeologist. His use of Bertrand Gilles and Gilbert Simondon, both historians of 
technology, and the anthropologist André Leroi-Gourhan, is in fact quite eloquent; 
technics is an empirico-transcendental individuating process which traverses (but is 
not limited to) human life.  In other words, technics designates a character, a tendency, 
an overall dynamic, more than an actual object. And this is what allow Stiegler to be 
elusive. But this lack of concrete engagement with new media is not without 
consequences, for it condemns Stiegler’s insight of new media culture to be either 
outdated, partially misinformed, or perhaps erroneous. It is in these commun 
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misconceptions, these approximations, I suggest, that his paranoid account of digital 
power has its roots.  One way to bypass this difficulty would be to actively link 
Stiegler’s project within the discipline of new media in order to reflect more 
adequately to our actual relationship with technologies.  This is what I intended to do 
through a discussion with Turkle, Galloway and Chun. To be fair, Stiegler is not 
foreign to the field, as can attest his work on Digital Studies: organologies des savoirs 
et technologies de la connaissance to which Galloway himself contributed. What’s 
more, his research on the deficit of attention in relation to neuroscience588 
demonstrates an interest towards empirical studies. I only suggest that such direction 
should be pushed further in order to fully meet its promise, instead of being a mere 
pretext to draw general conclusions about new media culture and its supposedly 
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